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Notes and References
I have adopted the following system of annotation. Points 
which do not belong in the body of the text but should be 
read along with it as qualifications or expansions I have 
set as footnotes at the bottom of the page. References to 
other works and other parts of this one which need not be 
absorbed along with the text are available if needed in the 
form of notes at the end of chapters. The first form I 
have marked with the single letter N (since normally no 
more than one per page occurs) and the latter in the normal 
way with numbers.
In addition there are a number of extended footnotes on 
points raised in the modern literature and in this text 
which I did not wish to leave undiscussed but which do not 
form part of the direct course of the argument. These I 
have set as Appendices at the end of the thesis, and I have 
referred to them at the appropriate point in the text and 
cross-referred to their textual relation in their titles.
ABSTRACT
Statements are made both in philosophy and in other 
disciplines about whether or not an item exists. Attention 
is normally focused on the answer, and therefore on the 
item posited, rather that on what is meant by the 
statement. Possibly as a result of this there seems to 
have developed a range of possible meanings to the 
assertion, denial or question of existence, and this in
turn has given rise to various philosophical problems. An
attempt is made here to simplify the situation. It is
proposed that all existence statements carry the same 
import, and that if this were understood both confusions 
and disagreements would disappear. The investigation to 
this end proceeds (in Section I) by identifying the 
problems in the sphere of existence statements by means of 
historical examples, which in turn will show that in spite 
of attempted solutions residual problems remain. With 
these in mind a clarification of the subject is undertaken 
by considering (in Section II) a range of existence 
statements and the methods used for disputing and 
determining them. The conclusion reached is that the 
meaning of existence statements always depends both on
convention or agreement on the one hand. and on experience 
or observation on the other, as opposed to being 
exclusively related to either: that both are necessary
factors In the Identification of their meaning while 
neither is sufficient. The third Section then clarifies 
these terms, and finally the fourth states and tests the 
theory.
Introduction
ASSERTION AND ONTOLOGY
This thesis is concerned with what is meant when somebody 
says that such—and—such exists. The intention is to arrive 
at a simple description which will apply to all such cases, 
rather than a set of descriptions with different
applications. That is what is meant by 'unified theory’ in 
the title. The motive for this, as will become apparent,
is that I think the present and historical disunity on the
subject has led to a great deal of unnecessary
disagreement. Those who appear to be in conflict might be 
reconciled if it can be shown that they are saying the same 
thing in different ways. Perhaps this may best be done by 
revealing the illusoriness of the difference and displaying 
the essential nature of the sameness.
It is obvious that part of the meaning of existence 
statements may relate to the essence or being of the thing 
in question, a field dealt with by ontology, the theory of 
being. I mention this because I wish to make a distinction 
between ontology and the subject of this thesis. Of course 
one of the things which someone might mean when asserting 
that something exists is that it possesses in itself an 
independent state of being — indeed to the layman it would 
seem likely that this would be intended.
In order that I should be able to make the distinction, 
however, it is sufficient that it were found to be the case 
that in some instances, or even only in one, no such 
implication is involved. If I may then make the 
distinction validly I can say that it is oossible that no 
implication as to independent being is ever made by an 
assertion of existence. I am not suggesting that any of 
these things are so, merely that they would be possible.
These are of course matters which will concern us further.
Philosophers are not always clear and consistent, 
unfortunately, in their use of the term ontology, and this 
has occasionally hampered understanding in an already 
rather subtle area of thought, (1). I mean by ontology the 
study or theory of being, and not a language or belief 
system to do with what exists. (N). If I were to go 
further and consider what is meant here by 'being' or 
'existence' in these cases (and I take the two words for 
present purposes to be synonymous) it would be begging the 
question we are about to investigate.
N: Some philosophers (2) speak of 'an' ontology, rather as
one might speak of 'a theology'. This no doubt arises from 
its secondary use in logic to mean the set of entities 
which a theory requires. I prefer to avoid the possibility 
of confusion (1) and use it only in its general sense.
What concerns us here is what is meant when existence is 
asserted. That (the meaning of existence statements) is 
not. is this terminology. ontology. It may be. as I have 
said. that a part of the meaning could involve a theory as 
to the nature of the thing in a realm distinct from both 
the asserter and the assertion. Thinking about such a 
realm is onto1oav.
Although, as I have said, this thesis is not strictly 
operating in the field of ontology - a position which might 
be re-described by saying it is concerned with existence- 
statements rather than existence - I do not find it the 
least bit problematic to accept ontology, in this work, as 
a near-neighbour. It is a branch of study which has 
recently been somewhat out of fashion. Along with other 
-isms and -ologies it has seemed suspect because of its 
metaphysical connections. (3). Empiricism was not of 
course a discovery of the Vienna school. nor did its hold 
over philosophy decline with the rejection of some of that 
school's doctrines. Ayer (loc.cit.) was aware that he was 
working in the same field as Kant.
Having "established our unavoidable ignorance of things in 
themselves, and limited all that we can know to mere 
phenomena" (4) where do we find room for ontology? On the 
face of it it is hard to see what could be more empirical 
than what there is. From what other source could we get 
our experiences? If from some form of unreality, then 
empiricism founders. (N). However since it will be
necessary to bear in mind throughout this work the
distinction I have just made, it would not be appropriate
to launch a reasoned defence of ontology here, since it is 
not the business in hand. It will in fact often be
necessary to resist involvement in questions of whether a 
certain item does or does not exist, in the search for what 
is to be understood by asserting its existence.
N: Peter Winch makes a relevant distinction between
experimental and theoretical approaches to the 
investigation of reality. "Whereas the scientist 
investigates the nature, causes and effects of particular 
real things and processes, the philosopher is concerned 
with the nature of reality as such and in general." To 
conflate the two. Winch points out, is to commit the error 
of failing to observe an ambiguity in the phrase 'the 
investigation of the nature of reality'. The question 
'What is real?' "is not an empirical question at all, but a 
conceptual one." (5).
Thus when Plato says that what is real is what has the 
power to cause effects (6) he is involved in ontology: when 
this work investigates what that must mean. if true, it is 
not. but only because it does not concern us whether or not 
it is true. In the same spirit we cannot undertake a 
discussion of whether or not existence is a real predicate 
(7). It will be interesting to understand, on the other 
hand. why some philosophers talk as if they assume that it 
is. others as if it is clear that it is not. and why still 
others evidently regard the matter as quite irrelevant.
It is impossible. as this Introduction has already shown, 
to write philosophy outside a historical context*. We shall 
see philosophers taking some trouble to remain bona fide 
empiricists while fully aware of the inadequacies of some 
of empiricism's manifestations. (8). It may be. I feel, 
that enough action and re-action has by now taken place for 
one to be able to steer a course through calm water between 
the Scylla of metaphysics and the Charybdis of 
'verificationism'. There have been attempts in the past to 
deal with the.subject of existence in non-ontological ways. 
(9). This work is not an attempt to do the same. partly 
because I do not feel, as they evidently did. .that to 
accept a background of ontology is to embrace metaphysics. 
In fact a demonstration of why these and other attempts 
ultimately fail to satisfy the requirements of the subject 
is part of the task before us.
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I SOME HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS AND
ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
Introduction
This Section provides illustrations of ways the range of 
subject matter surrounding questions of existence has 
been dealt with in the past as a step towards the attempt 
to deal with the problems thus illustrated. It does not 
intend to undertake an exhaustive review of the history of
the topic but rather to indicate by examples the scope of
the matter being dealt with and to isolate the residual
problems which remain to be dealt with.
Not surprisingly we shall start this process with a 
consideration of the ideas of the Greeks, and in particular 
Plato's 'Theaetetus' and its historical background. Since 
Plato lays down a rule for distinguishing between what 
exists and what does not. it is important to understand 
what exactly his rule implies. Wliether or not this is what 
he intended. it emerges that it has firm relational 
implications. It more or less rules out anything which 
might be termed 'absolute existence’ - that is. . the idea 
that an item can exist independently, without reference to 
its relation to anything else. and without the requirement 
of observation.
The Section then proceeds to follow up this train of 
thought by considering a branch of philosophy concerned 
with this particular question of 'absolute' existence: 
namely the philosophy of Berkeley. Consideration of 
Berkeley's philosophy therefore forms the second part of 
this Section, since its relevance in this discussion is to 
these thoughts on Plato's dictum.
As a further example of the historical background to the 
subject and the type of residual problems remaining, some 
specific points arising from Anselm's 'ontological' proof 
of the existence of God are dealt with next.
There then follows consideration of two branches of 
philosophy which may claim to have disposed of any problems 
related to existence statements, namely Bertrand Russell's 
mechanism for transformation of proper-name statements into 
statements containing description; and the linguistic 
concerns of a modern branch of philosophy mainly 
represented by Quine and Carnap.
The Section as a whole is concerned with scene-setting - 
providing a basis on which the subsequent Sections may work 
towards conclusions on the subject of existence statements.
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I.1. PLATO'S Rule
It is often debated in the area of philosophy to do with 
existence theories whether or not we can speak of the non­
existent. It might be said, for instance, that if 
existence can be asserted of a subject, then so can its 
contrary. The question of whether or not we can 
speak of the non-existent has two aspects. 1. Can we, in 
the first place, conceive of it; if not we cannot speak of 
it, and statements about the non-existent must be meaning­
less. 2. On the other hand, in thinking or speaking of it 
are we not bringing something into existence, for instance 
by accidentally attributing qualities to what we say is 
non-existent. These related points are dealt with at 
length by Plato, and his investigation of this question is 
where we shall now start.
In The Theaetetus Plato left open the possibility that the 
schools of thought which later became known as 
'phenomenalism' and 'idealism* can co-exist: that is, that
reality consists of sensed data and also of thought. 
"... the mind contemplates some things through its own 
instrumentality, others through the bodily faculties." (1) 
The terminology of The Theaetetus does not help, and when 
he treats of existence (as opposed to knowledge) Plato dips 
his toe into deep Aegean water:
11
SOCRATES: Under which head. then, do you place
existence? For that is. above all, a thing that 
belongs to everything (2)
We shall find the subject clarified in The Sophist. the 
main area of our concern in this chapter, and it is 
unnecessary to delay matters at present by investigation of 
the translation. But the idea of existence being a thing 
and belonging to things raises more problems than it 
solves. By this route Plato approaches the idealist 
conclusion he has as his aim: " ... knowledge does not
reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them. 
It is there, seemingly, and not in the impressions, that it 
is possible to grasp existence and truth." (3) The tagging 
of existence to thought, however loosely. raises the 
problem of whether what is thought automatically exists, 
and (its corollary?) whether what does not exist cannot be 
thought.
In 188C of The Theaetetus Plato has Socrates make the 
move from 'Knowing or not knowing’ to 'Being or not being'. 
If a man sees or hears or touches something, then that 
which he sees etc. must be 'a thing that is'. (Once again 
we will leave problems of translation until we come to the 
main burden of the argument in The Sophist.) It follows 
(Socrates/Plato claims) that ‘if he thinks, he thinks 
something', and 'when he thinks something, he thinks a 
thing that is.' Thus it is impossible to think what is 
not. 'either about anything that is, or absolutely.' (4).
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Noting the limitations of The Theaetetus would only delay
our cause. It is. however, from this rather unsatisfactory 
position that The Sophist begins. Let us now summarise the 
argument set out in Sophist 236-8 (5).
Consideration of cases intermediate between lying and 
truth. such as the making of images and likenesses. leads 
‘The Stranger' to return to the problem of what one does 
when one states or thinks something that is not. He refers 
to "the implication that 'what is not' has being; for in no 
other way could a falsehood come to have being" - i.e. 
because when it is stated it is not nothing that is stated. 
Parmenides is quoted as warning against this course, and we 
shall return to this origin of the argument, since much of 
The Sophist is a continuation of Parmenides' case. 
Parmenides had counselled not even thinking on these lines, 
but Plato now proceeds to do just that.
We do, 'The Stranger' claims, speak of ( (J)0eyye(j0ai ) 
the non-existent ( to puqfocjjuoq 6v ) . Yet this term has no 
application (237C). It begins to seem as if the person 
speaking of that which does not exist is uttering 
meaningless sounds. (237E). Part of this argument rests 
on the sense of the Greek, in which saying nothing and 
talking nonsense are expressed by the same phrase, 
oûdki/ Xéyeiy ' . (6) 'The Stranger' proceeds to
investigate in more detail how it is that it is apparently 
impossible even to speak of something which is not (either 
in the sense of being false or being non-existent).
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If you do try to speak of the non-existent (he says) you 
involve yourself at once in a contradiction. You 
implicitly assert, for instance, that it is either singular 
or plural. It is thus 'alogon', beyond expression. (There 
are, of course, hidden dangers in saying even this, and we 
shall mention them later). One cannot help being reminded
of Wittgenstein's conclusion; "Whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must be silent."
Plato quoted Parmenides explicitly, and in order to
understand what he is up to in The Sophist we shall have to 
investigate the course of Parmenides’ thinking on this 
point. Unfortunately the fragments are extremely cryptic, 
and must have posed problems of interpretation to his 
contemporaries which are magnified for the modern
translator. (7).
In fragment 2, starting at line 3, he distinguishes the 
ground of what necessarily is, from that of what is not. 
When he speaks of 'the one way' ( f) p,ey ottcoç ) he
presumably means line of thought or of discourse. The one
way (in this sense) which treats of what is, is the path of 
truth. 'The other, that it is—not and needs must not—be,
that I tell thee is a path altogether unthinkable.' (8)
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ihe word translated, here as 'altogether unthinkable' is 
panapeutnea '. the prerix 'pan' giving the qualifying
'altogether': ‘apeuthes - eos' literally such as cannot be
enquired into: it may perhaps be rendered 'unheard of', and 
30 give us an alternative translation as 'altogether
inconceivable'. the sense carried being both that this
direction of thought is improbable to the extent of
absurdity, and that it is also beyond comprehension.
The reason Parmenides makes this claim follows in the next
two lines, at which Fragment 2 becomes Fragment 3. You
cannot know that which is-not. "(that is impossible) nor 
utter it; for the same thing can be thought as can be." 
Literally. the translators point out. 'the same thing 
exists for thinking and for being'; Parmenides is using che
old dative sense of the infinitive;
TO yocp auTO v o g l v  gc t t l v t g  Kai Gtvai
Exactly what this means remains debatable. On the face of 
it. and in its context. it seems that Parmenides is 
claiming that if something can be thought of it can also 
exist. This interpretation is reinforced by Fragment 6.
"That which can be spoken and thought needs must be." 
(Literally: 'exists for being'. The translation 'needs
must' is perhaps too strong.)
"for it is possible for it. but not for nothing. to be ; 
that is what I bid thee ponder." (9)
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There then follows in Fragment 7 the passage quoted by
Plato; "For never shall this be proved, that things that 
are not are; but do thou hold back thy thought from this 
way of enquiry." (10) Line 16 of Fragment 8 seems to offer 
a summary of the situation; Tiv r\ oùk éôTiv" ; 'either
a thing is or it is not".
Lines 17 and 18 then provide the fullest statement
available in ^he Fragments of the position Parmenides
appears to want to hold;
KGKpuTau 6’ our, ocrTrep 
TTjv p.€V eocv àv6r|Toy àv6yup.oy (où yàp 
GCTTLV oâôç), TT]y 6 ’ üCTTG iréXGLy Kttl ET^Tugor etyai. 
Kirk and Raven translate 'anoeton anonvmon' as 'unthinkable 
and nameless'. Cornford translates: 'unthinkable,
unnameable' (11). The Kirk and Raven translation of these 
lines reads; 'But it has surely been decided. as it must 
be, to leave alone the one way as unthinkable and nameless 
(for it IS no true way), and that the other is real and 
true . '
There is some option open with the important word 
'anoeton', since other derivatives from the same root 
('noetos'. 'of the mind') come to indicate intention.
'Noema', for instance, means either 'thought' or 'purpose'. 
It must be said that Parmenides does elsewhere use 'noema' 
to mean 'thought' (as a noun) (Fragment 8, line 34) since 
it follows in the same line the verb 'noein' in the phrase 
'esti noein' . 'is for thinking'.
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that carried by its full range of usage, 'Unprofitable' to' 
'useless' w o u 1 d n o t. c a r r y the s arne i nip 1 ication s a s 
'unthinkable'.
Similarly we must at least ponder the translation of 
'anonymos' and note the difference between the Kirk and 
Raven and the Cornford versions. If taken in the sense of 
not having a name. rather that not having the capacity to 
be named. 'anonymos' implies. and therefore perhaps 
signifies. obscurity. elusiveness. or difficulty of 
conception. One might consider (for the full phrase) 
'aimless and vague' or 'useless. confused', as conveying 
this sort of indeterminacy and unnamedness. Something 
without a name is. in one sense, simply ill-defined.
"It has surely been decided. as it must be. to leave alone 
tne one way as unprofitable and conceptually 
problematic ..."
This would be a very different sort of message for us to 
receive from Parmenides via Plato. While by no means 
proposing this reading, we may see that (as shortly with 
Plato) the alternative translations happily reveal a spread 
of possible implications which if intended broaden the 
impact of the words. and if accidental nevertheless 
accidentally increase the scope.of our thinking un the 
matter.
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Parmenides continues with some important amplifications (if 
that is the word for these dense nuggets of thought) in 
Fragment 8, which we take up at line 34. Here it appears 
that there is a close and necessary correlation between 
being and being thought of:
T O C U T O V  d  ’ eCJTL V O £ l V  T  E K OC L O U V E K E l /  ECJTL V 0x\\LOi.
Literally: the same is for thinking and also on account of
the thought it is.
We may paraphrase: the only thing that exists for thinking
IS the thought that it is. The plain fact is that to 
translate that fragment, and indeed much of Parmenides, 
with any confidence, you have to know already in advance 
what you think it means. Kirk and Raven offer; "What can 
be thought is only the thought that it is". (12)
They continue (line 35); "For you will not find thought 
without what is, in relation to which it is uttered; for 
there is not, nor shall be, anything else besides what 
i s . P a r m e n i d e s '  argument is avowedly circular, and we 
have come back to the point at which we started at Fragment 
2; only what is can be thought about. But in the meantime 
he has apparently added the idea that only what is thought 
about is.
That this is all dangerous talk, or avoidance of talk, will 
become clear if we now return to Plato. Plato notes how 
the non-existent has the power to involve in immediate 
self-contradiction even someone denying its existence.
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(Sophist 238D). He might have added that the same fate 
befalls someone who asserts that the non-existent is not. au 
be thought or spoken of. For what is it that Parmenides is 
saying. when he says we must not talk about the non­
existent? And what is Wittgenstein referring to when he 
advises silence on the subject of that whereof we cannot 
speak? What do these philosophers say when you ask them 
what they mean?
ETRANGER; And what is it. Dr. Wittgenstein. of 
which you cannot speak?
Does he remain silent, lips pursed?
STRANGER; And what way is this, my dear Parmenides, 
which you cannot name. of which you specify that it
is such that we should not think or speak of it?
Tell me how you come to know so much about it.
Does he turn on his heel and walk silently out of the
Agora?
Plato however does not hesitate to break Parmenides' rule 
in full. since in 256D he identifies a borderland where 
existence, what exists ('.to on') can overlap with what is 
not ('^  me on').
It IS even possible (257B) to make true statements to the 
effect that what is not. 'is'. But here of course he is 
conflating negative statements. denials. with statements 
about the non-existent. We need not go into this, however.
19
Let us simply note that the terminology allows ambiguity: 
'to on' can mean 'existence'. 'the existent', and also can
refer to something which is, in the sense (for instance) of 
something which is white. This sense cannot be rendered in 
English, and the nearest we can perhaps get to conveying 
Plato’s range of meaning here is by translating '^  on' as 
'a reality', 'onta' as 'realities', as in the sense of 
things which we must accept as being there ('the SDP/the 
nuclear deterrent/etc ..., is a reality'). It is important 
to note that Plato has another word, 'pragma', for an
object-like thing : and that perceptions in the mind would
be expressed by him by the word 'eidos'.
With this groundwork behind us, we are now in a position to 
approach Plato's major point. Let us proceed to summarise 
the argument given in The Sophist. 243 onwards.
The early philosophers of the physical school had held that 
what was real was a set of principles such as Hot and Cold, 
Without arguing whether this is so, Plato imagines asking 
them whether they mean that there are three real things.
Hot, Cold and reality; or whether Hot and Cold equally
partake of reality, and so are the same real thing, rather 
than two real things.
20
tninui
ontd'). The physical pre-Socratics find themselves in a 
dilemma. But their predicament is to some exrent shared by 
Parmenides rmrnselr. Tf he claims that reality is one ■; ' en 
tn' • 'one real tning') then he will have to explain the 
apparent plurality implied by his use of two terms: chere
is. it seems. not only unity ( 'eu%' ) and identity {'on') . 
out then reality as well. Plato appears to enjoy this type 
of argument, and elaborates it in 244 and 245.
By these means he illustrates the problems which occur if 
one says of reality that it is two things or that it is 
one. Wliat sort of thing. then. can one safely say of 
reality? The materialists (dealt with in 'the battle of 
Gods and Giants'. 246-2470 say with apparent invincibility 
tnat what is real is the visible and tangible body.
But the problem with this is that (a) the materialists will 
nave to admit that some things such as moral qualities are 
real but bodiless: and (b) that being so. they cannot
easily explain what it is that bodied and bodiless things 
have in common which permits them to call them both real.
247D: "They must now tell us this: when they say
that these bodiless things and the other things 
which have body are alike 'real'. what common 
character that emerges as covering both sets of 
things have they in view?" (13)
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Plato has come a long way round to this crucial point. He 
had to show first what sort of thing one cannot usefully 
say about reality. He now offers an answer which he
evidently thinks may help.
"STRANGER; I suggest that anything has real being, 
that is so constituted as to possess any sort of 
power either to affect anything else or to be
affected, in however small a degree. by the most 
insignificant agent. though it be only once. I am 
proposing as a mark to distinguish real things, 
that they are nothing but power." (14)
Let us look a little more closely at this last sentence:
T L 0 e | u a L  y a p  o p o v  o p u C e i r  T &  ovtol ôç e a T i r  o v k  a X X o  t l  
ttX t]i/ (SuvapLuç.
The word 'dynamis' has a sort of technical status in the 
works of Plato. Cornford cites Dr. J. Souille (15) as 
concluding that 'dynamis' refers to the property or quality 
which reveals the nature of a thing. (16). That is, it is 
what it does. both in the sense of its doing something and
what jj: in particular does. We have something similar in
the 'affective qualities' of Aristotle (Categories 8). It 
IS through dynamis that the nature ('physis') of something 
is perceivable. Dynamis is quality in action.
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It is clearly difficult to render this idea adequately in
English, and one may wonder whether the word ‘power’ in
the above translation is not in fact misleading. The idea
\
one wants to convey is that of active relatedness. Shall 
we try the word 'effectiveness'?
Similarly the word 'gros' carries not just the idea of a 
distinguishing mark but also that of a bounding line. And 
this is reinforced by the verb 'orlzein'. which might be 
rendered 'to delimit'. The sentence is in fact a defining 
one in the restricting, as well as the identifying, sense. 
In translating it one has a number of options: literally 'a 
boundary to delimit'; one might say either 'I lay down, 
then, a limiting boundary', true realities are ...', or 'I 
lay down a boundary, then, to delimit true realities'. 
The second part of the sentence raises even more 
possibilities. Here again we must conclude that no one 
English translation can do justice to the density of 
meaning packed into the Greek words. It is unlikely that 
Plato was being accidentally ambiguous; it is not unlikely 
that he wished to convey in one highly concentrated 
sentence a whole family of related meanings. For this
reason it will be instructive to consider the
possibilities, and even if this exercise results from our 
inadequate understanding, at this range of time, of Greek 
verbal convention, the thoughts provoked by pondering what
Plato might have meant will all be pertinent to our
subject, even if he actually meant no such thing.
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Is the definition a negative one? Does it state that true 
realities are not things other than what has effectiveness? 
That I S ,  does the boundary referred to exclude rather than 
enclose? This would have the merit of avoiding the risks 
involved in saying 'reality is ... this or that’. Plato 
has just shown what happens when one does that. "And 
countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless 
perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either 
two things, or only one." (17)
In this interpretation one would be able to say of anything 
which had no effective activity that it was not real, 
without being committed to making any sort of statement 
about reality. Let us, without in any way tying Plato to 
this view, bear in mind the usefulness of being able to 
exclude all items which do not meet the required
qualifications .
Perhaps, however. he is saying something about the things 
he does count as being 'true realities': "they are such
things, and only those, as have effectiveness." This would 
follow if dynamis is construed as standing for a verbal 
phrase, 'the effective' being abbreviated from 'what has 
effectiveness', 'They are no other thing but
effectiveness' could then be amplified in the above form. 
This in fact seems the most intelligible interpretation.
It would have the advantage of being specific, and carry no
risk of obscurity.
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Is this thing a reality? If it is a thing which has 
erractiveness. yes. it it does not have effectiveness, no. 
It remains the fact, however, that ' dvnarnis ‘ is translated, 
as by Cornford. as standing for nothing but itself. An 
abstract noun drawn from the base of the verb 'dvnasthin' .
dynasthai ' ' I can. am able, have power or right to ' , it is
related to the adjective ’dvnatos‘. meaning 'able' or 
'powerful'. and hence bears connotations of force. But in 
the conventional translation it stands for force itself, 
rather than for forceful things. Hence Plato appears to be 
saying that reality is_ effectiveness. Either 'true 
realities are nothing other than effectiveness'; or ' ...
no other thing but effectiveness'.- or 'not something other 
than effectiveness’. In this range we have slight 
variations of emphasis. But the fact remains that Plato 
appears to be identifying reality not with things, but with 
a quality.
What exactly would this mean? If. peering behind the 
complexities of the world. we find nothing there but an 
abstract noun, would we not (even though, knowing Plato, we 
might have expected it) feel a little cheated? Nothing has 
been explained. by the revelation that reality is 
effectiveness. What sort of idea of effectiveness can we 
possible get without effective things? And surely he 
himself has just led us to expect that it is things. not 
abstractions. that 'have real being', and that they do so 
by virtue of 'possessing any sort of power'. (18)
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Before we dismiss this interpretation as an error, however,
it would be as well to consider that such claims are
actually seriously made, and not only by philosophers. 
Take. for instance. this recent attempt to explain the 
state of modern physics:
In modern physics. mass is no longer associated 
with material substance, and hence particles are 
not seen as consisting of any basic 'stuff'. but as 
bundles of energy. Energy, however, is associated 
with activity. with processes, and this implies 
that the nature of subatomic particles is 
intrinsically dynamic. To understand this better 
we must remember that these particles can be
conceived only in relativistic terms. that is, in
terms of a framework where space and time are fused 
into a four-dimensional continuum ... Their forms 
have to be understood dynamically, as forms in
space and time. Particles are dynamic patterns, 
patterns of activity which have a space aspect and 
a time aspect ... the being of matter and its 
activity cannot be separated; they are but 
different aspects of the same space-time reality. 
(19)
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Go there are no things; there is only activity. Several of
the phrases in this passage have a curiously familiar ring, 
to the student of Plato, and indeed closely echo Cornford's 
exegesis: " ... these entities themselves can only be
known in action; their action is their raison d 'être : 
action characterises and individualises them ... This 
action of qualities, again. is their dynamis. The term 
designates at once their essence and their proper manner of 
manifesting themselves." (20)
What sense are we to make of all this? What does it tell 
us? How are we to visualise it? Perhaps the problem 
underlying the whole matter rests in the form of our 
language, which is static, and therefore ill-adapted to 
expressing purely dynamic states of being. It is as if we 
were trying to use a digital rather than an analogue 
computer to analyse systems dynamics. The language freezes 
things: the whole apparatus of nouns, adjectives and
verbal cases and tenses isolates an object and a moment, 
rather than embracing a continuum. We sympathise suddenly 
with Plato's interpretation of Heraclitus: "Heraclitus
somewhere says that all things are in process and nothing 
stays still .." (21) But the language names the river and 
immobilises it on the conceptual map.
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Before we proceed to summarise the situation. it would be 
as well to note that the bounding line referred to is 
something which Plato says he is proposing. This is not 
quite the same as claiming to have discovered or identified 
it. If we take the proposal to be something of the nature 
of a working hypothesis, then it would not be appropriate 
to demonstrate or refute it, but rather to test its 
usefulness or applicability. We shall learn a lot more 
about it by trying to apply it in cases of possible dispute 
throughout this thesis. In the next section of this 
chapter, for instance, putting it to use will reveal a 
feature which might either be a limitation or an 
intentional qualification. (22)
However, let us now try to see what, in Plato's terms, 'the
Real' really is. To summarise by extreme simplification;
1- Things are real if and only if they have dynamis.
2. Therefore reality is inseparable from relation.
3. Therefore things are a product of relatedness.
The entaiIment is not stringent, of course; but it does 
seem that in Plato's reasoning the conclusion is that what 
is actually there is not any sort of reified object, but a 
specially consistent type of event. We will bring up this 
point again, in relation to the idea of 'absolute 
existence', in the second part of this chapter and 
elsewhere.
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It might be objected to this account of Plato that if being 
affected by something is evidence of its existence, then 
one could argue the reality of, for instance, elves, as 
follows: suppose I begin to think about elves; I am
affected by the idea of elves; therefore there are elves. 
(23)
The weakness of this reasoning, however, resides in the 
lack of an intermediate step. To argue from the idea of 
elves to elves you would have to be able to supply the 
premiss 'Ideas of elves are caused by elves'. It is not 
enough to claim that if you are affected by an idea you are 
affected by the item of which it is an idea. This would be 
like saying that you have a photograph of the queen, 
therefore you have the queen. The two sets of things - an 
elf, for instance, and an idea - are quite unlike. They 
are members of different classes. One can quite well be 
affected by one of them without even the implication of 
being affected by the other.
The position we have reached here involves us in entering a 
new area of the subject, since the restriction of reality 
to relatedness, and the consequent denial of 'absolute 
existence', makes it necessary for us to consider the 
arguments for and against the school of thought known as 
'phenomenalism', and hence to plot the path of thinking on 
and against this line, in particular the problems arising 
from Berkeley.
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se est Percipi
If the understanding of Plato's principle requires us to 
think of reality in terms of relatedness or effect. then 
are we in danger, if we follow Plato, of having to accept a 
view of existence consistent with the theory. known as 
phenomenalism, which replaces an existential assertion by a 
hypothetical statement about the experiences of an observer 
under normal conditions? Let us. to remind ourselves of 
the position, use Isaiah Berlin's example, in his elegant 
demolition of phenomenalism in Mind. 1950: (1)
I say, "There is a brown table in the next room." 
This. I am told. should mean a set or range of 
propositions of the type. "If a normal observer' 
were to go next door and look. he would, in normal 
light. under normal conditions, etc.. see such and 
such brown-coloured data, etc."
Berlin makes the point that existential expressions have an 
irreducible ostensive element which cannot be conveyed by 
phenomena 1ist hypotheticals: and that their intrinsic
content of categorical assertion ('there i_s a brown table 
in the other room') is equally lacking from statements 
about what would be the case certain things happened. 
We are going to have to consider this very carefully if we 
propose any theory of existence based on behaviour or 
acquaintance, for instance on lines derived from Plato's 
relation-dependent interpretation.
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It will be seen in a moment that the theory itself has 
distinct phenomena 1ist undertones.
The position against which phenomenalism is trying to 
guard is one already apparently dealt with by Berkeley; we 
shall now see that Berkeley's analysis came to be 
considered unacceptable, and how this gave rise to need for 
the phenomenalist redescription.
Berkeley held that minds exist, and that objects exist in 
so far as they are perceived by minds. He cannot accept 
that there is any sense attributable to statements about 
things existing unperceived; and thus he holds that 
'absolute existence' is impossible. "The absolute 
existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning 
or which include a contradiction." (2) Now since 'absolute' 
here means divorced from a context which includes an 
observer; unobserved; unperceived and unimagined; it leaves 
us with the problem of the table in the other room, and a 
whole world full of things which were real enough when we 
last saw them but which nobody now happens to be seeing or 
otherwise perceiving. (3).
Berkeley's well-known solution to this is to bring into 
play the mind of God. Phenomenalism's reply to this 
rather dubious ploy is the translation into hypotheticals. 
Berlin's attack is as good a revelation of the inadequacy 
of this as we need.
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The spectre remaining unexorcised in these rather strenuous 
manoeuvres is that of ‘absolute existence'. (4).
A point made by several writers on the subject is that 
there is a tendency to introduce the idea of different 
types of existence which arises because there are existence 
statements of different forms. And this is a mistake which 
leads to further error. For instance. Professor T. R. 
Miles: "The temptation to speak of different 'kinds of
existence' is highest where the truth or falsity of two or 
more sentences is known in different ways. The crucial 
point - on which Berkeley and Ryle are in complete 
agreement, is that we should not be misled by the fact that 
we use the word 'exist' in connection with words of many 
different categories into supposing that there are 'kinds 
of existence' in the way in which there are kinds of dog." 
(5)
Berlin seems to be addressing himself to a related point, 
though in a different way; once again we feel the implied 
presence of Berkeley, though now as target. Just as we 
should not be misled by language into thinking that 
existence can be of different types, so we should not be 
misled into thinking that there is some necessary 
difference, rather than an accidental one, between things 
which I can and cannot see.
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The difference of logical form between categoricals and 
hypotheticals should not be confused with the purely 
empirical difference between observed and unobserved 
objects (the table next door, the back of the cupboard): 
"for the only relevant difference between the two types
of case is that I was originally in a better position in
space (or time) to describe the table in front of me. 
There may be important semantic differences, e.g. in 
learning the use of symbols for present, as opposed to 
absent entities. but there is no logical difference 
dividing sentences which describe things in my field of 
vision from those which describe things beyond the 
horizon." (6).
Berlin's attack on Berkeley is implied; phenomenalism is 
his real foe, and Berkeley is in line of fire as its
ancestor. It is therefore not clear (because it is not the
subject being dealt with) what Berlin's position would be 
on the question of 'absolute existence'.
A more direct attack on Berkeley comes from Russell, in his 
chapter on Berkeley in 'The History of Western Philosophy'. 
And here the stand on 'absolute existence' is clear. 
Russell takes the view that plenty of unthinking things 
exist unperceived.
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Russell is arguing against the claim that statements about
the absolute existence of unthinking things are either 
meaningless or contradictory. He takes the example given
by Berkeley of a house which no one is perceiving or
thinking about. The claim that such a thing is conceivable
contains a contradiction, according to Berkeley, since to 
conceive of it you have to think of it. Russell suggests 
the form "I can understand the proposition 'there is a 
house which no one perceives', or, better still, 'there is 
a house which no one either perceives or conceives'". (7)
"This proposition is composed entirely of 
intelligible words, and the words are correctly put 
together. Whether the proposition is true or 
false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot 
be said to be self-contradictory." (8).
Russell then proceeds with an interesting refutation of 
Berkeley, on the grounds that not only is such a
proposition not contradictory, but several such 
propositions can actually be proved to be true.
"For Instance: the number of possible
multiplications of two Integers Is Infinite, 
therefore there are some that have never been 
thought of. Berkeley's argument. If valid, would 
prove that this Is Impossible." (9)
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In other words, there are some numbers that have never been 
thought of. But what is this supposed to mean? What form 
is their existence supposed to take? "Surely," comments J. 
A. Brunton with an understandable note of pain, "we must 
not talk of numbers as if they were things waiting to be 
counted?" (10) The point is, of course, that these 
numbers do not have any sort of existence at all until they 
are thought of. All that Russell can mean is that a number 
may be thought of which has not been thought of before. We 
know that this event remains permanently possible. Far 
from being a refutation of Berkeley, this is simply an 
observation of one of the properties of mathematics - that, 
like language, it is self-generating; that its self- 
generating capacity gives rise to infinite combinations. 
The fact that the proposition 'there are some (numbers) 
that have never been thought of' is not self-contradictory, 
and can even be shown to be true, has led him into 
endowing these numbers with a spurious identity. 'There 
are' in that sentence does not, of course, mean 'somewhere 
there exist ...' The sentence just means 'a number may be 
thought of which has not been thought of before.'(N)
N: Compare A. J. Ayer (11) "....not all the predicates
that we use are regarded as being capable of applying to 
anything ... For a formalist who does not admit numbers 
into his ontology the expression 'being a prime number 
between 7 and 13' may have a meaning, but he will not allow 
that there is something to which it applies.
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Similarly with the house which no one perceives or 
conceives. When Russell says that he does not know whether 
the statement that "there is" one is true or false, he 
clearly implies that it is capable of being true. Let us 
then ask Russell to assert that it is true, and see what 
follows.
Immediately I want to know more about this house. Is it 
for sale? Evidently it is no longer occupied. But then it 
cannot be for sale, since to achieve that status it would 
have to be known of. Is it, then, not for sale ...? If at 
this point Russell were to reprimand us, on the grounds 
that such a line of inquiry is not applicable, I would say 
that it is just the sort of thing that is usually 
applicable to a house. If he denies it to this one, I 
would ask him if he is really sure it is a house. 
He would have to fall back on saying that at least the 
proposition ('there is a house which no one perceives or 
conceives') is not self-contradictory. It is rather a 
matter of logical properties than of real estate.
Although Russell thinks he has avoided the alternatives of 
meaninglessness or self-contradiction of Berkeley's Hylas 
by rephrasing the assertion as "I can understand the 
proposition 'there is a house ...' " h e  may not ultimately 
have done so. We are entitled (as we have just been doing) 
to challenge him on his understanding of the proposition.
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I would like to ask him now, for instance, whether he can 
(like Hylas) conceive of such a house. If he can, he is 
back with the contradiction; if he can not, then is he 
really sure he 'understands the proposition' that there is 
one? If it is for all practical purposes inconceivable, 
then it is absurd to say that "there is" such a thing. The 
contradiction has not been evaded at all, and Berkeley is 
supported rather than refuted.
It could be objected at this point that it is precisely 
because Russell cannot perceive or conceive of the house 
that he cannot answer questions of this sort. (11a) The 
claim that he can understand the proposition that 'there is 
a house which no-one perceives or conceives' is thus not 
capable of being refuted by his failure to answer questions 
about it. But this argument from his inability to do so 
only arises because we have supposed that Russell might 
assert that the proposition is true.
If the proposition were such that it might be true, then 
that state of affairs would have to be different, in some 
way, from its being false. Yet if Russell cannot answer 
any questions about this house which he nevertheless claims 
exists, such as the questions I could normally ask about a 
house that exists, then the state of affairs in which the 
statement is said to be true is exactly the same as the 
state of affairs in which the statement was false.
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In that case it seems that the assertion means nothing. It 
may not (as Russell claims) be contradictory. But 
'Socrates is equal' is not contradictory. It is simply 
meaningless. And this was Berkeley's alternative.
If you know nothing whatsoever about a hypothetical item, 
you can say nothing whatsoever about it. That seems fairly 
obvious. Even 'I didn't know this house existed' is a 
remark you cannot make until you do know. The fact is that 
all the rest of the time the idea of existence, as applied 
to the house, was not relevant to anything. What could it 
possibly be relevant to?
It would not be just a great waste of breath to insist on 
applying terms irrelevantly. It would, rather, be quite 
incorrect. Relevance is the essence of the correct 
application of a term. (N).
N: See Appendix 1, 'A Note on the Grammar of Discovery'
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If we were to accept, with Plato, that talk of reality only 
makes sense when something or other is happening; and, with 
Berkeley, that talk of any jji vacuo existence of objects is 
impossible to make sense of; and reject, versus Russell,
the coherence of the idea of the existence of the
undiscovered, we apparently find ourselves in an
unexpectedly important position. By elimination of 
alternatives, things spring into being when we know of 
them; we thus constantly generate the universe. To claim 
such ability would be at least a little arrogant, and it is 
of course an illusion. It now becomes necessary to explain 
exactly why.
The concept of existence is part of our language system,
and therefore tuned to our state of knowledge. (12). If it 
then turns out to lack applicability when divorced from a
context involving knowledge, this is not the least
surprising. Our language-system is, after all, our
language-system. It is tied - by a thread not so much 
invisible as so obvious as to go unnoticed - to us.
There is nothing odd about this; there is simply no logical 
alternative. We could not think and talk in a way
ascribable to someone or something other than us.
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The medium in which we conceptualise inevitably brings 
restrictions and distortions; but it is necessarily the 
only one we have. We are normally no more aware of the 
medium in which we think and talk than (presumably) fish 
are aware of water. Only in cases such as this is it 
sometimes as well to note its importance.
Let us, to simplify these points, take some simple examples 
Suppose the Plain Man were to say to me now: "This is all
very well, I understand your point about existence being an 
idea designed for certain uses and therefore, not at all 
surprisingly, useless for other purposes; but tell me now: 
how does this leave this table if we both go out of the 
room? And when you have done that, answer this: I read in
The Times that a Sino-American team of 1epidopterists, 
penetrating a hitherto unexplored part of Manchuria, have 
just discovered a new type of butterfly. Was it there last 
week?"
I will try to answer him in simple terms, while still 
bearing in mind that we are trying to make sense of a 
position which accepts and rejects the above-mentioned 
points, that talk of reality only makes sense when 
something is happening, and that the idea of the 
undiscovered is not coherent.
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The two cases are quite different. You and I are aware of 
the existence of this table, and so are in a position to 
make statements about it, even when absent from it - such 
as 'I left my briefcase on the table'. To that extent talk 
of its existence is assured applicability. You question my 
memory of the furniture of the room. 'No such table 
exists,' you assert. 'Of course it exists. I left my 
briefcase on it.' The table exists because 'existence' has 
application in relation to it. This is to say nothing at 
all about sense-data or substance. They are relevant in 
their own contexts, not in this.
'Is the table in the other room still hard/brown/wooden, 
etc.?' are questions with an inbuilt catch. I know the 
table in question, so that I can answer for it. In doing 
so I am of course referring to a table I have been able to 
see and touch, not to one which is (as the question tries 
to imply) absolutely and eternally in-the-other-room. As 
Berlin says, it is an accident, which can disappear if for 
instance the wall becomes transparent, that there is a 
difference between the table in front of me and that next 
door; it is not built into their identity. This is where 
your butterflies come in.
You ask: Were they there last week? Applying Plato's test
we find that if they were having any sort of effect last 
week, they were there.
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Note well that this is only any use as a means of answering 
the question if there is some way of telling. Presumably 
our international scientists, if they are worthy of their 
sponsorship, can tell a patch of brush which has been 
browsed by papi1io hvpotheticus from one that has not. But 
this is only to say that we have been lucky in our choice 
of example. There might have been absolutely no way of 
telling. Where would the usefulness of Plato's dictum be 
then? To say 'If they were having an effect they were 
there, though we do not know whether they were having it or 
not’, is to rephrase the question rather than to answer 
it.
And here we encounter an interesting feature of Plato's 
principle referred to in the last sub-section of this 
chapter (13): unless 'to have effectiveness; is construed
as 'to be known to have effectiveness', then the principle 
is, in a large number of important cases, useless. If 
however Plato was aware of this, then it implicitly ties 
ontology to epistemology. 'Dynamis', as Cornford put it 
(14) is the way a thing manifests its 'physis'. the way 
the 'physis' of it is known; and this usage clearly entails 
an observer. Without one there is no making—known 
achieved.
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If this implication is intended, then the principle says
something more than it appears to say. Namely, that for a
thing to count as real something must be known of it. i.e.
it must be known at the very least that it has dynamis.
According to this reading (which I regard as inevitable if
the principle is to be of use) then if something is not 
known to have dynamis it does not exist. It is not just 
that we do not know whether it exists of not. The
principle proposes to lay down a bounding line: those
things are real. and only those, of which we know of the 
dynamis. So it might be argued, on Plato's behalf. I 
repeat: if this is not the meaning of the principle, then
we cannot use Plato's principle to help us answer 
questions, such as this one of the butterflies.
Berkeley would say that if they were observed by God last
week, they were there. But is this not again simply to 
rephrase the question? Did God observe them last week? We 
do not know.
What, then, do we conclude?
We could not, for obvious practical reasons, say about them 
last week any of the things we can say about them this 
week: and among these is 'They are there'. This is a
matter of historical accident.
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No more can we now say, in the way we shall be able to 
next week, 'They were there last week', ('I wonder where 
they've gone. Sorry to have got you all up here for 
nothing. I swear they were right there,' and so on), 
referring to past experience, to first-hand knowledge - as 
in the case of a table one knew to the extent of leaving 
one's briefcase on it. There are some things one cannot 
say, for practical reasons. And this is indeed the point. 
There is no logical error in pretending to knowledge one 
does not have, but from a practical viewpoint it is futile. 
The point is that existence is a very practical matter.
Although it appears to follow from Plato's rule that for 
something to exist it is necessary that someone should have 
reason to be able to say that it exists, there is no need 
to convince the reader of this point in order to emphasise 
the practical element in existence statements. It may or 
may not be the case that if one cannot know whether or not 
something exists or existed then no sense can be attached 
to the assertion that it does or did. What is certain is 
that it can serve no conceivable purpose for someone to say 
that something exists if they have no reasons for making 
the claim.
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It IS true. of course. that these items. whether 
butterflies or the table in the other room, are the sort of 
objects which could have been there last week; and the 
inability to say of them that they were is simply a result 
of our state of knowledge, and has nothing to do with their 
reality, whether present or past. This is why it is worth 
stressing that pretending to knowledge one does not have is 
simply a waste of time, for practical reasons. There are 
some things one is not in a position to say. (11a)
The answer to the Plain Man's question ('Were they there 
last week?') must therefore be in terms of what one can
say. rather than in terms of what was the case. If in
principle one cannot know of their effects last week then 
one cannot say either that they were there or that they 
were not. One can answer the question affirmatively if one 
can know of their effects and find there to have been 
effects. There is an intermediate case in which one can 
know of their effects but have not yet found any. The
Plain Man should recognise these situations, being as he is
familiar with conclusions such as 'We can't say' or 'We 
don't know'.
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I•3 Anselm's Distinctions
In Chapter Two of 'Proslogion', St. Anselm sets out on the 
daunting task of proving, philosophically, the existence of 
God. We are not concerned here with whether or not he
succeeded. We are concerned rather with trying to discover 
what St. Anselm meant, and what his successors mean, when 
they speak of the existence of God.
Anselm takes as a premiss that God is 'aliquid quo nihil
maius cogitari possit‘ - something than which nothing
greater can be thought. Even the fool who says 'There is 
no God' understands this phrase, though he is committed to 
denying that it has a referent. But whatever is understood 
IS in the understanding. For Anselm this being in the 
understanding constitutes something different to not being 
all. since he says that God so defined must therefore 
'exist at least' in the understanding. ('esse ve1 in 
inte1lectu'). (1)
'Quidquid Intel 1iqltur in Intellectu est' . Whatever is
understood is in the understanding. But it is one thing
for an object to ^  in the understanding ( ' i_n inte 1 lectu' ) 
and another thing for it to be understood to exist. We 
thus have a general category, things each of which can be 
thought of ('cogitatur'). subdivided into things which one 
has in one's understanding ('habet in Intellectu'). and 
things which one has in one’s understanding which one also 
understands to exist ('intel1igat esse').
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Anselm gives the example of a painter; 1. He thinks of what
he is going to paint: he has it in his understanding.
2. He paints it. and it now exists as well as being in his 
understanding. The second is something more than the 
first.
Resisting the temptation to pursue with Anselm the results 
of this analysis, let us examine his distinction a little 
more closely, since a point raised here may well prove 
relevant to the ensuing discussion.
Anselm goes on in Chapter 4 of the 'Proslogion' to 
distinguish two senses of 'think'. " ... it is clear that 
something can be said in one's heart or thought in more 
than one way. For we think ('coaitare') of a thing, in one 
sense, when we think of the word that signifies it, and in 
another sense, when we understand the very thing itself, 
('cum id ipsum quod res est intel1iaitur'). Thus. in the 
first sense God can be thought of as nonexistent, but in 
the second sense this is quite impossible." (2)
Shall we call these two senses of 'think' the general and 
the special senses? Now it seems for reasons given below 
that the general sense is such that it does not commit the 
thinker to holding that the item thought of exists.
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The special sense is based on the understanding of 
something which has logical status, such as the outcome of 
reasoning, and so does involve the acceptance of the 
existence of the item thought of. In the general sense. 
Anselm says, one can think of a certain thing as not 
existing, even when it does exist. In the special sense 
the thing thought of is understood, and therefore exists as 
something in the understanding. He reinforces this 
distinction and its effects by saying that "although none 
of the things that exist can be understood (’inte11iqi’) 
not to exist, still they can all be thought of ('cogitari') 
as nonexistent.". (3). Nothing could be clearer than this 
distinction between things which are thought of in a way 
involving understanding. and things which are just thought 
of .
The impossibility of thinking of God as nonexistent, in the 
special sense of 'think', he explains, arises because God's 
attributes are so defined as to involve the understanding, 
and because as understood he must possess existence by 
logical necessity: ... it now seems obvious that this being
than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of 
as nonexistent, because it exists by such a sure reason of 
truth." (4).
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It might be argued against this interpretation - which 
holds that for Anselm something can be thought of but not 
exist. even in the understanding - that he is ambiguous in 
his use of the word 'exist'. ' He certainly distinguishes 
between things which "exist at least" in the understanding 
('esse vel in intellectu') and those which exist "in 
reality". ('esse et in re'). (5). Of course it is
possible that when Anselm says that something can be 
thought of as nonexistent, he intends "as not existing in 
reality". and implies that it nevertheless exists in the 
understanding by virtue of being thought of. But this will 
not at all square with the sentence quoted above; 
"although none of the things which exist can be understood 
not to exist, still they can all be thought of as 
nonexistent." If to be thought of and to exist in the 
understanding were one and the same state of affairs. this 
sentence could not make a crucial distinction between the 
two.
In the general sense then something can be thought of as 
non-existent. It follows (though Anselm does not say this) 
that it is possible to think of things which do not exist. 
It therefore also follows that thinking of something does 
not thereby entail its existence. This is the general 
ground against which things which are understood are said 
by Anselm to exist in the understanding.
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We may now see how this analysis, on which Anselm embarked 
after presenting his argument, applies to the terms he used 
at the start of the discussion itself. (It is as if he had 
realised that he had started with an implicit distinction, 
which he then decided to make explicit).
We believe, he said, that God is "a being than which none 
greater can be thought". (6) The fool says in his heart 
that there is no God. The fool however "hears what I am 
saying - 'A being than which none greater can be thought'". 
(7) In the light of the discussion in Chapter 4 of the 
'Pros 1ogion' , we know that all this so far is applying the 
general sense of 'thought'. The analysis in that chapter 
I S  specifically addressed to this passage. ( 8 )  God is a 
being than which none greater can be thought, in the 
general sense of 'thought'. The fool saying in his heart 
that God is nonexistent is thinking that, in that sense. 
And when he hears the words he is partaking in the type of 
thinking described in Chapter 4: "we think of a thing, in
the sense, when we think of the word that signifies it ..." 
(9) We know that it is this general sense of think that is 
applicable, because the involvement of understanding has 
not yet become a part of the process. That forms the next 
step .
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Now for the application of the special sense. "But when 
this same fool hears what I am saying - ‘A being than which 
none greater can be thought' - he understands what he hears 
•••" (10) He is now involved in the special sense which is 
described in the above sentence with the words " ... and in 
another sense, when we understand the very thing itself." 
(11) The thing then exists as something understood, even 
if that is the only type of existence it has.
There may therefore be some things which can be thought of 
which do not exist, even in the understanding. Indeed, for 
the purposes of Anselm's argument there must be, or there 
would be no point in specifying that the concept Anselm is 
concerned with achieves that status of existing in the 
understanding. This is a crucial and (it will turn out) 
far-reaching point made implicitly by Anselm at this early 
stage. Anselm would not have introduced the idea that the 
God-denying fool nevertheless understood his phrase if he 
did not wish to draw an initial distinction: he has it in
his understanding, as the painter has the unpainted 
painting. There is then a further level, represented by 
the painted painting, covering those things which may not 
only be thought of and exist in the understanding, but also 
exist in reality.
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(Alselm reinforces existence at this point by 'in reality'
('esse et in re'), no doubt meaning to refer to the world 
not enclosed within the understanding. We shall have to 
deal with the terminology involved shortly. At this point 
it is sufficient to note Anselm's usage.)
Perhaps it is because Anselm's argument for the existence 
of God actually relies on a clear perception of the second 
distinction, (between being in the understanding and being 
in reality) that subsequent philosophers (and indeed prior 
ones, as we shall see) have consistently missed the 
importance of the first one (between being thought of and 
existing in understanding). Because of the part this 
omission has played in bringing into philosophy some of the 
problems we are here setting out to solve, it might be as 
well to go over this again,
God is a thing than which none greater can be thought. 
There is thus an unspecified, possibly infinite, field of 
things which can be thought. But this particular concept 
has a characteristic evidently not shared by all such 
things, since it exists in the understanding.
It exists at least in the understanding. Anselm then goes 
on to show that it must exist not only in the understanding 
but in some other form. The problem arises, however, if 
the first step is not noticed, and it is thought that 
Anselm is saying that everything that is thought of exists 
in the understanding.
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But when he says that the fool understands the concept, 
which is therefore in his understanding, he does not mean 
that the fool understands the words, in the sense of 
speaking Anselm's type of Latin. A few sentences later he 
uses the phrase 'quidquid intel1iqitur in intellectu est‘; 
supporting this with the example of the painter makes it 
clear that 'understood' here means something like 
'perceived' or 'grasped'. When the painter forms a 
coherent impression of the painting he is about to start, 
'he has it in his understanding' in that sense.
There is an important category of things to which this 
particular specification might apply. They exist in the 
understanding, but only there. Shall we call them 
theoretical constructs? They perhaps include things such 
as numbers, classes, universels; but they will be 
considered in some detail later, and it would be as well to 
avoid being too specific about them until then. It is 
sufficient for the time being to note that such a type of 
thing is accommodated by Anselm's formulation.
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Anselm distinguishes, then, firstly things which may be
thought of from things which may be thought of and which 
exist in the understanding; secondly, things which exist in 
the understanding from things which exist in the 
understanding and also in reality. (N)
In order, now, to identify the type of problem which we are 
setting out to deal with, we may take two examples of the 
treatment of existence and reality from modern philosophy; 
and the comparison of these with Anselm's treatment will, 
at the same time, show how problems may arise.
N : While it is here contended that the evidence cited above 
demonstrates that Anselm intended these two distinctions, 
it would be sufficient for our subsequent purposes if all 
that was accepted, from the foregoing argument, was that 
the terminology of thinking and existing permits the first 
distinction as well as the generally-acknowledged second 
one, regardless of whether or not Anselm meant to say so.
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Norman Malcolm; 'Anselm's Ontological Arguments'. (12)
Malcolm starts by outlining Anselm's argument, up to the 
point about what is understood being in the understanding. 
He then says: "Of course many things may exist in the
understanding that do not exist in reality; for example, 
elves." (13) Now this, if the above reading of Anselm is
right, is exactly what Anselm was not saying. Malcolm has
missed the point, and with fatal consequences.
Elves may be thought of, or as we might say, imagined. 
This is distinct from the sort of thing, such as the being 
a greater than which cannot be thought, which are 
understood, and therefore are in the understanding. 
Perhaps the trouble arises with the translation of 
'intellectus'. If Anselm had meant 'imagination' he would 
have said so ; there is a perfectly good Latin word 
available: 'imaginâtio'. If he had meant 'mind', likewise,
he would have used the word 'mens, mentis'. It is not the 
ability to think of something that is being referred to, 
but the ability to grasp or comprehend it. 'Intellectus'
is the faculty by which we recognise the significance of
prime numbers or square roots, but not of elves.
To put it another way : there is no process in logic or in
any other nomology impelling the recognition of elves.
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Elves cire by no means el one in this - one would not wish to 
be discriminatory - and we shall see in fact both shortly 
and at a later point that they inhabit a vast world of 
ideas outside the category Anselm meant by things 'in 
intellectu'. The point here, however, is that by failing 
to spot the initial distinction, Malcolm has put himself in 
the position of investing elves, in (as he thought) 
Anselm's terms, with a sort of spurious existence.
The rest of Malcolm's paper, though undermined by his
initial misunderstanding, deals with the validity of 
Anselm's proof of the existence of God, and so need not 
concern us. The second example of the coming into being of 
a major problem reinforces the point identified in the
first.
G . E . Moore : (14)
Moore is considering the notion of time. In Chapter XI he 
asks the question 'Is Time Real?"'. This leads him to
embark in Chapter XII on 'The meaning of "Real"', and in 
the meantime to consider the distinction between the real 
and the imaginary. He wonders whether what one imagines 
has existence by virtue of being something one imagines. 
(15) Griffins, chimaeras, centaurs; these can be imagined. 
"And to imagine a centaur is certainly not the same thing 
as imagining nothing." (16)
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decision that existence is an extra element added on to 
some ocner sort ot identity. and Moore considers that sort 
or explanation, among others. "The difference is that 
grirrins are or exist only in the mind or in dependence on 
it. whereas elephants are or exist not only in the mind but 
independently of it." (17)
rrorn this we may see that Moore came close to recognising 
Anselm's distinction. Yet evidently he did not come close 
enough, since it was tnen necessary for him to pursue one 
matter of griffins and centaurs through a further eiaht 
pages. For Anselm did not find it necessary to say that 
everything that you may think of exists in thought; to him 
that would probably devalue the term 'exists' beyond use. 
He was recognising a sort of existence which is not ‘in 
reality', but is an existence of the understanding. Now if 
any element of understanding applies to griffins and 
centaurs, it must be that they are understood not to exist: 
they therefore do not exist even in the understanding. If 
one wants to say that they are there in some way in the 
mind or the imagination. then existence is not a suitable 
term to apply to that state.
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In fact it is ruled out by the presence of two factors 
incompatible with it: (a) that we have just said that the
point about griffins and centaurs is that they are under­
stood not to exist; and (b) by locating them in the 
imagination (Moore: "I certainly can imagine a centaur; we
can all imagine one.") (18) we are in effect saying that 
they are neither in the understanding nor in reality.
In relation to items in those two fields Anselm would 
consider it meaningful to talk of existence; but 
imagination is to be contrasted with them.
To develop a little the position derived from Anselm but 
expanded by this example from Moore: among the things which 
may be thought of (an unspecified class) there are some 
which may be imagined. and some which may be comprehended; 
the latter are imbued. by that fact. with existence in 
comprehension. It is incorrect. and leads to endless 
problems, to apply the term existence to the former. 
Indeed it would not be meaningful to make the distinction 
between things which exist because they are comprehended 
and things which are not so comprehended and so do not 
exist, if the term 'existence' could be used in association 
with the incompatible word 'imagination' as well as with 
the translation of 'intellectus'.
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In case his distinction between understanding and imagining 
is not clear, it is worth stressing again Anselm's use of 
the word 'intellectus'. We have said above (19) that 
'intellectus' is the faculty by which we recognise the
significance of prime numbers and square roots, but not of 
elves. We know that when Anselm uses the word (as in
' quidquid intel1iqitur in intellectu est' - meaning 'such 
things as may be grasped by the intellectual faculty have 
being within that faculty') he is referring to things that 
can be worked out, that can be comprehended by rational 
thought. We know this because he explicitly contrasts this 
process with just thinking of something. (20)
It is in this sense that we do not understand griffins just 
by thinking of them. If on the other hand we had worked 
out that there must be griffins, then we would have 
understood them, in Anselm's sense. If there is any
working out involved here, however, it must result in the 
conclusion that griffins do not exist, so that all we may 
be said to understand about them is that they are 
fictional.
Fictional or imaginary things are of course the sort of 
thing that Anselm meant when he spoke of just thinking of 
something, ^  contrasted with grasping it intellectually.
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To say that what can be merely imagined exists in the
understanding might be quite acceptable in terms of some
other terminology, but it is directly contrary to the 
points that Anselm is making. Given his emphasis on 
intellectus. 'in intellectu', representing the faculty by
which one works things out, it is mere confusion of words 
to say that what is imagined exists in the understanding.
It must be said, before leaving this example, that Moore 
compounds his difficulty through a willingness to accept as 
meaningful the loose terminology which surrounds this
question. If a centaur is "something, isn’t that the same 
thing as saying that there is such a thing - that it is or 
has being?" But if centaurs thus are, yet still they
are not real. (21) He thus distinguished being real from
being, and equates being real with existing. (22).
We are going to come across again this apparent desire to 
confuse the issue: does such-and-such a philosopher mean
something more by 'real existence' that by 'existence'? 
Did Anselm mean to add something to the sense of existence 
when he distinguished 'existence in reality' from some 
other form? Would we be right to follow some philosophers 
off this route on a detour into the realms of truth and 
fact? It will help things considerably if we dispose of 
this tangled complex at once, treating it as such a mixture 
of metaphors deserves: that is, by using Occam's razor to
cut the Gordian Knot.
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Either there are centaurs or there are not. It makes no 
difference, either to the state of the world or to the
present argument, if you want to paraphrase that statement 
using other terms, such as 'exist', 'are real', 'are a
fact'. The situation remains the same. Either centaurs 
exist or they do not.
Neither should we be led into further involvement by the 
addition of a qualification; 'either there are (in some 
sense) centaurs or there are not' can be replaced by some 
other phrase without altering the argument or the state of 
affairs, as 'either centaurs exist in some sense ... ', or
'are real in some sense ... ' and so on. It will become
necessary to make a fine distinction (and we have already
seen one made by Anselm) between different ways of
existing. It will be possible to be precise about this in 
due course. But nothing would be gained by allocating one 
of these other terms to one mode or degree, one to another. 
If there are different ways of existing, these are
different ways of being, or being real. To say that
something can be, but not be real, is one way of setting up 
for oneself an endless problem. It is to be avoided 
because it leads to confusion and unnecessary discussion; 
but it is to be avoided anyway because it is fundamentally 
paradoxical. It is equivalent to saying that there are 
centaurs and there are not.
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It is clear from the above examples that we commonly wish 
to be able to say, both in philosophy and ordinary 
discourse, that certain things exist; and that there is 
therefore a difference between existing and not existing. 
Moreover we can all think of things which we wish to say do 
not exist. And we need to be able to say this without 
being forced into self-contradiction.
Moreover it is also clear that no problem would arise with 
respect to these distinctions if there were some ready-made 
and agreed way in which we could decide whether or not 
something exists. It is our apparent ability to decide 
without knowing how we do so that gives rise to the 
problem. It leads us, or at any rate it leads 
philosophers, to find themselves saying that something 
which does not exist, must, by virtue of having been called 
'something', somehow exist. This is plainly a ridiculous 
state of affairs and must be sorted out.
(At a later stage we shall see how the problem is shifted, 
but not destroyed, by the refinement of posited entities 
into names and descriptions).
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The Anselm example highlights the difficulty caused by the 
lack of readily-available criteria, by taking an apparently 
undecided case. If Anselm says that God exists, and the 
fool says in his heart that God does not, the dispute 
between them would disappear if they were both able to say 
how the issue is to be decided. But by what procedure is 
this dispute to be settled? Clearly a first step towards 
such an outcome would be for them to be able to say (and 
agree) what they mean by 'exists'. The existence of God is 
thus a case where disputes may genuinely arise, and is also 
a deciding test for the meaning of statements about 
existence. If this case can be clarified, one feels, less 
marginal existence disputes will also have become clear.
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1.4 Introduction
It is hoped that the foregoing examples have successfully 
illustrated the prevalence of a group of problems, namely 
that it is not clear, in philosophy, what is intended when 
it is asserted of something that it exists, how such claims 
are to be determined, whether existence is to regarded as 
(as it were) free-standing, or as relative to a subject or 
context, and a number of other side-effect difficulties. 
Before we set out to seek a solution to this bunch of 
related problems, which will no doubt breed during this 
process, it will be as well to enquire whether the matter 
has already been satisfactorily dealt with. {Plato, we 
saw, left us with difficulties very similar to those we had 
before he came to our assistance. Is this, one wonders, a 
portent of future predicaments?) We therefore turn now to 
a consideration of a number of attempted solutions.
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Russell's Theory of Descriptions
There is no doubt that Bertrand Russell thought he had 
disposed of the question of existence statements once and 
for all. If this were correct, then of course the 
subsequent literature on the subject should not have been 
composed, and our present exercise would be redundant too. 
We implicitly start from the supposition that he was 
mistaken, and it is therefore important to understand why.
But first, Russell's case.
The 'Theory of Descriptions' is first stated in his paper 
'On Denoting', published in Mind in 1905, and later 
reprinted in the collection of Essays 'Logic and Knowledge' 
(1), from which present references are taken. The theory 
was developed to become a major feature of the first volume 
of Principia Mathematica. which appeared in 1910. Let us 
now see what prompted Russell to produce the theory in the 
first place, how the theory is formulated and applied, and 
what consequences follow.
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Russell's ' problem is that whereas descriptive terms 
(‘denoting phrases') appear by their form to be designed 
to stand for some object, there are some which do and some 
which do not. It had puzzled philosophers as to how this 
could be so. 'The present King of England is fat' was a 
statement which could be true or false by virtue of the way 
in which the denoting phrase forming part of it stood for a 
an object: 'the present King of France is fat' is of the
same form, and so should work in the same way. 
Philosophers felt obliged to conclude that its denoting 
phrase must also stand for an object. "Thus 'the present 
King of France'. 'the round square', etc., are supposed to 
be genuine objects." (2). Russell found the consequences 
of this "intolerable: and if any theory can be found to
avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred." (3)
If this problem arises with descriptive phrases, it is even 
more pronounced in the case of names. Indeed Russell 
considered in a later series of lectures ('The Philosophy 
of Logical Atomism'. 1918) (4) that to be truly a name, 
rather than "a sort of truncated description" a word has to 
stand for something real, "because a name has got to name 
something or it is not a name." (5)
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Russell's solution was to reduce both denoting phrases and 
apparent names to what he called prepositional functions. 
The effect of this is to rephrase a sentence which 
contained a denoting phrase or a name in such a way that 
this disappears, and in its place is a construction
involving a variable and an ascription of a property.
Russell had good reasons for proposing what he frankly 
called "a somewhat incredible interpretation" (6), in that 
it cleared up a whole range of puzzles. It is. however; so 
elaborate in its form that even Russell did not attempt to 
describe it, but instead relied on examples. To take the 
most familiar one; the sentence "Scott was the author of 
Waverley" becomes "It is not always false of x that x wrote 
Waverley. that it is always true of y that if y wrote
Waverley y is identical with x, and that Scott is identical
with x". (7).
Knowing as we do that Bertrand Russell was endowed with a 
sense of humour, our initial reaction must be to conclude 
that he was joking. But no; in fact he regarded this 
analysis as providing something of a philosophical panacea. 
"The whole realm of non—entities, such as 'the round 
square', 'the even prime other than 2', 'Apollo', 'Hamlet', 
etc.. can now be satisfactorily dealt with." (8). It 
clears up, among other things, the problem of the French 
monarchy. (9)
Moreover (and this is why we are discussing it) it is
crucially helpful in overcoming the problematic side of 
existence statements. There is no doubt that Russell saw 
this function as one of the theory's greatest achievements. 
He puts the case for the application of his formula to
existence statements in the later lectures, 'The Philosophy 
of Logical Atomism'. "When you take any prepositional 
function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is
sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of
'existence'. You may express it by saying that there is at
least one value of x. for which that prepositional function 
is true ... To say that unicorns exist is simply to say 
that ' fx is a unicorn) is possible'". (10).
Existence is thus reduced to being a property of a 
prepositional function. The benefits of this become 
apparent when one applies the principle to awkward cases, 
such as statements about non—existants. Instead of saying 
"The golden mountain does not exist", with the paradox of 
appearing to say something about the golden mountain, one 
says with Russell's mechanism (to use his admittedly rather 
loose terminology) "There is no entity such that 'x is 
golden and mountainous' is true when x is c, but not 
otherwise." (11). Russell sees this as a considerable 
breakthrough, as far as existence statements are concerned. 
"This clears up two millennia of muddle—headedness about 
'existence', beginning with Plato's Theaetetus.". (12).
Quite an achievement, we may feel.
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There is one further consequence of the working of the
theory which is relevant to our inquiry. and that is its
application to the question of the existence of God. It
has been shown that descriptions are reducible to
prepositional functions; names on the other hand do not 
occur at all in correctly formulated existence statements. 
"'Existence'. according to this theory. can only be 
asserted of descriptions. We can say 'The author of
Waver1ey exists,' but to say 'Scott exists' is bad grammar, 
or rather bad syntax." (13). The qualification is due to
an earlier claim that "a great part of philosophy can be
reduced to something that may be called 'syntax' " (14).
When reviewing this section of his work in 'My
Philosophical Development' (15) Russell does not insist on 
this distinction between grammar and syntax. "We can say 
'the author of Waverlev exists' and we can say 'Scott is 
the author of Waverlev.' but 'Scott exists' is bad
grammar."
Returning to 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', let us
now see how this grammatical analysis applies to God.
Russell claims (16) that "The fact that you can discuss the 
proposition 'God exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in 
that proposition. is a description and not a name. If 
'God', were a name, no question as to existence could 
arise." He does not pursue the matter, yet we feel that 
this brief conclusion indicates much of the motive behind 
the talk of Scott and the author of Waverlev.
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Clearly. on Russell's previous reasoning. 'God exists' 
would be bad grammar if God were a name. 
Yet if 'God' is a description then God-existence 
statements can be transformed by means of
propositional functions in such a way that the constituent 
'God' disappears. "When I say 'the author of Waverlev 
exists', I mean that there is an entity c such that 'x
wrote Waverley' is true when x is c and is false when x is
not c. 'The author of Waverlev' as a constituent has quite
disappeared here, so that when I say 'The author of
Waverlev exists' I am not saying anything about the author 
of Waver1ey. You have instead this elaborate to-do with 
propositional functions, and 'the author of WaverIev' has 
disappeared. That is why it is possible to say 
significantly 'The author of Waverlev did not exist'. (17).
Shall we try this for ourselves? Let us say that 'God' is 
shorthand for 'the creator of the world'. Then when we say 
'God exists', Russell would interpret our statement as 
follows: "There is an entity c such that 'x created the
world' is true when x is c, and is false when x is not c. 
And God is identical with c." (N).
N: I repeat here Russell's habit uf using 'c ' instead of
some other letter, in spite of the misleading implication 
that we are referring to a constant.
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Now a number of questions all present themselves for
attention at the same time, but we shall have to try to
keep calm. Firstly. I would like to ask about the status 
of that first "is", in the opening phrase "There is ..." 
Does it mean the same as 'exists'? If not, what sort of 
information can it possibly give us? But if so, then I
suspect that we are involved in an endless regress.
'An entity c with certain properties about to be specified 
exists', or, so simplify, 'An entity c with properties p, q 
exists', now has to be reinterpreted as follows. "There is 
an entity d such that 'x has properties p .q ' is true when x 
is d. and is false when x is not d. And c is identical 
with d." But wait: we have said 'There is' again, meaning
'There exists',, so we have to clarify this further. And 
so on. Quite apart from the tedium of going on until we
have run out of letters of the alphabet, it is difficult to
see where this is going to get us.
It is true that this difficulty arises from the looseness 
of Russell's form of statement. Had he constructed instead 
a statement of the form '"x is - " is true for at least one 
value of the variable x ', the regress might have been 
avoided.
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We could then say ‘"% is a creator of the universe" is true
for at least one value of the variable x ', and in order to 
accommodate 'the creator of the universe' we could add '"x 
is a creator of the universe" is true for only one value of 
the variable x '. But what would have been achieved? We
would have replaced a statement about what there is by a
statement about what is true. For the sake of the original 
formality of avoiding 'exists' in the sentence 'the creator 
of the universe exists' (or whatever), we would have 
embarked on a rather devious, and possible specious,
circumlocution. The assertion of the truth of a
predication to a variable for at least, or for only. one 
value of that variable gives one much the same 
uncomfortable feeling as one had before. Are truth 
statements really immune from the diseases of existence 
statements? And can they really be cashed without loss, 
one for the other? While recognising that these questions 
are likely to occur again, and may require further 
investigation, we should not allow them at this point to 
distract our attention from Russell. We have to bear in 
mind that although the above exercise was what Russell 
might have done, it was not what Russell did.
The crucial test of any philosophical theory is to ask 
whether it leaves us philosophically any better off. We 
have seen that Russell claimed that the theory of 
descriptions had problem-solving, or problem—avoiding, 
capacities.
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To replace a statement about a descriptive phrase by a 
statement about the value of a variable. and then to add 
that the descriptive phrase is that value of that variable, 
does not. looked at in the clear light of day, seem likely 
to avoid any problems. And this is particularly so when it 
sometimes produces a sentence including the phrase 'there 
is' in place of one including the phrase ‘there exists'. as 
part of its mechanism.
This is a serious state of affairs; but it is not the only 
basis of possible doubts about the usefulness. in this 
field, of Russell's theory of descriptions. We may wish to 
know, as before, what he is really trying to say. Does he 
mean that if one applies a process of linguistic analysis, 
'N exists' turns out to be of some other form, which he 
then specifies? The form, of course, is dependent on the 
form of the technical rules imposed, so that the sentence 
could equally well be translated into any sort of code or 
language: and the supposed discovery is therefore really a
tautology. It says that if you adopt this particular code 
of interpretation, this is the result you get with 
sentences like this. And this information is trivial. It 
has absolutely no effect on our knowledge or understanding 
of the world.
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But does Russell perhaps Intend much more than this? One
would gather from his presentation of the theory and his 
insistence on its therapeutic effects that he did. Is this 
perhaps what he really means: that those who go around
making statements such as 'God exists', or 'God does not 
exist', or even (in extreme cases) 'Scott is the author of 
Waverley' are all the time, unknown to themselves, in 
error? Does he mean that all the time they have been 
ungrammatical, or unsyntactical. without knowing it, rather 
as Molière's Monsieur Jourdain had all the time been 
speaking prose? Does he mean that if only they knew better 
they would be saying things like 'There is an x such 
that ...'? That this is really what they are trying to 
say, what they mean. and only their benighted ignorance 
obstructs such true expression? That they would be better 
able to express their intentions satisfactorily if they 
changed their ways? And presumably, therefore, that this 
is the sort of thing that is said by the grammatical (or 
syntactical) élite?
One grows increasingly^sceptical of philosophers who tell 
people that they should not be saying what they are saying, 
but something else. In a way it is a self-defeating 
criticism, since by the time it is made it is too late for 
it to be useful.
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But let us say that this argument is wrong, and that 
Russell's analysis does make a genuine semantic point - a 
question of what the words mean — and that whenever people 
say 'N exists' it would be a clearer expression of what 
they intend if they phrased the statement in the longer 
way, but nobody actually does that because the cruder, less 
accurate phrase is shorter. One talks, for instance. of 
'The Wealth of Nations'. in most cases without being aware 
that the work one is referring to is in fact called 'An 
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations'. Now doubtless the latter form is really more 
correct, but the fact that one used the shorter form
instead in no way altered the significance of what one said 
about it: everything you say about "The Wealth of Nations'
is as true or untrue as it would be if you used the full 
title. It follows therefore that no puzzles on the subject 
could be resolved, no errors avoided, no "two millennia of
muddle—headedness" cleared up, by adopting a more long-
winded form of the same expression of meaning.
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Moreover we only have to look round us to see that errors 
of grammar (or syntax) do not affect meaning. 'Between you 
and I' works every bit as well as 'between you and me', 
though it is undoubtedly wrong; and if 'Scott exists' were 
wrong in some such way it would make absolutely no 
difference to the way in which it is used and the 
consequences of using it. Pronouncements do not become 
nonsense, it appears, just because they are incorrectly 
formulated.
If, then. the matter is really one of the relation of 
semantic significance to grammar or syntax it is of no 
interest. And if it is one of academic linguistic analysis 
it is of no consequence. In its claim to avoid the 
pitfalls of existence statements it turns out to be wrong, 
and as a problem-solving mechanism it seems likely to be 
unusable.
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1=5. Semantics and Ontology
There is an area of common concern between semantics (the 
study of meaning) and ontology (the theory of being) which 
leads to the question of what. if any, relationship there 
is between them. It would not be surprising if philosophy 
concluded that they cannot impinge on one another. since 
they deal with different matters. A lot of work in this 
area has been done by Quine and Carnap, and this is not 
quite the conclusion which they appear to reach. Quine, 
for instance. as we shall shortly see in detail. claims 
that one can commit oneself to an ontology by means of what 
one says. Carnap's approach reduces the matter to a choice 
of language system. so that questions of ontology do not 
occur.
The relevant works of Quine and Carnap form a dialogue or 
duet rather than a one-way process of influence. They are. 
for one thing, historically contemporary. They frequently 
refer to each other. occasionally in disagreement; in 
general they are singing the same song, and in moderately 
close harmony.
The papers in question. to which reference will be made in
this chapter, are as follows:
I. QUINE, Willard van Orman, 'On What There Is'. 1948 (1)
II. CARNAP, Rudolf. 'Empiricism. Semantics and Ontology' 
1950 (2) .
III. QUINE, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 1951 (3)
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Let us start by following the course of thinking conveyed 
by these three papers.
Quine starts, much as Russell did, with the apparent 
problem that denying the existence of something seems to 
entail reference to a something which is not. (4) This 
leads him to remark. usefully, that some terms (such as 
’Pegasus’) have "spatio-temporal connotations", and some 
(such as 'the cube root of 27') do not. (5) He follows 
Russell further in seeing a solution in analysis in terms 
of 'bound variables' (such as 'something', 'nothing') by 
means of which the descriptive phrase which might have 
caused problems disappears from the statement. (6)-. It is 
therefore not names or descriptions that should concern us 
when we ask ontological questions, since both can be made 
to disappear. (7).
Thus it appears to be reference which determines being; "to 
be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun." Or, 
more basically, "To be is, purely and simply, to be the 
value of a variable." (8). To what extent, then, does what 
we say commit us to an assertion of what there is? Quine 
at this point seems to think that it always does, but that 
our commitment may be varied with our statements. This is 
at least consistent. When we make a statement about (for 
instance) the characteristics of some zoological species, 
"we are committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the 
several species themselves, abstract though they be.
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We remain so committed at least until we devise some way •:-f
so paraphrasing the statement as to show that the seeming 
reference ... was an avoidable manner of speaking.". (9).
Does this therefore mean that things can be eliminated from 
reality purely by paraphrase? Or alternatively does Quine 
mean by 'recognizing as entities' only something as trivial 
as 'talking about'? 'We talk about things that we talk 
about' sounds somewhat less interesting.
Quine seems to back down hastily from the former possible 
interpretation, that things can be brought into existence 
by statement and eliminated again by paraphrase, and to 
settle for the second less exciting one. "Now how are we 
to adjudicate among rival ontologies?" he asks promisingly. 
(10). "Certainly the answer is not provided by the 
semantical formula" — the one. incidentally, which he had 
given two pages earlier - " 'To be is to be the value of a 
variable' ... We look to bound variables in connection 
with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in 
order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or 
someone else's, says there is; and this much is quite 
properly a problem involving language. But what there is 
is another question." (11). (That, indeed, is what he has. 
in opening, called "the ontological problem" (12)}. Later 
on p. 203 Quine reinforces this position very firmly, with 
the sentence "we must not jump to the conclusion that what 
there is depends on words."
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Although this seems to be a betrayal of the trend of his 
argument so far. if the above is a fair summary of that, 
this is a position on which Quine will remain steadfast, 
and therefore one which we must examine seriously. 
Elsewhere ('Logic and the Reification of Universals*. a 
paper written mainly in 1947 and revised in the early 
1950's) he attempts to clarify the consequences of this 
stand. (13).
I am not suggesting a dependence of being upon 
language. What is under consideration is not the 
ontological commitments of a discourse. What there 
is does not in general depend on one's use of 
language, but what one says there is does.
We shall return to these words. Dealing at this point with 
the doubts to which they give rise (the unease generated, 
for instance, by that phrase 'in general') would obstruct 
the present exposition of the Quine-Carnap argument. Let 
us therefore try to disentangle the position now attained 
by Quine.
1- Statements can give rise to ontological
commitments,
2. Such commitments however are not a measure of what
there is, but a delineation of what we say there 
is.
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adopting a scientific theory. we have reasons for adopting 
one rather than another. chiefly the desire for "the 
simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered 
fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged." 
(14). (N). In constructing a "conceptual scheme" simplicity
is the overriding criterion. (18). "By bringing together 
scattered sense events and treating them as perceptions of 
one object. we reduce the complexity of our stream of 
experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity." (19).
N: Perhaps Quine's severest critic is Ilham Oilman, whose
book 'Quine on Ontology. Necessity and Experience. A 
Philosophical Critique’ (15) points to some crucial 
internal contradictions in Quine's work. He questions, for 
instance. the coherence of Quine's talk of 'raw reality'. 
This implies "an ontology which is not relative to a 
particular language." But if Quine "thinks of the idea of 
an absolute ontology as confused, then what does he mean by 
'raw'?" (16) "Surely," Oilman says earlier. "where it
makes sense to speak of ordering there must be something 
that is ordered ...". (17)
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Quine référés to physical objects as "postulated entities", 
comparable to the notion of irrational numbers, having "the 
status of a convenient myth".(20). (N) This is a term he 
resorts to elsewhere, in the important paper 'Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism', which we shall be discussing shortly:
N: Ayer comments (21) on this procedure: "No doubt we can
rid ourselves of abstract entities, or even of physical 
objects, by so limiting our use of the word 'exists' that 
we can consistently label them as 'convenient myths', but 
this does not prove that they really have no being. For 
what right have we to assume that nothing exists but what 
can be experienced? If someone wishes to have a more 
generous ontology, how can we refute him except on the 
basis of definitions which he is at liberty to reject? May 
he not even be right?"
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Physical objects are conceptually imported into the
situation as convenient intermediaries - not by 
definition in terms of experience, but simply as 
irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically. to 
the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay 
physicist, believe in physical objects and not in 
Homer's gods: and I consider it a scientific error to 
believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological 
footing the physical objects and the gods differ only 
in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities
enter our conception only as cultural posits.
The myth of physical objects is epistemologically 
superior to most in that it has proved more effica­
cious than other myths as a device for working a 
manageable structure into the flux of experience. 
(22). (N).
N. Oilman's comments are again relevant: " ... Quine seems
to think that any posit must be a myth. But if it does the 
work for which it has been posited or postulated why should 
it be a myth? Presumably because it is 'only' a posit'.
Only a posit as opposed to what?" (23) Later, he says:
"Quine is wrong both about physical objects, as I have 
argued. and about Homer's gods. He is immeasurably crude 
in his few scattered remarks about the latter. in fact a 
complete philistine." (24).
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We have now come a step further:
3. We decide on what we will say there is. on grounds
of simplicity in relation to experience.
This brings us conveniently to a point at which we may turn 
to the parallel discussions of Carnap.
It may be useful to start with if we identify a case of 
doubtful terminology. We have been speaking, with Quine, 
about ontologies, an ontology, etc., as if we were clear 
about what this meant. Quine several times says such things 
as 'commitment to an ontology', 'commit ourselves to an 
ontology' (25), and we have followed his way of speaking 
while expounding his case. But to Carnap the use of this 
word is misleading. It seems indeed that he decides to 
misunderstand it, thus demonstrating its imprecision:
With respect to the basic attitude to take in choosing 
a language form (an "ontology" in Quine's terminology, 
which seems to me misleading), ... (26).
Now if one thing is clear from Quine's statements it is 
that by 'ontology' he did not mean 'a language form'. To 
him indeed the choice of a language form sometimes did not 
commit the speaker to an ontology. He speaks, for instance, 
of "the degree to which in our philosophical and 
unphilosophical discourse we involve ourselves in 
ontological commitments." (27).
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When Carnap appears to think that Quine means by 'ontology'
something like 'a language form in which assertions of 
existence occur' he is surely being unnecessarily misled. 
It is clear from Quine's words that there is on the one 
hand a form of discourse and on the other an implication of 
existence. the first of which can entail an assertion of 
the second. But to Carnap, as we shall see, such a 
connection is quite unacceptable.
Carnap calls a system of speaking about things a framework; 
and he starts by making a crucial distinction between 
questions which are internal to the framework. and 
questions about the framework itself, which are external to 
it. (28). To talk about things is to use a thing— language 
and thus to adopt the framework of things. But to ask 
about the reality of the thing—world itself (these terms 
are Carnap's. and may prove useful to us) is to ask a 
question external to this framework. He implies that there 
is no framework for asking external questions in, and 
therefore that any such questions are "framed in a wrong 
way". Such questions, he says later, are "devoid of 
cognitive content". (29). We are reminded of Wittgenstein 
in the Tractatus. distinguishing between what is in the 
world and what is beyond the world, (and indeed the 
derivation of these thoughts may well be traceable to that 
source via the Vienna Circle).
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But we are also reminded that Russell. with the theory of 
types, produced a perfectly good system for asking 
questions about totalities, when he distinguished between 
first-order and second-order propositions. Provided one 
does not confuse the two, one can meaningfully ask second- 
order questions about collections of first-order
propositions. Why not. we may wonder. a second—order 
framework within which questions could be asked about 
first-order frameworks?
Carnap, however. does not dwell on this point; he is 
concerned with something else. He wishes to make the point 
that to accept the reality of something "means nothing more 
than to accept a certain form of language". (30)
What he wants to know now is why or how one chooses to 
accept that language. This acceptance. he says, is not a 
theoretical question, but a practical one. The decision 
itself is "not of a cognitive nature", i.e. it is not a
question of knowledge or information (31). though it may 
be influenced by knowledge:
The purposes for which the language is intended to be 
used, for instance, the purpose of communicating 
factual knowledge, will determine which factors are
relevant for the decision. The efficiency,
fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing 
language may be among the decisive factors. (32).
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With the use of the word ‘simplicity' here we are reminded 
of Quine. Carnap, however, will rather stress the factor 
of usefulness. Like Quine at one point, noted above. he 
recognises the relevance of experience;
The thing language in the customary form works indeed 
with a high degree of efficiency for' most purposes of 
everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon 
the content of our experiences. However, it would be 
wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact
of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming 
evidence for the reality of the thing world"; we should 
rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to
accept the thing language". (33).
Let us again summarise in simplified form:
1. Talking about things amounts to adopting the thing— 
world framework.
2. We adopt the thing-world framework because it accords 
conveniently with experience.
Like Quine he will not take the next step, whichever way it 
might be, and say either that the world of things is 
brought into existence by our choice of framework and has 
no other existence; or that the thing— language works well 
because the non— linguistic world does really contain 
things.
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Our experiences do not, in his analysis. tell us about 
those things; they simply tell us about the efficiency of 
the thing-language. The refusal to take any third step is 
based on his earlier decision not to allow cognitive 
content to questions external to the framework.
However. the efficiency of the thing-language does. Carnap 
agrees, give it some sort of prerogative. This, he says, 
is a practical matter; and he will not allow us to draw any 
theoretical conclusion from it. Yet surely, we wish to 
reply. it is practical in relation to a state of affairs 
external to the framework, with which the framework has to 
co-operate? Asserting its efficiency, usefulness,
practicality etc., is itself making an external claim? It 
is not merely saying that a language must be internally 
consistent, but is it not rather saying that it must fit. 
itself, into a framework larger than itself? When both 
Quine and Carnap allude to the part played by experience
they admit the relevance of matters external to the system
itself.
Carnap, using the example of the choice of geometrical 
frameworks, considers co-ordinate systems: " ... the
decision to use three rather than two or four spatial
coordinates is strongly suggested, but still not forced
upon us, by the result of common observations." (34).
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Now if observation can be mentioned at all, we may feel, so
can the existence of the world of objects of observation,
which, according to this statement, appears to be external 
to the framework in question. But no, apparently not. 
Empirical questions are permissible, because this is an 
empirical framework. But ontological questions are not:
Internal questions are here, in general, empirical 
questions to be answered by empirical investigations. 
On the other hand, the external questions of the 
reality of physical space and physical time are pseudo­
questions. (35).
If we ask, he continues, whether there are really such 
things as space-time points, we may be asking an internal 
question, to which the answer is a matter of definition, 
and therefore "analytic and trivial". (36). Or we may be 
asking whether we should introduce a particular term into
our language, which is a practical question, "a matter of
decision rather than assertion", and only misleadingly 
presented as anything else. Or we might be asking whether 
our experiences are such as to make it "expedient and 
fruitful" to use these particular linguistic forms, which 
is, he says, a matter of degree and so not open to a clear- 
cut answer. (37). Nowhere, in fact, do we approach an 
assertion or denial of reality external to the system.
Carnap summarises his own case as follows.
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Adopting a framework - "the introduction of new ways of 
speaking" - does not imply any assertion of reality. (38). 
(We may note that this is in contrast to Quine's point 
about commitment to an ontology; Carnap is insistent that 
accepting the framework implies no "assumption. belief, or 
assertion" of the reality of anything.)
To be sure. we have to face at this point an important 
question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical 
question; it is the question of whether or not to 
accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot 
be judged as being either true or false because it is 
not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more 
or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for 
which the language is intended. (39).
The same considerations, he says, apply to the use of 
abstract linguistic forms, involved for instance in talk of 
universals and numbers. This question of whether some form 
of language is "expedient and fruitful" (40) (N) is "not a 
question simply of yes or no, but a matter of degree."
N: Overleaf
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N; Compare Ayer (41) on the subject of universals: "The
question of universals is unrewarding as a subject for 
ontology since nothing turns on it. Once we have set out 
the motives for saying that there are universals and the 
motives for saying that there are not. the decision is 
unimportant. Whichever view is taken, nothing follows with 
regard to the truth or falsehood of any statement in which 
the predicates which are supposed to stand for universals 
are used." And further: "The trouble with these questions
is that there are no agreed criteria by reference to which 
they can be settled. If the purist wishes to deny himself 
the use of certain symbols, then let him do so: it will be 
interesting to see how well he manages without them. Those 
who decide to retain them will consider it a sufficient 
justification that they perform the function that they do. 
There is no way of justifying their retention other than 
describing the use to which they are put."
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This, we will see, is closely in accordance with the 
inclinations of Quine in his later paper, though the 
emphasis is different. Crucially Quine is inclined to say 
that it is a matter of degree as to what exists, rather 
than what language form we choose. Let us now turn to 
Quine's paper, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’
The two dogmas to which Quine refers are (1) that 
statements are true either from their meanings, which 
statements are known as analytic, or due to their relation 
to fact, which are known as synthetic; and that there is 
"some fundamental cleavage" between the two: and (2) that
meaningful statements are reducible to a form related to 
immediate experience. He is evasive about the exact 
expression of this last idea, so that one needs to use his 
own words: "the belief that each meaningful statement is
equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer 
to immediate experience." (42). Both these dogmas he 
considers mistaken, and his aim is to refute them.
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In his dealing with the first dogma we shall see Quine
departing radically from Carnap's standpoint. and in both 
we find him tackling, as Carnap did not (N) the crucial 
area of the relation of language to experience. His avowed 
aim is the achievement of a consistent pragmatism. That 
is, he recognises the wisdom of Carnap's identification of 
usefulness and expediency as the criterion by which 
language forms are chosen, but feels that this approach may 
be more fruitfully exploited.
N: See, however, Carnap’s paper ’The Elimination of
Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language’ (43) 
where he approaches a consideration of what verification 
actually consists of. "Since the meaning of a word is
determined by its criterion of application (in other words: 
by the relations of deducibility entered into by its
elementary sentence-form, by its truth conditions, by the 
method of its verification), the stipulation of the 
criterion takes away one's freedom to decide what one 
wishes to 'mean' by the word." The primary sentences. he
says, are supposed to refer to 'the given'; "but there is
no unanimity on the question what it is that is given." 
(44). This is perhaps as close as Carnap comes to a 
consideration of the relation of language to experience. 
Although he talks about "empirical criteria" and the method 
of verification, it is clear that language remains a matter 
of syntax and deducibility which he sees as a free-standing 
system.
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The idea of analyticity rests, Quine observes. on 
synonymity. He investigates at length what characteristics 
define a synonym, and comes to the conclusion that a 
circular argument results. (45). Briefly, synonymity can 
only be defined in terms of interchangeability without loss 
of truth; but the preservation of truth values can only be 
understood, Quine argues, if one already possesses the idea 
of an analytic statement. Whether his argument on this 
matter is convincing or not need not concern us here, since 
the interesting point is the effect of rejecting Carnap's 
division between the analytic and the synthetic.
"It is obvious that truth in general depends on both 
language and extralinguistic fact." This statement comes 
towards the end of a long explicit disagreement with 
Carnap. (46). If statements were, however, dissectable 
into linguistic and factual parts, there would be some in 
which the factual parts would have a zero value, and these 
would be analytic statements. But according to Quine no 
such distinction has yet satisfactorily been made, and 
therefore "That there is such a distinction to be drawn at 
all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical 
article of faith." (47) (N).
N: Overleaf
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N: In drawing this paper to a close. Quine summarises his
agreement and disagreement with Carnap. Unlike Carnap, he 
will not admit a distinction between ontological questions 
(presumably Carnap's 'external' ones) and the ('internal') 
questions of natural science. Quine gives the example of 
the question whether to count classes as entities. "Now 
Carnap has maintained that this is a question not of 
matters of fact but of choosing a convenient language form, 
a convenient conceptual scheme of framework for science. 
With this I agree, but only on the proviso that the same 
be conceded regarding scientific hypotheses generally. 
Carnap has recognized that he is able to preserve a double 
standard for ontological questions and scientific 
hypotheses only by assuming an absolute distinction between 
the analytic and the synthetic; and I need not say again 
that this is a distinction which I reject."
Turning to the reference which Quine gives at this point, 
we may read Carnap's side of the story;
Quine does not acknowledge the distinction which I 
emphasize above, because according to his general 
conception there are no sharp boundary lines between 
logical and factual truth, between questions of meaning 
and questions of fact, between the acceptance of a 
language structure and the acceptance of an assertion 
formulated in the language. (48)
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N : cont. . .
Quine responds:
I have been urging that this difference is only one of 
degree, and that it turns upon our vaguely pragmatic 
inclination to adjust one strand of the fabric of science 
rather than another in accommodating some particular 
recalcitrant experience. Conservatism figures in such 
choices, and so does the quest for simplicity.
Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the 
question of choosing between language forms, scientific 
frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined 
boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In 
repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough 
pragmatism. Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a 
continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the 
considerations which guide him in warping his scientific 
heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, 
where rational, pragmatic. (49).
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Historically both Quine and Carnap were writing these 
articles at a time when the rejection of metaphysics and 
commitment to empiricism were part of philosophical 
orthodoxy. It would have seemed very eccentric for either 
of them to have claimed not to be an empiricist. (N). Yet 
the second dogma which Quine now attacks is the basis of 
the verification theory of meaning (51), and he observes 
that while this dogma. "the translatabi1ity of statements 
about the physical world into statements about immediate 
experience" (52), occupied a good deal of Carnap’s 
attention in his earlier works, "in his later writing he 
abandoned all notion" of it; "Reductionism in its radical 
form has long since ceased to figure in Carnap's 
philosophy." (53).
Now Quine sees the two dogmas as being closely related. 
"My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root 
of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a 
factual component in the truth of any individual 
statements." (54). How then is truth related to fact? As 
an empiricist, he is obliged to explain. "The dogma of
reductionism survives in the supposition that each 
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit 
of confirmation or infirmation at all.
N;Dilman comments (50); "For all his rejection of
'dogmas', he is tied to the apron-strings of Logical 
Positivism.
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My countersuggestion, issuing essentially from Carnap’s 
doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau, is that our
statements about the external world face the tribunal of
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
body." (55). It is as a totality that a linguistic system, 
such as that of science, "has a double dependence upon 
language and experience", a duality not identifiable in 
any of its statements individually.
This seems highly promising, but we must observe that it is 
in conflict with a point of Carnap's already noted. We
cannot say anything about the system as a whole, least of 
all whether it corresponds to sense experience, since these 
are external matters and therefore, in terms of the
framework, devoid of cognitive significance. We were, 
however, less than happy about this specification when it 
occurred. supposing that ways could be found of avoiding 
it. And if Quine is now proposing a formula which may 
prove useful and which contradicts it, perhaps we should 
not feel that Carnap's internal/external ruling need much 
de lay us,
Individual statements do not break down into linguistic and 
non-1inguistic elements, and so cannot be either analytic 
or synthetic: the whole body of statements, however, has a
dual dependence, on language and on experience. As a 
"corporate body" our statements about the external world 
have to "face the tribunal of sense experience".
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That is, presumable, to the extent to which the whole body 
partly depends on experience. The whole body has a 
synthetic element. It follows, but is at present less 
interesting. that the whole body has an analytic element, 
which has to face a different tribunal. that of meaning. 
Thus we may happily continue to be empiricists, while still 
exercising our preference for semantics.
Quine's conclusions from these stimulating considerations 
are of special relevance to the present work, and so will 
now be considered in detail. It will be useful then to set 
this later paper in the context of the points made earlier 
by both Quine and Carnap, to see to what extent we have 
progressed and whether the doubts to which some of the 
earlier discussions gave rise have been aggravated or 
quelled.
Quine applies his conclusions about empiricism to the body 
of our knowledge or beliefs, that which, in his earlier 
terms, we would assert that there is, "from the most casual 
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of 
atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic". 
(56). This body of belief, he says, "is a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along its edges." He is. 
however, prepared to adapt it to conform to experience.
1-03
"A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions 
readjustments in the interior of the field." (57). It 
follows, though he does not explicitly say so, that 
experience is itself a system independent of language. or 
of whatever form the knowledge. laws etc. may be supposed 
to take. Experience is not a man-made fabric, but
(therefore) given from outside any man-made system. This
latent point does not quite accord with what he has to say
next.
The fact is that if we know what we know partly through the 
effect of experience, we may be supposed to know of
something, not just to know something. What has Quine to
say on this delicate subject? Every statement. Quine says, 
can be treated in the way we treat analytic statements, 
"can be held true come what may," even one which seems to 
be close to the boundary with experience. Equally every
statement, even those which seem to state immutable laws,
is always open to revision in the light of experience. Yet 
it appears that in this particular democracy some
statements are more equal than others; when a statement 
seems particularly "germane to sense experience", what this 
means, Quine explains, is that there is a "relative 
likelihood, in practice, of our choosing one statement 
rather than another for revision in the event of 
recalcitrant experience." But why? Whence this relative 
likelihood? What has one statement got that another lacks?
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There is. he continues, a "natural tendency to disturb the 
total system as little as possible". Some statements are 
felt "to have a sharper empirical reference" than others. 
(58). Those, it is implied, cause more trouble if you 
adjust them.
So once again the trouble-makers get preferential 
treatment? Is this fair? Why should the harmless "highly 
theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology" be 
liable to continual adjustment, when statements such as 
that which says "there are brick houses on Elm Street" can 
be assured of immunity? Why is this? There must be a 
reason? Is it not, we wish to ask, precisely because there 
are brick houses on Elm Street?
Quine cannot admit this, since "any statement can be held 
true come whay may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system" (59), which is a necessary 
condition if one is to do away with the Carnapian 
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic; and it 
can therefore be maintained, with a certain amount of 
effort, that there are no brick houses on Elm Street. It 
is a matter of convenience, and convenience is a matter of 
degree. To cite again the crucial passage quoted above;
(60)
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Physical objects are conceptually imported into the 
situation as convenient intermediaries - not by 
definition in terms of experience. but simply as 
irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to 
the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay 
physicist, believe in physical objects and not in 
Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to 
believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological 
footing the physical objects and the gods differ only 
in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities 
enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth 
of physical objects is epistemologically superior to 
most in that it has proved more efficacious than other 
myths as a device for working a manageable structure 
into the flux of experience. (21).
But what this amounts to is that physical objects are not 
entirely of the epistemological status of myths, for the 
good reason that we do not find ourselves obliged to 
accommodate our language to concur with the experience of 
mythic items. The choice of posit, Quine clearly says, is 
only better or worse in relation to the "differences in the 
degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense 
experiences". This makes centaurs as a posit considerably 
less worthy than brick houses on Elm Street.
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ihis is not just to say that they are more liable tc/ 
adjustment; they are simply not as good. We are never 
going to have our dealings with experience expedited by 
talking of centaurs. This is moreover not a matter of 
degree. but an absolute position. Perhaps Quine is 
exaggerating. when he says that "in point of 
epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods 
differ only in degree and not in kind."
The edge of the system must be kept squared with 
experience; the rest. with all its elaborate myths or 
fictions. has as its objective the simplicity of laws.
(61)
The edge of the system is squared with something outside 
the system. with something which, in these terms, would 
be another system, the system of experience. Shall we 
therefore highlight the existence of these two systems by 
calling them systems A and B?
Now system A, that of language and its associated knowledge 
and beliefs, has its internal organisation, in which such 
things as influence from the periphery, distance from the 
edge, and so on, are matters of degree.
Now this applies to all factors internal to system A. We 
may usefully borrow Carnap's terms here, and distinguish 
between internal and external questions. The position of a 
point within the organisation of system A is a matter which 
is relational in terms of the framework of system A.
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But the framework of system A itself cannot be such a 
relative matter: it cannot be relative to the framework of
system A. If with Carnap we choose not to discuss it. 
holding such discourse devoid of significance, we can say 
no more. But if like Quine we do hold that system A makes 
contact with system B at its edges, then there is something 
more we can say.
The interface with system B is not a feature within the 
framework of system A. It is rather a property of system A 
as a whole. This is perhaps what Quine meant when he said 
that our beliefs can only be tested as a corporate body. 
But it does not fit with his dictum that all decisions as 
to the use of terms are a matter of degree. The final edge 
of system A is a form of absolute, a limiting case. There 
is nothing for the interface with system B to be a degree 
of: there is no scale of calibration available.
The only way we could continue the doctrine (which one 
might call 'Quine's dogma’) is by seeing both system A and 
system B as components of a supersystem, system 0. whereby 
the interfaces between them become internal to the organi­
sation or framework of system 0, and therefore relative to 
that, and so a matter of degree.
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We have now broadly reviewed this material. It leaves one 
with a curious sense of ambivalence, as being at the same 
time tantalisingly promising and ultimately disappointing. 
The time has come to give expression to some doubts. When 
Carnap leads us to recognise the distinction between 
internal and external questions, he prompts us to remark 
that it is the latter which we wish to ask; he then 
dismisses them as devoid of cognitive significance. When 
Quine says that we must not think that what there is 
depends on words: it is what we say there is that depends
on words, he leads us to ask what then is known of what 
there is? If external questions are not cognitively 
significant because they are practical rather than 
theoretical, is there not something very significant and 
informative about the fact of their practicality?
In any case, how can Quine possibly distinguish between 
what there is and what we say there is, since every time he 
makes a statement on the subject of what there is he is 
destroying the distinction. On the one hand, to say that 
there is such a distinction is to claim that there is a 
realm of what there is which is not spoken about. On the
other hand to say that there is a realm of what we say
there is entails holding that we do speak about what there 
is. If Quine says there is (a) 'what there is', and (b)
'what we say there is', how is he going to express this
claim that there is (a)?
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How is he going to say that he knows about it, that it is
separate from (b), or anything at all, without
contradiction? And if he cannot do any of these things, 
then what is the sense in trying to make the claim? 
Whereof he cannot speak, thereof he should have remained 
silent. But it is too late.
Our programme now must be to disentangle our
dissatisfactions and state them in a way that would help us 
to find a means of revealing, if possible, the point at 
which a promising line of thought diverged from our 
expectations. What, then, is one's overall reaction to the 
arguments of these two philosophers? It is hard to avoid 
the response that the existence of some things makes itself 
apparent to us in strict independence of, and without the 
help of, any linguistic structure chosen by an act of 
decision. An apple falls on the head of Isaac Newton 
Right, Carnap replies, all you are about to say is that
Newton, among others, has chosen to adopt the thing-
language. It is convenient for him (and incidentally has 
far-reaching consequences) that he did; had he been more 
inclined to describe the event in terms of relativity or 
quantum physics, or indeed if he had opted instead for the 
language of Berkeleian idealism, we might never have had 
the law of gravitational attraction.
110
The event itself, however, had no meaningful non-framework 
form. Whatever it may be that has made itself known to 
Newton, it is not, in exclusion from his preference for the 
thing-language, an object, namely an apple, which strikes 
him on the head.
Very well, we bear in mind the alternatives, and defer to 
Carnap on cases which involve the thing-language. But 
there are non-thinglike entities which surely manifest 
themselve to us without our needing to choose a language 
system to enable them to do so. Take for instance the 
thunderstorm which broke while we crossed Time Square last 
night. Now there was a set of circumstances which we 
became aware of through direct sensation of several 
different forms, none of which were linguistic in the 
slightest. Nothing is plainer than that the thunderstorm 
was real, that it was part of actuality, and that in the 
process of getting wet we have made no linguistic decisions 
whatsoever.
There is, to the layman without an umbrella, nothing 
linguistic about this thunderstorm at all. It is presented 
to us without any action on our part as a fact of the real 
world.
Now Quine would say that while all this may be so it is not 
the point that he is making.
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He is only saying that our ' grouping together various
phenomena and reifying them under a single title, 
'thunderstorm in Time Square', is a decision about the
choice of linguistic forms, and anything we may appear to 
say about the reality of the phenomena in fact amounts only 
to saying something about the happening of that choice. 
Quine would probably not deny that in mentioning our
attitude to the phenomena he is implying that there are
such phenomena. He accepts that one of the things that 
makes one language system preferable to another is the 
degree of accord with experience. But he does not admit 
that anything is being said about the phenomena 
experienced, not even that they exist, when we talk about 
such an event being real or actual.
Now on the one hand one can see the usefulness of this. 
'That is the sort of thing that I, in my chosen language 
system, call real or actual.' This distinguishes, for
instance, thunderstorms from events which may be equally 
intensely experienced but are nevertheless recognised as 
hallucinatory.
Yet what is unsatisfactory is the apparent refusal to 
follow the causal chain to its natural conclusion. The 
choice of language is partly conditioned by experience; the 
experience, it is not denied, is non-1inguistic; therefore, 
surely, the causes of the experience must be real in a
perfectly non-1inguistic way?
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That Quine will not say this even when he is led to the 
brink of doing so must make us wonder what it is about it 
that he dislikes. To understand this I think we have to 
remember the paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' , of which the 
conclusion 'Empiricism Without the Dogmas' points clearly 
to the position which Quine wished to adopt.
A programme which attempts to rid empiricism of its 
dependence on experience may seemed doomed to failure. But 
Quine does not deny that experience plays a part in the 
process of decision-making which he sees going on. Had he 
not been willing to accept this he would have had to 
embrace the standpoint that words alone determine (or 
perhaps constitute?) the makeup of the world. And this, we 
have seen, he is not willing to do. He is, as he says, 
aiming for a wider and purer pragmatism than Carnap's.
If the rejection of experience as the ultimate validation 
of statements did in fact lead to the loss of empiricism, 
then surely Quine would have the duty either to accept that 
loss or to avoid that rejection? The fact is that he 
cannot reject experience entirely; he wants to remain an 
empiricist; he wants to accept that there is a 'what there 
is' which does not depend on words; but he sees that what 
there is when construed through the medium of what he says 
there is has a flexibility the infinitude of which is only 
constrained by pragmatic considerations.
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To summarise the doubts. then. First, the difficulties 
inherent in distinguishing what there is from what we say 
there is make this a most unpromising course to follow. 
And if they cannot (and I think they cannot) be 
distinguished, then possibly they are the same thing, or at 
least so causally linked as to be part of the same event. 
This could work in either of two ways:
(1) What there is is whatever we say there is, in that it 
gets its being from that saying:
or
(2) We say what we say there is because of what there is.
This is not as confusing as it sounds. Let 'what there is'
= X. 'what we say there is' = q :
(1) q governs x
(2) X  g o v e r n s  q
You cannot have it both ways. But Quine, with remarkable
self-denial, wants to have it neither. He can only do that
if he can find a way of disentangling the two items; but it 
seems to me that their nature is such that neither can live 
without the other. The reader may try the experiment for 
himself. First, say that there is something without saying 
that there is something. Second, say that something is 
without saying that something is.
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A second set of related doubts may be summarised as
follows. If we adopt a language form because of its 
simplicity in relation to experience. this implies that
experience is something outside that language form. At
this point I think it would be interesting to ask some
simple layman's questions.
1. Are our experiences real?
2. Are they experiences of real objects?
If the answer to 1 is no, then why are they relevant to a 
choice of language system?
If the answer to 1 is yes and the answer to 2 (for whatever 
reason) no, then what are our experiences experiences of? 
What, in fact, are they?
But if the answer to both questions is yes, then why do the 
semantic philosophers not allow us to say so?
Has the process of discussion of semantics and ontology 
somehow gone wrong? Should we conclude after all that 
semantics cannot throw any light on ontology, because it 
deals with a different subject, using different tools and 
attending to different matter? But surely the structure of 
the world and the structure of language must be mutaily 
relevant to one another? Nobody is claiming that the 
choice of language system is an arbitrary or random matter.
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In fact it is said to be pragmatic, decided in terms of 
usefulness, expediency, efficiency or simplicity. And if 
the choice is a pragmatic matter, then whatever it is that 
makes one system more convenient than another is discovered 
empirically. Otherwise what does 'convenient' mean? It 
must mean that it has a certain type of accord or relation 
to experience.
So deciding on a system is in effect making some sort of 
assertion about what the world is like, because if it was 
of a structure which did not accord with this language 
system one would have chosen another. The decision says, 
as a minimum, that the makeup of the world is of a sort 
that makes this language system convenient. We saw Quine 
inclined to deny this, but he cannot do so consistently. 
Perhaps one could go on from there. For our purposes we 
only need to note that something is asserted by semantics 
about ontology. (62).
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II FROM UNIVERSALS TO CHAIRS AND TABLES
Introduction
To sum up, before we start the review which constitutes 
this Section, the progress we have so far made: Existence
is at least partly a practical matter; the use of the word 
'exists' in assertions or denials cannot be reduced to a 
purely theoretical exercise. This has been the conclusion 
reached from investigation of several different approaches 
to the question of existence, ranging from the Platonic 
formula to the work of the semanticists. With this 
conclusion behind us we now approach an important move.
In this second Section we will see that an agreement-based 
decision is the necessary reverse of the empirical coin. 
It will emerge that while claims about the existence of 
something can have no meaning without a reference to
experience, they are at the same time implicitly statements 
about what is agreed.
The primary significance of this second point will emerge 
from the discussion. This position might be summarised as 
follows. It is no test of whether or not something exists
to refer to experience. That is not how the matter is
ultimately decided. It is however a test - and the one we 
normally use, albeit without noticing - to refer to
agreement.
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1 is in oraer lo mcixe tnis ciear tnat nnis Section will
now consider a range of cases of entities Co which 
statements about existence may be applied, from those which 
common-sense would consider to exist only in a very weak 
sense. such as numbers and universels; through more
debatable classes such as terms supposedly standing for 
medical or scientific entities: by way of things which we
know for one reason or another do not exist, yet may still 
be spoken of in similar terms: through the marginal class
of things which may possibly exist (such as the Loch Ness 
Monster and the abominable snowman) but about which one
cannot, for one reason or another, be sure; ending by
considering such features of the world as those which
nobody outside philosophy would doubt existed.
Inserted into this graded procedure is a discussion of a 
special case. the closed system, which will throw some 
light onto the methodology of disputes.
In all this we shall be trying to discover what is actually 
meant in each case where an existence claim is made or 
rejected, and trying to identify what procedures disputes 
on such claims lead the disputants to adopt. We will be 
interested to discover whether the means of settling 
disputes varies between the cases.
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II. 1. Concerning Universels
Aristotle said that Socrates did not believe that 
universels existed independently of the particular objects, 
"It was the others who made them separate, and called these 
separate entities the Forms of everything that exists", 
(1) . But however little we know about the mind of 
Socrates. there is no doubt about what Plato believed. or 
at least claimed to believe and consistently argued for. 
True knowledge can be approached only by thought, not 
through the senses. (2). This is because the qualities 
apparent in particular objects of sense all fall short of 
their absolute form. (3). Yet there must be such an 
absolute, and that being so the objects of sense gain their 
qualities by resemblance to the respective absolutes. (4).
If that exposition of the Theory of Forms has the merit 
only of brevity, it is because we are not really concerned 
here with discussing it. What we are concerned with is the 
following problem: when Plato asserted that there were
such things as 'absolute beauty and magnitude and all the 
rest' (5) what did he mean?
Now clearly he did not mean that if we happened to go 
somewhere we would encounter Beauty. Anything perceived by 
the senses can be perceived in different ways, and so falls 
short of being absolute; and thus it would be self­
contradictory to hold that what is absolute could be 
perceived by the senses.
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Since his universa 11a are definitely ante rem. since he
even concluded that we have knowledge of them before our
birth. being born knowing them (6), he cannot mean that we 
can extract, from instances of justice, the idea or concept 
of pure and unadulterated Justice.
Plato implies in fact that there could be Justice without 
there being justice. And certainly that if there were no 
Justice there could be no justice. The absolute is free­
standing, independent of the instances. Yet what sort of 
thing can it be?
Plato does, however, give us the impression that by the
Form of something he intends much the same sort of thing,
in perfect form. as the object with which we are familiar, 
with the crucial difference that it can be perceived only 
by the mind. Towards the end of The Republic he says that 
the maker of a bed or a table has his eye on the relevant
Form. (7). But the Form of Bed, he goes on to say, was
made, if it was made by anybody, by God. (8). God made the
unique and pre-existent Bed, the essential and real Bed. 
Now this is crucial, in that it implies that the Form of 
Bed is the sort of thing that exists somewhere, since it 
may be thought of as having been made, and since Plato says 
that for one reason or another there is only one of it. (9)
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Indeed Plato may be guilty of some internal inconsistency 
on this matter. since he has said that 'the beautiful, and 
the good' are never seen 'with your eyes' or any other
sense, but through thought, (10), yet when he speaks of 
eternal and absolute Beauty in the Symposium (11) he talks 
of seeing, catching sight of, appearing to and coming to
sight of, exactly as if the person having the experience
were using his eyes.
Certainly there is much that is mystical in Plato. and we 
do not always know on what level to take what he says: he
also makes full and frequent use of metaphor. so that the 
literal sense of any statement may be open to doubt. Let 
us therefore offer alternative views, as being the main 
possibilities of what he might have meant,
Plato might mean that there is an actual thing. Beauty, 
which one can (by means which we do not need to understand, 
though by thought rather than through the senses) come to 
see, just as one sees Socrates sitting across the table. 
If he meant that, we would be entitled to ask him such 
questions as 'how do you know?’ and 'where is it?’ and so 
on.
Alternatively he might mean that by advanced intellectual 
training one could come to perceive the idea of pure and 
absolute Beauty, the refinement of the concept in the mind, 
in such a way that talk of 'seeing' it etc. is necessary to 
express the clarity of the perception.
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Under such circumstances it would not be relevant U;- ask 
about location. and we would have to be content wlt-h 
wondering whether his expression of an experience which we 
may suppose him to have had is not slightly misleading.
The relevance of this paraphrase of Plato to our present 
exercise is as follows. We do not have to decide on the
sense of an existential claim, providing we are able to
identify the broad classes of alternative. When we have 
done that. however, we are presented with a choice of 
different procedures, if we wish to go further and contest 
or support the claim. And that concerns us, because as a 
purely practical matter it indicates the direction* in which 
the meaning of existence claims may lie.
We have had occasion to say of Plato's theories before that 
if they cannot be applied in the course of deciding actual 
questions they are of diminished interest. (12).
Let us take, then, an example of a possible real dispute, 
and consider how a disagreement on the matter of the 
existence of universels might actually arise. Citizen A,
also known as the man in the street, has the habit of
proclaiming "There's no justice in the world'. Elsewhere, 
on a different platform, an aspiring politician, B, is 
making the claim 'I stand for liberty and justice'. Now 
clearly if they met they would be confronted with 
an incompatibility, and if pressed on the matter would need 
to agree on a means of resolving it.
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What A means is that he has encountered numerous examples 
of unjust circumstances and no evidence of the contrary. 
Does he mean that this has led him to conclude that Plato 
was wrong, in that there is not after all an absolute item. 
Justice, which enables just things to take place? But both 
he and Plato have knowledge of at least the idea of 
justice. otherwise he could not deny its occurrence in the 
world. So does he perhaps mean that although he concedes 
the possibility of Plato's Justice, he does not expect ever 
to encounter manifestations of it in this vale of tears? 
The question matters to B, because without at least the 
possibility of justice he cannot maintain his position. It 
would therefore be wise of him to refute A's claim, which 
he will presumably do by pointing to instances of bona fide 
justice. In doing so he would illustrate the fact that 
they share the common notion. We shall see what may result 
from that.
It might, of course, have been otherwise. They might have 
found that they disagreed about the meaning of the word. 
This would quickly have brought them, and us, to a 
deadlock, and since there is a strong vested interest for 
all parties in avoiding that, we may freely suppose that 
either from the start or after brief discussion they become 
clear in their agreement.
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B: How can you say there's no justice, when we propose to
give Old Age Pensioners half-fare flights to the moon?
A: I'll believe that when it happens.
The worst that can happen by way of inconclusion is for A 
to remain an agnostic on the matter. If B can point to any 
event within the experience of A which A would agree to be 
an instance of justice, than A will admit that justice 
exists. And conversely if A can persuade B that none of 
the Just Party's attempts to implement justice in the real 
hard world will ever succeed, then B will be obliged to 
become a sceptic.
Once the question of definition is no longer a contention, 
in fact, existence is a matter of things such as may be 
experienced. But this is by no means the end of the 
matter. The fact that A and B can embark on the dispute in 
the first place and proceed to attempt to identify 
examples, means that they are able to hold up, as it were, 
an independent blue-print of justice, and see if anything 
conforms to it; even the prior step of agreeing the 
definition implies that they already both think that they 
know what they mean by justice, and in A's case moreover 
while denying that any examples of it exist. And this 
gives some weight to Plato's contention that the Form of it 
pre-exists experience.
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We shall consider shortly what that might mean. in normal 
life; but if in the meantime we find this a slightly 
uncomfortable result. it could well be because we are 
drawing the wrong sort of analogy. The existence of 
African things, for instance, indicates the existence of a 
large item called Africa. But on the other hand the
existence of Roman Catholic things does not in any way 
impel us to seek an object, Roman Catholicism, for which 
they are evidence, and if it did we would be disappointed. 
While similarly we do not deny that there are many
manifestations of a 19th-century Gothic Revival. we do not 
hope in due course to find that revival itself, and 
purchase it for the British Museum. Why then be sorry 
about the apparent insubstantiality of Justice, when a 
healthier attitude would be to give thanks for the very 
hard reality of the evidence which makes it real.
These considerations will now lead us to leave Plato and to 
think about the role of universels in our normal world, by 
means of asking how we would decide on their existence or 
non-existence, and (to put the same matter a slightly 
different way) what the consequences are if they do or do 
not exist. We will then move on to discuss the related 
area of numbers. Before proceeding, however, let us note 
that there is nothing so far which cuts off the matter of
the existence of universels from the question of the
existence of anything else we have so far considered.
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Â semantic question such as might be dealt with by the use
of a dictionary leads. when agreed on, to strictly 
practical and experiental matters. That is as it should 
be. Matters of reality are matters of our world. There Is 
no mystical abstraction here.
When we remark the incidence of a black cat and of a. black 
dog we are recognising the transferability of the term 
'black'. When we identify Mrs. Jones' cat and Mrs. 
Williams' cat, we are making a similar claim about the term 
'cat'. The question is. if this does not imply that there 
is. or exists, a thing called blackness, and a thing called 
catness, then what does it imply. Yet if that were the 
case. we should then want to know by what means Mrs. Jones' 
cat participated in the item catness and the item 
blackness.
To instantiate something is to represent it by an instance. 
Thus if you do not know what paranomasia is, I could give 
you the example of 'non Anali sed anaeli', and doubtless 
given also some background knowledge of the sort of thing 
being dealt with you would then recognise paranomasia 
whenever you came across it again. Paranomasia is 
instantiated by 'non Angli sed anaeli'. But we know quite 
well that what is happening is that the identity of the 
rhetorical form itself results from the similarity of such 
instances.
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Because there would be no paranomasia without that 
similarity. there would be no paranomasia without those 
instances. It is not as if Pope Gregory actually took 
anything from a common pool of paranomasia (risking. for 
instance, its depletion) when formulating his little 
joke.
To say that catness is instantiated in Mrs Jones' cat is 
only to say that a number of creatures have particular 
characteristics. If one or more of these characteristics 
is definitive. to the extent that it distinguishes that 
group of creatures from all others, then those (as we shall 
see in the next sub-section) are necessary characteristics: 
but only those. The others may be, in greater or larger 
numbers, sufficient; some cats may lack some of them, and 
still be cats, while no dogs could possess them without 
being counted as cats.
There is a theory that what has happened in the case of a 
black cat is that catness and blackness (or, if one wishes 
to make a fine point, cat and black) are co-instantiated. 
That is, that an example of what is meant by black and an 
example of what is meant by cat reside, by chance, in the 
same item. Evidently it might have been otherwise. Cat 
and black are not co-instantiated in Mrs. Williams' cat. 
nor in Mrs. Evans' dog.
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The irnp 1 ication is that there is an act of p u 1 1 i n g t h i n g s
together. and that this takes the form of drawing from an 
independent source. itself amenable to several uses. The 
olive oil bottle stands on the kitchen shelf. It may be 
used to make a salad dressing or alternatively a 
mayonnaise. For the salad dressing we reach also for the 
vinegar bottle. And we would reach for that as well if we 
wished to make (on the other hand) a mint sauce. And so 
on.
However. this is so hopelessly misleading that it casts 
doubt on the usefulness of the term co—instantiation. When 
we form the idea of a black cat we do not take from the 
conceptual shelf the jar marked 'cat' and measure out a 
little, then reach for the jar marked 'black'. Indeed if 
we did we should for a moment be faced with the necessity 
of a colourless cat. An uncomfortable regression sets in 
if we contemplate that idea, since in order to do even that 
we would need to have reached for a jar marked
'colourless', or alternatively 'formless'. And what would 
the world be like during that moment when we have reached
for one of those? Philosophers have enough problems
without being visited by the spectre of a non-yet-
colourless cat. In fact, however. the matter only arose 
because we have in front of us, requiring a description, 
Mrs. Jones' household pet. (13).
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What actually takes place does not however entirely avoid 
the kitchen-shelf view. We know that the general term 
'black' arose because a number of otherwise disparate 
pieces of the world have the same spectral range. (N) 
There is no immediate implication there that that spectral 
range has independent existence, in heaven or in the mind 
of God or whatever. It is a function simply of the 
refractive quality of the substance, which is a relation 
between light and matter, an activity or event taking place 
at certain moments of time. However, from the fact that a 
number of such events do fall within that range we derive 
the general term for them, 'black'. It is that which then 
takes on independent existence, to the extent that a black 
cat may be an instance of it. You cannot have an instance 
of something which is only that instance.
N: A literal acceptance of this point would overlook the
fact that universals, however they may come about, may play 
a limiting and standard-setting role themselves. It is not 
suggested that the same effect might be achieved by 
something we might call 'a certain spectral range'. This 
would be to invite the responses 'What spectral range? Are 
its limits the limits of what is black? Or might something 
fall within that range and not appear black?' and so on. 
(13a)
cont
132
N: continued
This consideration brings out the point that any approach 
to universals would have to take account of marginal cases 
- 'It's not really black, it just looks it', 'It looks 
black enough to me'. The usefulness of emphasising this
point, for the purpose of the present work, is that it
underlines the requirement of a reference to agreement, 
which plays the role of a deciding factor. Again, however, 
it should not be thought that consensus could be some form 
of law; if that were the case then we would not have taken
account of possible cases of unresolvable dispute, and
would thus fail to accord with observable reality. Where 
consensus occurs we can confidently say that such-and-such 
is black. Where it is absent we can say that we are not 
quite sure.
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It should not be thought that by means of replacing a
heavenly kitchen-shelf with a linguistic one we have in any 
way diminished the problem. If we are obliged to say that 
something exists, but that it only exists linguistically, 
the issue has simply become more baffling and obscure. It 
has not gone away. Certainly the terms which we use are 
culturally conditioned, and therefore not absolute in a 
universal way. We know that the Eskimos have a number of 
different words for white, whereas one is enough for us. 
They need them.
It would therefore be acceptable to say that for the 
Eskimos white (1), white (2) and so on are real items of 
experience, real parts of the make-up of their world, and 
so on, in just the way that our single white is of ours. 
The question of existence thus survives recognition of the 
relative nature of terminology.
When we use universals in ordinary life, if indeed the 
simple act of recognising common characteristics may be so 
termed, we do embark on both a semantic and an ontological 
track. That is, we bring into play a term the meaning of 
which relies on its context in a culturally-based language- 
system. We also refer to something outside that system, 
existing independently of its examples, such as the light- 
refracting quality of matter or the characterising elements 
of biological species. We do not, by doing so, make any 
claim as to what sort of thing that is, merely recognising
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by the reference that it belongs to the sphere of 
experience rather than of language.
Further pursuit of these independent referents would reveal 
them to have both semantic and ontological aspects; but we 
shall be dealing with that situation when we come to 
consider scientific and medical terms in Section II. 2. For 
the moment the important point to note is that we do not 
discover universals by means of, for instance, blundering 
into them; we rather choose (by social conditioning) to 
include them in our language system.
But nor can we reduce them entirely to their role in that, 
since by their nature they refer to something real outside 
it.
Let us now take a similar approach to the related question 
of the status of numbers.
It is hard to imagine any circumstances other than the 
practice of philosophy in which one might ask 'Do numbers 
exist?' or 'Does the number four (or whatever) exist?'
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Indeed the ordinary person, and even perhaps the ordinary 
philosopher, might not take this question very seriously, 
if it were not for the fact that it has been held by some 
(N) that numbers are the only things that exist, or that 
numbers are more real than anything else, and on a less 
extreme level that numbers are certainly real.
Now 'real' might well be used here in the sense of
something's being a real logical construct, which would
mean that it plays a valid and effective part in some
system. This is not the same as being a given feature of
the world. One of the many differences between these two 
forms of what we would be willing to call reality is that 
the former is mutable in a way that the latter is not.
N: It was commonly believed that for Pythagoras and his 
followers, number was the essence of all things. See for
instance Arisotle, Metophvsics 1, 6, 987; 'They say that
whatever is ( ) exists by imitation ( ) of
numbers.
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That is, if one changes the reference system, rather as one 
might apply a different measuring grid to a map, then one 
gets a different result. Thus any number can be viewed as 
some other number, when for instance one could say that a 
certain multiplicity was not four units but two pairs, or 
sixteen half-units, and so on. If numbers had independent 
reality, we instinctively feel, this would not be so. 
There would be an irreducible phenomenon which could be 
expressed only by one symbol.
Let us see if such a thing can be found in the realm of 
numbers. The phases of the moon would seem to be a feature 
presented to us rather than constructed, yet they are not 
necessarily four in number. One could view the matter as a 
duality, for instance, made up of the waxing moon and the 
waning moon. On the other hand the whole cycle is a unity, 
since it proceeds from the moment of the full moon to the 
next time that occurs, or alternatively from the new to the 
new. A lunation is one complete event.
A solar year is also a complete event, from winter solstice 
to winter solstice. These two unities, in fact, a lunation 
and a solar cycle, would seem to have the sort of
determinacy we have in mind. They have fixed boundaries 
and peculiarly defining characteristics, a recognisable 
effect and a degree of constancy. (15). It is in the
nature of our galactic position that this should be so.
Now let us ask one more question about this real world.
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If the number twelve did not exist, what would be the 
relation between lunations and the solar cycle? If they 
are real, then the relation between them must be real. It 
will not do to paraphrase 'twelve' in some way. That would 
be the same as saying that twelve exists, but for some 
reason we have some taboo about uttering its name.
If the moon does perform so many full lunations during the 
period in which the sun completes one cycle, then we are 
presented by nature with an example of number, and even if 
we were to call it something else it would still be an 
example of something, which is something outside and beyond 
the individual, particular lunations and the one complete 
cycle of the sun.
It might moreover be asserted (quite independently) that 
Christ was accompanied by certain specified disciples, and 
no more than them, and no less. One can easily imagine a 
means of demonstrating, or indeed of discovering, a 
structural relationship between that fact and the annual 
lunations; and from there proceed to the conclusion that 
this structural conformity has a being independent of 
either the harvest moon, the hunter's moon and so on, on 
the one hand, or Peter, James and John on the other. 
For instance, if we used pebbles, or any other objects, to 
represent the one set, we would then be able to use the 
self-same pebbles, and no more nor less, to represent the 
other.
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Hence through the abstraction of symbolism we come to the 
concept of the independence of numbers.
Numbers are more than an abstract type of pebbles. since 
they express also the transferabi1itv of one set of pebbles 
from its role as symbol of one set of objects to a role as 
symbol of another set. When we use numbers we are not just 
counting, but making a statement about structural 
similarity.
Let us. to test this. imagine a counting system in which 
there are no numbers. You do it by appointing a pebble of 
a standard size to stand for each individual. then 
measuring the quantity by putting, the pebbles into a 
standard-sized tin. When each tin is full you take another 
of the same size. until at some stage you have enough 
filled tins to fill a larger but equally standard-sized 
box. There is opportunity also for fractions, in that 
other tins and boxes could be half this size (though one 
would have to be careful in defining that), and so on.
We will then achieve the concepts' 'tin-ful', 'box-ful',
'box-and—a-half—ful', etc., to 'crate—ful', shed-ful'. 
wherever one wants to stop. It would be cumbersome, but it 
would work. It is only when one wants to put this counting 
system to the use of expressing structural conformity that 
we realise that we are now. quite suddenly, dealing with 
surrogate numbers.
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One might for instance, having counted up, boast of the 
possession of a crate-ful of cattle and a crate-ful of 
wives: pebble for pebble one would know that it was the
same amount. At that point 'crate-ful' has now become a 
number,
Prior to that point. however, a man accustomed to this 
capacity-measurement form of counting might well be 
disposed to deny the existence of numbers. Confronted by 
Pythagoras he could in fact attempt to demonstrate that 
there are no numbers. What he would mean by that, however, 
is that he did not have a use for the concept. Is that, 
then, what it amounts to? Numbers exist for Pythagoras 
because Pythagoras uses numbers. They do not exist for our 
tin and box man because he has no need for them. It is a 
purely practical matter?
Yet in saying that we are allowing that in certain 
circumstances. for one reason or another, numbers exist. 
That is perhaps the counterpart of our discovery that the 
structural similarity between the summation of the 
individuals accompanying Christ and the annual lunations is 
an objective and independent quality. We have made sense 
of both the relative and the absolute form of the existence 
of numbers.
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Now if there is any sense, however slight. in which we do 
wish to be able to assert or deny the existence of 
universals and of numbers. how is their form or nature to 
be imagined? What is meant by saying that they. rather 
than merely their effects, exist?
From our examples it appears that the sense is this; 
there is a functional place for these abstract terms in 
our dealings with the world. They exist in that they serve 
a purpose. It is not simply that if they did not exist we 
should have to invent them. We do not cast around for new 
concepts as we would if the problem pre-existed the 
solution. or turn up with them under our arm at the 
universal patents office. The Philips screwdriver is not a 
solution to. but rather a part of, the Philips screw. You 
cannot have one without the other. The problem almost 
presupposes its solution.
Is this to say. after all. that abstract qualities have a 
purely linguistic identity? Only in the trivial sense thay 
they can be located in language, their role identified 
there, and not in the physical world. This phenomenon is 
not (as we shall see further) all that unusual. To say 
that something has a place in language is not to identify 
it as being exclusively linguistic. But what then is its 
non-1inguistic being?
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Perhaps it is unfortunate that many decades of empiricism 
have led us to think of physical objects as being the
chosen race. But if these examples are true it is apparent
that something can perfectly well be imposed on us by
experience without having to be a physical object. The
nature of such things is experiential.
All this section has attempted to do is consider what is
meant, what is intended, when the word 'exist' is used in 
such cases. The answer (which will now be developed 
further) can be viewed in two different ways, from as it
were two directions. On the one hand, circumstances make 
us tend to undertake certain actions, of which the use of 
the word 'exist' in certain contexts is one, rather as the 
presence of a wall inclines us towards using the door. On 
the other hand one can correspondingly infer a likely use 
of the word 'exist' in its normal, correct sense, by 
observation of such behaviour, as if passing through doors 
implies the reality of walls. This will now be our 
continuing theme: to use the word 'exist' correctly one
must be inclined to behave in certain ways.
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II. 2. The World of Science and Medicine
When one makes an existential claim, the subject of which 
is described by a medical or a scientific term, is this 
necessarily and always a proposal? That is. a proposal 
that such-and-such a collection of symptoms. behavioural 
patterns or phenomena shall be called 'dyslexia', 'the 
unconscious', 'tuberculosis' or 'gravitational collapse'. 
Is a claim that such things exist always a covert 
definition? Or is there (as is implied by the fact that 
making the proposal is evidently thought to be worthwhile) 
a secure informational residue, an ostensive element?
Plato's answer would be to do with acting, would therefore 
depend on whether or not the bundle which we thus put 
together has identity in its effects (1); and in particular 
cases this, as we have seen, becomes a matter of something 
being experienced, something observable (2). This 
procedure, however, comes up against the test of its 
marginal cases, since there are, in real life, many 
instances of things which we are inclined to say exist yet 
which, for one reason or another. observation cannot 
confirm.
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In science. for instance. there are doubts and disputes 
about the existence of the latest micro-partIcie. or in 
astronomy the latest quasar. There is reason to suppose 
that these things exist. yet it is not compelling or at 
least not yet. Now here the empirical nature of the 
exercise is made manifest by the procedure; we go on trying 
to find out. It is agreed what counts as observation, and 
what will count as proof. It is therefore this activity 
which enables us to distinguish between the informational 
statement and the proposal, the discovery and the 
invention.
There is. however. a range of cases in which apparently 
similar statements are made which cannot be so clearly 
investigated. There are some things which cannot be 
directly observed. for practical and accidental reasons: 
such as the books in Berkeley's closet. There are other 
terms which refer to posited entities which cannot be 
observed directly in principle. but can only be known in 
their indirect effects. 'The mind exists. in addition to 
the brain' is not intended to imply that the mind may be 
observed under the microscope. More extreme cases make 
this feature even more obvious. 'The soul exists' posits 
an essentially dimensionless entity. 'The astral body 
exists'. and so on.
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It is thus that we come to deal with statements of the form 
'the unconscious exists'. It will shortly become clear to 
us that what is peculiar about this and related statements 
is that they appear to be of the same type as the 
statements about particles or quasars, whereas they are 
really of the same type as those about minds or souls - 
that is, of a type for which it is understood in advance 
that the item referred to cannot simply be produced as 
verification. What makes the matter interesting, and in 
fact gives rise to the number of puzzles and problems which 
we will investigate in this sub-section, is that all these 
statements appear, at face value, to be of the same form.
There are clearly items in our world which rely for their 
existence on a proposal; there is no contradiction there. 
If that situation is clear, it will correspondingly be 
clear that there are items which do not. Thus : 'the United
Nations exists' - one can satisfy oneself of that by seeing 
a facsimile of its charter. 'British Telecom exists' - it 
was established in separation from the Post Office and 
offered to the public by means of various Acts of 
Parliament. (N).
N: It is perhaps stretching the imagination somewhat to
provide examples of these statements actually being used. 
(On the matter of settling the Falklands dispute? 'The 
United Nations does exist, you know'.) Cases of genuine 
doubt may be rare, but the significant point is the method 
of resolution which would be applicable i% they arose.
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Now something which relies ultimately for its existence ■:>n 
a charter or an Act of Parliament is clearly the subject of 
a proposal. It is no less effective for that. But it was 
not discovered. rather it was invented.
Freud was aware of the distinction and the danger, since he 
was careful to give effective action as the basis for his 
assertion that the unconscious exists: "When anyone objects 
that in a scientific sense the unconscious has no 
reality. that it is a mere makeshift, (N) une fa^on de 
parler, we must resign ourselves with a shrug to rejecting 
his statement as incomprehensible. Something unreal, which 
can nevertheless produce something so real and palpable as 
an obsessive action!" (3)
It is the fact that the unconscious can produce an effect 
which makes it real. We shall see before the end of this 
section that this is at the least misleading; but for the 
moment let us simply recognise that Freud has made a valid 
distinction. Something which can produce effects which are 
real and palpable is not just a figure of speech.
N: In German 'Notbehelf': literally a 'need-expedient'
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What then, we may ask. was going on before Freud discovered 
the unconscious? People were presumably simply performing 
obsessive actions, and so on. without any identifiable 
cause. Before the term 'dyslexia' was coined, people were 
failing to learn certain language skills. We had the 
phenomena. without the explanation. But there is a 
striking difference between such things and, for instance, 
the discovery of the source of the Zambesi. To diagnose 
dyslexia, or to identify the unconscious, one puts together 
a number of effects which were not previously connected. 
What has been discovered, in fact is not dyslexia itself, 
but a relationship between disparate phenomena. Let us put 
this another way.
If dyslexia is a condition which gives rise to certain 
symptoms, then it must have existed even before being 
named. If however it is not a prior condition. but a 
nexus, the form in which various things are connected, then 
it is they (plus their joint structure) rather than it, 
which exists; and there would be no need to imagine it pre­
existing them. However in so far as the relationship 
between the elements was there even before being identified 
as dyslexia, then dyslexia would be discovered rather than 
invented, and its existence would be independent of its 
being named.
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On either interpretation, to say that dyslexia exists is to 
say more than that the behavioural acts themselves exist; 
it is to say that they are related in some specific way. 
either (on the one hand) by having a common cause - 
'dyslexia' - or by possessing a structured connection, 
which recurs in the same form - 'dyslexia' - whenever 
sufficient of those acts themselves recur.
Those are two ways of making sense of the claim that 
dyslexia exists. But what if someone were to maintain that 
dyslexia did not exist? It seems that a number of things 
might be intended. It might be held that the phenomena 
were not regularly related, their conjunction being
fortuitous, and that they should therefore be treated as 
separate, or in an ad hoc and not in a programmed way. The 
test of this claim would be the regularity or otherwise of 
the conjunction of effects, plus the success or failure of 
a schematic approach to treatment. We would also need to 
assure ourselves that such cases of apparent success were 
not a confidence trick or a joint delusion.
A similar but not identical meaning to the denial might be 
that the symptoms were simply a group of symptoms, and that 
nothing would be gained by looking beyond them for a 
syndrome, (a subject to be dealt with shortly), and this
claim would be tested in the same way. There is, in other
words, an essentially practical aspect to the discussion of
the existence of dyslexia.
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Such terms however appear to offer more than an approach to 
a programme of action. They appear to propose a causal 
aspect to a heuristic situation, such that the value of the 
statement might be academic or informational. rather than 
just useful. This supposed explanatory factor will occupy 
us again when we deal more specifically with scientific 
terms. Before doing so. however. I would like to 
investigate a little further this distinction between the 
pragmatic element in medical existential statements. and 
whatever other content they might have.
A useful distinction which has been made in medicine is 
between nosographic and nosologic terms. (4). Nosographic 
terms are those which describe a condition; nosologic terms 
are those which account for it. There are two aspects to 
this important distinction. Firstly, nosologic terms point 
to an item of some sort, say a virus or a chemical 
compound, which lies outside the symptoms being observed 
and in a causal relation to them, whereas nosographic terms 
do not. Secondly. nosologic but not nosographic terms 
imply the possibility of a programme of long-term action, 
beyond the mere treatment of symptoms. They have, in 
other words, a temporal dimension, indicating both the past 
cause and future cure; whereas nosographic terms are 
essentially spatial, dealing only with what is present.
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Plainly since medicine is a purposive discipline it will
favour a terminology which aids its ends. and thus the
pragmatic element will influence any decision as to what to 
identify. Does this mean that something will exist if
acceptance of its existence, is useful in the terms already 
set by the context of the discussion, and not exist if that 
is otiose? We have seen above that one way of testing such 
an existential statement, and one used in real life, would 
be 'the success or failure of a programmed approach to
treatment'. (5).
Although this seems an arbitrary way of assigning existence 
- by its practical usefulness - it is in fact closely 
related to other common ways. We would not in general 
accept an existential claim if there were no evidence for 
it - if, in fact, its acceptance or denial made absolutely 
no difference. This is for the simple reason, perhaps 
among others, that we do not in general waste our breath. 
Thus there is a programmatic aspect (which the medical 
terms have helped us see more clearly) to every existential 
statement. There is a 'so what?' to be answered. This is 
perhaps nothing mysterious or innovatory; it is akin to the 
positivist approach, in that it requires that something 
observable should be happening.
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A question has been asked. in the meantime. which it will 
pay us not to ignore: 'Does this mean that something will
exist if acceptance of its existence is useful ...?' If we 
move the discussion now from medicine to science we may 
work towards an answer.
Science does not on the face of it present such a pragmatic 
nature as medicine. Part at least of its identity is 
supposed to be purely descriptive. As a structured form of 
'knowledge' it purports to set out factual information in 
an unambiguous form. There is, however, another side to it. 
which may or may not be an adulteration of its pure 
purpose. but nevertheless forms part of its normal usage. 
There is a supposed explanatory factor.
In other words, much science sets out to be 'nosologic'. 
It is not content with a 'nosographic' role.
Thus when in medicine a condition is diagnosed as 
tuberculosis, it is not intended that a tendency to cough, 
and so on, is thus redescribed, but rather a claim is being 
made also about the analysis of a blood sample, about 
the virus made visible by the microscope, the effectiveness 
of certain antibiotics in its destruction, or whatever.
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When Freud speaks of the unconscious, he does not mean that 
phobias. obsessive actions, recurrent dreams, etc.. may be 
thus grouped together and given a collective label. but 
rather that under hypnosis or in the course of analysis the 
patient will reveal items of his past of which he had 
become unaware, which by elimination must persist in the 
realm of the unconscious; and that the process of revealing 
these suppressed memories may relieve the symptoms.
There is, however, a crucial difference between these two 
cases, which we may as well state at once, although it will 
occupy us further. In the first case there is something to 
put under the microscope — a virus - and in the second case 
there is not. Wlien astronomers infer the existence of the 
planet Neptune, and nuclear physicists that of the latest 
micro—particle - shall we call it the minitron - they go 
about their business in the same way as Freud and the 
doctors. They notice irregularities in the behaviour of
observable phenomena - the other planets, other particles — 
which are not explicable in terms of any data already
possessed, but which would be adequately explained by
Neptune or the minitron. They then produce those entities, 
like a white rabbit out of a hat. And yet it is not an 
illusion; it is a real white rabbit. (6).
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It will not do. under such circumstances, to maintain that 
there is a white rabbit in the hat but not produce it. 
Such rabbits are of no interest to us. because their 
contribution leaves the situation in all respects the same 
as there being no white rabbit in the hat. We want to see 
the rabbit.
Now Freud is in an ambiguous position, faced with this 
request. In his own terms he can display the unconscious 
to US; its effects are real and palpable. And yet when he 
does so he only points to phenomena which were already 
there. which have been there all along. and which we all 
knew about already. He cannot produce the new item to 
correlate to his new term, show us the virus under the 
microscope, the existence of which we did not know, show us 
the planet through the telescope, likewise invisible to the 
naked eye.
The question is : can we clearly distinguish between a term
which identifies something previously unobserved, and one 
which points to a systematic complexity in the relationship 
of events (which are themselves already known about). It 
will now be suggested (a) that we can, according to a 
formula shortly to be discussed; (b) that both are valid 
existential statements; but, crucially (c) that very much 
confusion on the issue arises when one type pretends to be 
the other, or indeed when the claimant is unaware of the 
distinction.
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It is this conclusion, (c), which makes the exercise worth 
undertaking.
Now we have seen that in the case of certain medical and 
scientific terms an implicit claim is being made as to 
their heuristic value. That is, it is assumed that they 
assist in explaining, or expanding our understanding of, 
the phenomena. They are not thought to be simply a 
redescription, a neater or more accurate way of saying what 
takes place, a sort of shorthand.
There are, by contrast, terms which make no heuristic
claim, but set out simply to name the data before us, 
adding nothing to it in the way of invoking an agency 
beyond the data in explanation. I am going to say of such 
terms that they are co-extensive with the phenomena. They 
do not pretend to deal with anything other than what we 
have before us. This is not to say that that means that
they say nothing. They draw our attention to a state of
affairs. They can, as I suggested, make perfectly valid
existential claims, while remaining co-extensive and non­
heuristic. Let me look a bit more closely at these points, 
taking the co-extensiveness question first.
Jung uses the phrase 'the collective unconscious' to refer
to the fact that experiences of a number of phenomena -
dreams, images, symbols, etc. - are held in common by
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different people. Does ‘the collective unconscious' 
describe the collection of phenomena, or is it something 
beyond them?
In the first case, in which it is co-extensive with the 
phenomena, nothing has been added to the data which we 
already had. One might then ask the question: do we really 
need this new name? This is a matter of expediency, and if 
for one reason or another use of the name is convenient, 
then all is well. We can proceed to talk of the collective 
unconscious.
If on the other hand the name does not stand for a simple 
summation, but for something outside this group of items, 
then a different question must be asked. One can then 
inquire for instance what or where it is, and in this case 
there is something more to be explained. There are on the 
one hand the dreams, images and symbols; and then there is 
the collective unconscious as well. (N overleaf)
One may perhaps generalise this principle. If the name is 
co-extensive with the phenomena, then we may ask about its 
usefulness. If it is not co-extensive, then one may ask 
about its identity.
The way the first question is answered determines whether 
the second one is going to be a linguistic or an 
ontological question. {See diagram following footnote 
overleaf}
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N: It might seem at first sight that there is some
correspondence between this distinction between terms which 
are co-extensive with the phenomena and terms which are 
not, on the one hand, and Locke's distinction between real 
and nominal essences on the other. Closer inspection will 
reveal that the point being made by Locke is on a different 
subject and results in conclusions unrelated to mine.
Real and nominal essences are distinguished in the 'Essay' 
(7) according to whether the way we divide the world up for 
linguistic purposes (nominal essences) corresponds to the 
way the world is divided up by its own nature (real
essences). Thus for instance in the case of a geometric 
figure such as a triangle the real and nominal essences 
directly coincide, but in the case of most material
objects, the real essences of which may often be beyond our 
full knowledge, they probably do not.
In setting out the co-extensiveness principle here it is
not intended to say that for the term N to be co-extensive
with the phenomena is for it to match their reality in such 
a way. For a term to be co-extensive with the phenomena 
means simply that the term N summarises or re-describes the 
phenomena which are under consideration and does not, in 
such a case, refer to anything beyond them.
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N : cont. . .
In order to see why quite different things are being dealt 
with here let us take as an example the term 
'tuberculosis’. It will then. I hope, be seen that Locke 
and the present discussion are concerned with different 
matters.
Locke would say that if the world contains. in its nature, 
a separate and distinct condition corresponding to the 
perception which we call 'tuberculosis', then the nominal 
essence and the real essence are the same in this case. He 
adds that in most cases our state of knowledge is so 
incomplete that we cannot be sure of this.
Per contra. we are here saying that if the term 
'tuberculosis' turned out to describe nothing but the nasty 
cough, etc.. which we knew about and which gave rise to our 
decision to produce a term in the first place, then it 
would be co-extensive with the phenomena and we should 
proceed accordingly. As it happens it does more than this 
in that it indicates a causal virus which in turn suggests 
a course of treatment, so that it is not co-extensive.
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Note that if one wishes to say that N causes the phenomena, 
then one has to answer ’No' to question I, and move on to 
ontology (II B). If you hold that N Is a description of 
the phenomena, and answering 'Yes' move on to semantics (II 
A). then It cannot bear any relation to them.
Because a causal relation Is possible In the former but not 
the latter case. only the former can be explanatory. 
Something which appears to be of type B. and therefore 
capable of explanatory force, but which Is In fact of type 
A, bears what one may call a pseudo-heurlstIc status. If 
many scientific terms turned out to be of this type. It 
might be because to be of type B they would leave their 
users In the position of having to answer yet one more 
question: and the liability to regression could threaten to 
nullify the potential heuristic value.
The problem which such terms appear to solve tends to re­
instate Itself In either case. If on the one hand the 
collective unconscious Is to be taken to be not Itself a 
separate entity but rather the sum of the phenomena 
common themes and symbols, forms, and dreams, and so on - 
then It Is simply a restatement of the problem, and If the 
question were 'how do x, y , z occur?' one could thus 
restate It by using the directly equivalent group name, 
and say 'how does the collective unconscious occur?'.
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Although nothing would be any worse for this translation.
nothing would be any better either. except for the small 
saving in time or space effected.
On the other hand. If the collective unconscious is taken 
to be something separate from the phenomena, in the form 
for Instance of a common cause. then we have simply added 
one more item to the list of things to be explained. and 
might say not 'how do x, y, z occur?' but now 'how do x, y , 
z and the collective unconscious occur?'
It must not be assumed. however, that the imminence of a 
regression means that no such terms can have heuristic 
content. To produce the planet Neptune Is to have 
explained the errant behaviour of other planets. To 
Isolate the tuberculosis virus Is to have explained the 
onset of an Illness. Certainly the questions 'What causes 
the coming Into existence of the tuberculosis virus/the 
planet Neptune?' are of great Interest. But It Is not 
necessarily our task to answer them. In the course of this 
first heuristic step. One might say: 'answering those
second—order questions Is someone else's business. I have 
done my job. In the terms In which I set It out.'
162
This is the difference between heuristic and pseudo- 
heurlstlc terms. If It were the case that In Instances of 
supposed collective unconscious nothing whatsoever could be 
produced, beyond the Items which are to be explained. then 
nothing In the way of explanation would have been achieved. 
Once again, we want to see the rabbit.
The absence of a further Item, where one Is Implied, does 
not mean that nothing Informative Is being said: but It
does mean that what Is being said Is not what Is claimed 
Is being said.
We are. In effect, back to the distinction between a 
proposal and a discovery, and the question as to whether 
all scientific and medical terms are of the nature of a 
proposal. The answer. In view of our recent
Investigations, would appear to be 'only If they are type 
A, not If they are type B ' . To summarise : terms which
have a genuinely heuristic force, type B terms, are able to 
produce an Item such as a planet or a virus which stands In 
a separate and often causal relation to the observed 
phenomena. Pseudo-heurlstIc terms, type A terms, add 
nothing to the grouped data except a name, and In answer to 
the demand 'let us see the vlrus/planet equivalent' produce 
only the original data.
1 6 3 ,
It might be objected, however, that In the case of type A 
terms, something, no matter what, has caused us to group 
the phenomena securely enough to attribute to them a name. 
It might be, for Instance, an Innate structure In their 
relationship, such as a tendency to occur together or to 
combine to give rise to further effects.
Let us now consider this possible objection to the above 
preliminary conclusion further, taking as a starting point 
some work on the subject done by Wittgenstein.
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Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' metaphor
In Philosophical Investigations. part I. Wittgenstein 
considers what Is common to all the activities which we 
call language that makes them all language. (8). He 
concludes that It Is not a common element so much as a 
relationship. He then (9) takes the example of games. 
"What Is common to them all? - Don't say: 'There must be
something common, or they would not be called "games"' -
but look and see whether there Is anything common to all. 
For If you look at them you will not see something that Is 
common to al1. but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that." Examples of games reveal overlap, 
but no common element: "a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing ..." (10)
This he decides to call 'family resemblances' (11), "for 
the various resemblances between members of a family 
overlap and criss-cross In the same way." He also uses 
another metaphor for this, that of a rope: "the strength of 
the thread does not reside In the fact that some one fibre 
runs through Its whole length, but In the overlapping of 
many fibres." (12)
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"One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with 
blurred edges." (13) "If someone were to draw a sharp 
boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too 
always wanted to draw. or had drawn in my mind. For I did 
not want to draw one at all." (14) "Only let us understand 
what 'Inexact' means. For it does not mean 'unusable'." 
(15)
No doubt much effort has been expended on the question of 
whether or not games ^  have a common feature; but this is 
not really Wittgenstein's point. Using the idea of family 
resemblances between games as an example, he means to say 
that we are quite happy to use a word without having to 
decide beforehand on Its definite boundaries, its precise 
limits. This Is a perfectly acceptable comment on the 
flexibility of language; but It does not mean that 
a definition of games Isn't all the time available to us. 
as It were In case we need It. What, Indeed, happens when 
we ^  need It? People start getting killed: 'this Isn't a
game any more.' 'Why not?' 'Because games are for fun,
games are not serious,' and so on.
We operate successfully with the blurred concept 'games' 
because we possess enough knowledge of Its precise limits 
to know when Its use Is appropriate, when Inappropriate.
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We do not have to have thought about this or discussed it 
beforehand, because It is part of the way we have learnt
our language, just as in learning to swim you pick up all
sorts of essential points, such as not opening your mouth 
when under water, which no-one has to tell you are part of 
any particular stroke.
Imagine someone - a foreigner, perhaps - using the word 
‘game’ wrongly. He speaks of the jobbers at the Stock 
Exchange, where millions of pounds are changing hands. as 
playing a game. We are puzzled at first, and then explain 
that a game Is only such activity as has no serious 
practical consequences. Perhaps he will then refuse to 
change his usage, citing Philosophlcal Investigations Part
I. 71, 76, and 88.
When Wittgenstein says: "But Is It senseless to say: 'Stand
roughly there?' Suppose that I were standing with someone 
In a city square and said that. As I say It I do not draw 
any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand - as 
If I were Indicating a particular spot, And this Is just 
how one might explain to someone what a game Is" (16). he 
Is Implicitly admitting that we will know In advance what 
counts as 'roughly'. There Is a point beyond which no-one
would consider the person as having conformed to the
Instruction,
167
Although we do not normally have to draw this line - 'not 
more than seven paces in any direction' - this does not 
mean that we would be unable to do so. or that doing so 
might not In some cases turn out to be useful. or 
necessary, as for Instance when Instructing a child. It Is 
true that the decision as to what shall count as 'roughly' 
has to be arrived at In some way, either as a rule laid 
down by the user — 'this Is what 1 mean by roughly' - or as 
an agreement arrived at by the various parties. I am 
certainly not claiming what Wittgenstein Is denying by his 
use of the example: that we actually go through this
procedure In normal cases of using a word. I am saying 
that the term Is usable (and by extension, terms are 
usable) only because we could go through It If a case 
arose where It was In dispute, or subject to some other 
doubt.
When Wittgenstein says that the criss-crossing of 
relationships between games Is like that of family 
resemblances, he means that we can recognise combinations 
of similarities without having to rely on a predetermined 
structure for them. Yet what Is It that enables us to see 
these as (to adopt and use his metaphor) family 
resemblances? Is It not surely the fact that we are 
already equipped with the Idea of a family? Equipped with 
some other category Instead, and lacking that of kinship, 
we would handle the matter differently.
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But we start with not just a blurred. cross—crossing idea 
of a family. but a clear and precisely formulatable one. 
that of (for instance) consanguinity. Certainly 'a family' 
in some cases may include in-laws and maybe others and 
Wittgenstein no doubt would refer to anthropological 
extensions. even perhaps to the Mafia; but this Is to miss 
the point. When we are dealing with physical 
characteristics we are Implicitly referring to a very 
definite use of the word 'family'. such that we can say 
quite clearly what will count as being Inside It, what 
beyond.
We do not say of all people with blue eyes, long noses, 
hlgh-cheekbones and prominent chins that they have a family 
resemblance. We certainly would say this If we were 
already equipped with the knowledge that they were related 
by blood. There can be no use for the Idea 'family 
resemblance' without a prior understanding of the Idea 
'family'.
Putting together the things which form the 'family 
resemblance' between games, for Instance, Involves already 
knowing that there are such things as games, and without 
that prior knowledge can not be done.
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You could not therefore get that knowledge by studying the 
family resemblances. since they might be evidence of 
anything, or for all you would know, of nothing; but 
equipped with It you can deal with those effectively. 
Wittgenstein's Image does not therefore help us to tackle 
the question of how a certain collection of symptoms 
constitute a syndrome, or Indeed of how a definition may be 
achieved from the apparently kaleidoscopic assortment of 
characteristics.
Syndrome construction (N)
It was said above (17) that "to say that dyslexia exists Is 
to say more than that the behavioural acts themselves 
exist: It Is to say that they are related In some specific
way, either (on the one hand) by having a common cause 
'dyslexia' - or by possessing a structured connection, 
which recurs In the same form - 'dyslexia' - whenever 
sufficient of these acts themselves recur."
N: A 'syndrome' Is a combination of signs or symptoms
Indicating a particular disease or disorder. I am using 
the term here as a means of revealing some principles 
which apply, though less evidently, to the formulation of 
other concepts.
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relationship. He then (9) takes the example of games.
/
"What is common to them all? - Dbn't say: 'There must be
/
something common. or they would not be called "games"' -
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but look and see whether therb is anything common to all.
/
For if you look at them you will not see something that is
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y
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing ..." flO)
/
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always wanted to draw. or had drawn in myymind. For I did 
not want to draw one at all." (14) "Only^let us understand 
what 'inexact' means. For it does not/ mean 'unusable' . 
(15)
No doubt much effort has been expended on the question of
whether or not games do have a common feature: but this is
/
not really Wittgenstein's point./ Using the idea of family
/
resemblances between games as an example. he means to say
/
that we are quite happy to jase a word without having to
/
decide beforehand on its definite boundaries. its precise 
limits. This is a perf/ctly acceptable comment on the
flexibility of language; but it does not mean that
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a definition of games isn't all the time available to us.
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as it were in case we/need it. What, indeed, happens when
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we ^  need it? People start getting killed: 'this isn't a
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game any more.' /Why not?' 'Because games are for fun.
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/
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because we possess enough knowledge of its precise limits 
to know when its use is appropriate, when inappropriate.
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roughly there?' /Suppose that I were standing with someone
/
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/
definite use of the word 'family'. /such that we can say 
quite clearly what will count as/being inside it, what 
beyond.
We do not say of all people w/th blue eyes, long noses,
high-cheekbones and prominent chins that they have a family
/
resemblance. We certainky would say this if we were 
already equipped with thy/^nowledge that they were related 
by blood. There can/ be no use for the idea 'family 
resemblance' without /a prior understanding of the idea 
'family'. /
Putting togethe/ the things which form the 'family
resemblance' between games, for instance, involves already
knowing that/there are such things as games, and without /
that prior knowledge can not be done.
/
/
/
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You could not thererore get that knowledge by stj/üying the
amily resemblances. since they might be /evidence of
anything, or for all you would know. of /nothing; but
/
equipped with it you can deal with those effectively./Wittgenstein's image does not therefore^blp us to tackle 
the question of how a certain collection of symptoms 
constitute a syndrome, or indeed of lno\/a. definition may be
achieved from the apparently kaleidoscopic assortment of
/
characteristics. /
/
/
/Syndrome construction (N)
It was said above (17) that "t^ ô say that dyslexia exists is
/
to say more than that the/ behavioural acts themselves 
exist; it is to say that bhey are related in some specific
way, either (on the one/hand) by having a common cause -
'dyslexia' - or by possessing a structured connection,
which recurs in th^/same form — 'dyslexia' - whenever
sufficient of these acts themselves recur."
N: A 'syndrome' is a combination of signs or symptoms
indicating/ a particular disease or disorder. I am using 
the term here as a means of revealing some principles 
which ^ply. though less evidently, to the formulation of 
other /concepts.
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In the following passages I should like to analyse and 
generalise this dochotomy.
Let us therefore call the 'common cause' interpretation 'I' 
and the 'structured connection' interpretation 'II'. What 
are the elements of each? Taking I first, its elements 
would appear to consist of a number of observed phenomena, 
a,b,c,...n , and a common cause, Q. We might convey its 
form by writing Q:a,b,c,...n. The problem will clearly be 
to know how many separate data to include between c and n. 
To say that any are to be included which have Q as their 
cause is to indulge in circularity, since it is being 
claimed, by applying a name to this grouping, that Q is the 
cause of anything which is included.
We will deal with this problem shortly. Let us first take 
a look at the structure of II. Again we have an 
unspecified number of observed items or events, a,b,c,...n. 
In place of the common cause, Q, we have a regularity of 
relationship between them, R. It is perhaps important not 
to think of R as being something separated from a,b,c,...n, 
since its own identity is the way they are ordered. 
Certainly a structure, relationship or connection is in an 
ambiguous position, since it both is and is not a further 
thing.
171
But the important point for our purposes is that K oould 
not have any Identity at all without a.b.c,...n. whereas, 
in interpretation I. Q could. One should perhaps question 
this point a little more closely before accepting it.
Q could be the cause of another set of circumstances 
entirely: Q: x,y,z,...0 is another syndrome, which would be 
known by another name. Thus for instance an applied source 
of heat causes water to boil and evaporate, but causes lead 
to melt and flow. Fire can thus be the cause either of 
something one would call boiling, or of something one would 
call dissolving. To revert to our medical examples. the 
common cold germ can cause bronchial ailments, a cough and 
painful chest. or nasal ones. sneezing and runny nose, or 
again pharyngeal ones, a sore throat and vocal hoarseness. 
The same virus (it is thought) causes either chickenpox or 
shingles. No doubt many examples could be given, but the 
point is not controversial.
It is not immediately clear that R cannot in the same way 
be transferred, as it were, from a,b,c, to x,y,z. If it is 
the principle of organisation. then it can occur anywhere, 
in the company of diverse phenomena. Thus for instance 
either buildings or soldiers can form a square. snowflakes 
and flowers be symmetrical, trees and lamposts equidistant.
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But if it is the relationship of a,b.c. the particular 
thing that they have together, a joint quality of theirs, 
the spatio-temporal facts (for instance) which they share, 
then there is something about it which can clearly not 
belong to a situation involving x,y,z.
This is not just a matter of definition, but an observation 
of a way of looking at the situation a,b,c. What we are 
saying is that there is an 'a', a ‘b ‘, and a 'c', not just 
one by one, but together. And that being so, it is 
inevitable that there will be a relationship between them. 
Perhaps one might now summarise the dichotomy as follows:
T . Q : a , b , c , . . . n .
II. (a,b,c,...n)R.
— although neither this. nor any other formula. entirely 
expresses the intrinsic nature, to a,b,c,...n, of R.
Now to some extent, of course, there is a relationship 
between any two or more items one might like to choose. 
One might, if one wanted, specify the distances and 
directions between say, the Prime Minister, the planet 
Venus, and the Empire State Building, on any one particular 
occasion. It is not even necessary for them to occur 
contemporaneously. There is a relationship, describable 
chronologically and physically, between Shakespeare, Arthur 
Scargill and the Martyrs' Memorial.
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This is why the principle of regularity of structure is 
important to the concept of a syndrome, in interpretation
II. If it were the case that every time b occurred, there 
was the same relationship between it (however loosely 
specified) and a and c, then one would be entitled to posit 
an instance of R. This is something which could not be 
said of our examples. If every time Arthur Scargill 
occurred (whatever that might mean), he was the same 
distance in time from William Shakespeare and in space from 
The Martyrs' Memorial, then there would be reason to 
assign R. The improbability of this, indeed the 
incoherence of it, demonstrates the special nature of 
syndromes. A possible objection to this demonstration 
serves to illustrate another point; it is important that 
the regularity of relationship should occur between more 
than two items. If it were objected that Shakespeare will 
always be related to Scargill in the same way, to the 
extent of being before him, we would reply that that 
applies to many millions of other things, and would only 
start to take an interest if The Martyrs' Memorial turned 
out always to be to his left.
What shall count as regularity is a delicate matter, and 
the way this is dealt with in normal life represents the 
fine tuning of the business of syndrome construction.
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Regularity of chronological occurrence by itself will 
clearly not do. or one would have a whole set of syndromes 
stemming from the initial condition of drinking milk or 
breathing air. Similarly co-occurrence by itself is not 
enough. Yet either of these may be important to the 
identification of a syndrome, given a further degree of 
relational complexity.
Clearly one does not want to say. even if one could, 
exactly what degree of complexity must be reached before we 
stop having a case of co-incidence and have a syndrome. 
What one can say. however, is that this decision is closely 
related to the one mentioned above, the question of how 
many integers lie between c and n. (18). Clearly the 
greater the number of items related, the greater will be 
the complexity of the relationship, and so the more secure 
the identification of the regular relationship R. and hence 
the more highly-defined the syndrome.
It has often been said (and Wittgenstein's examples are an 
illustration of the same point) that in normal language- 
usage concepts are open-ended. This is to be contrasted, 
perhaps, with formal languages such as those of logic and 
mathematics. What is meant by this, in the terms we are at 
present using, is that there is no law about how many items 
must lie between c and n; nor even, presumably that there 
must be any.
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Üince we are concerned with the relationship of phenomena 
and interested in the regularity of its structure. there 
must presumable be a 'c '. since one could not identify the 
structure of the relationship between a pair of items on 
its own. except in the broadest and least useful way. The 
point made above is important here: the greater the
complexity the more secure the identification of the named 
occurrence which we are trying to identify. and which we 
here call a syndrome. It follows from this that we would 
be likely to have difficulty agreeing about a supposed 
syndrome having only the elements 'a ' and 'b'.
We must agree in the meantime that in general there is no 
law on this matter. and that therefore in particular cases 
there must be a decision. The decision about which 
variables to include in any particular case is not. 
however, just a matter of going for the largest possible 
number. One further complication obstructs such an easy 
course.
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'Upper and lower case' conditions
To summarise the position dealt with in this sub-section: 
when we examine the symptoms which form the elements of a 
syndrome. or the conditions which define a particular 
concept, we find that some of them appear to have a 
stronger role than others. Indeed it seems that there may 
be two types, strong elements and weak, to the extent that 
some may be regarded as necessary, and others only as
sufficient conditions, in combination with one or more 
necessary ones.
The situation will now be set out in more detail. Let us
start with some examples.
It cannot be influenza unless there is a fever. That is, 
whatever other symptoms of flu are present, there must be
some other explanation for the disorder, if there is no
fever. In this case this is because of what we know about 
the influenza germ, other germs having different effects. 
A fever is a necessary condition of a case of influenza.
This is not to say that a fever on its own indicates 
influenza. There must be other symtoms of the influenza 
syndrome for us to be sure that it is not something else, 
such as malaria. A fever is not, on its own, a sufficient 
condition of a case of flu.
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in some cases the matter may be one of definition. and so
the statement 'it can't be X without p ' is analytic. The 
co-called 'Hiroshima syndrome'. for instance. applies to 
people who die of cancer some time after being subjected to 
radiation. It thus sets out to distinguish these from 
others who die of cancer without the prior condition. and 
being subjected to radiation is therefore a defining 
factor, hence the name. It will consequently be a 
necessary condition, but for logical rather than incidental 
reasons.
Let us now illustrate a common but fairly complex 
situation, in which a number of characteristics may be 
sufficient. individually or together, provided that one or 
more non-sufficient condition is also present.
If you are a late reader we would not assume at once that 
you suffered from dyslexia, because the condition could be 
attributed to other causes, such as poor teaching, home 
problems, low IQ.
Similarly if you were a poor speller, we would be in the 
same position.
Therefore even if you were a late reader and a poor 
speller. we could still not say confidently that it was a 
case of dyslexia.
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And again if you were otherwise intelligent and with normal 
memory ability but unable to remember how to spell a word 
moments after being told, dyslexia might be indicated but 
without further information one would perhaps not have the 
right to rule out mere inattentiveness or lack of interest.
If however you tended to write letters backwards, we would 
be inclined to diagnose dyslexia without further
information. (N) We would not easily be able to think of
another reason.
Similarly if you were unable to recognise whole words, and 
if someone else in the family were affected, we would at 
once recognise a probable case of dyslexia.
The first three are weak conditions, the second two are 
strong ones. Although the latter might not be sufficient 
on their own (and we will assume for the sake of
consistency that this would always be the case) any
combination of them with weak conditions or with each other 
would be sufficient. Let us identify them by letter, as 
follows:
late reader x letters backwards A
poor speller y trouble with whole words B
forgetting spelling z
N: I am here only giving examples for the sake of
illustrating an argument, and do not propose to defend a 
medical position.
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Now to generalise from this. It is clear that A + R forms a
sufficient condition. and that either or both A and B form 
a necessary one. No combinations of x.y.z. however, form 
either. Progressing, we find that A + x. or B + x. and so 
on. would be sufficient combinations of the upper case and 
the lower case conditions. and we will thus be able to set 
out the range of options for the identification of a 
syndrome, or by extension a concept, N :
Syndrome construction: upper and lower case conditions.
Given the identification of two upper case and three lower 
case conditions. a set of events is identified as N if it 
possesses the characteristics represented by any one of the 
following:
A + B A + x + z
A + x B + x + z
B + x A + B + x + z
A + B + x A + y + z
A + y B + y  + z
B + y A + B +  y + z
A + B + y A + x + y  + z
A + x + y B 4- X 4- y + z
B 4- X 4- y A 4 - B 4 - x 4 - y 4 - z
A 4- B 4- X 4- y A 4- z
B 4- z
From this. using the sign 'v ' to represent a disjunction 
('either or both') we may formulate a set of sufficient 
conditions, as follows:
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1. A + B 
or
2. ( A v B )  + ( ( x v y ) v z )
It is important to bear in mind that the distinction 
between upper and lower case conditions, in this analysis, 
is not an arbitrary decision, but a matter of fact which 
may be determined by observation. Do people say 'If it 
displays A it must be N ' and 'Yes, if it involves both A 
and B then it is definitely N ', and act accordingly? We 
may observe them and see. (N)
It is hoped that this analysis demonstrates both the extent 
and the limits of the open-endedness, or open-texture. of 
terms or concepts. It replaces Wittgenstein's 'family 
resemblance' image with a survey of what may actually 
happen. and it is intended to avoid not only the unwanted 
vagueness of a semantic approach but also any tendency to 
imply an unreal rigidity. The message is complexity, but 
complexity within bounds,
N: Compare the distinction made by Professor T. R. Miles
(19) between 'samples' and 'symptoms' of a condition. 
Miles then proceeds to make use of the terms ‘greater and 
lesser exemplaries' to describe a distinction similar to my 
'upper and lower case conditions'.
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The relevance of this to the 'convention/experience'
investigation is that it reveals the extent to which 
agreement is involved, and even helps us to see the method 
by which agreement may be reached.
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II.3. Introduction
It might be helpful at this point to identify the position 
we have now reached, in terms of the programme set out in 
the Abstract. We are now just past the middle of the 
section which forms the core of this investigation, and 
before proceeding must deal with a related but slightly 
oblique topic. A great amount of work has been done by 
others (1) on the apparent problem that amongst the whole 
range of things which exist there seem to be some things 
which do not exist. These form a less important part of the 
present work than of that of others, but they certainly 
require to be dealt with, and that takes place in this sub­
section .
We therefore turn now to a consideration of the position of 
existence statements in the field of cases where we know, 
for one reason or another, that an item spoken of does not 
exist.
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On What ihere Isn't 1J )
"If I say 'The present King of France is bald'. that
implies that the present King of France exists." ('3)
Russell is concerned with the subject of statements
containing a name which stands for something which, for one
reason or another. does not exist. We all feel
intuitively uncomfortable with this concept: how can a
name stand for something, if there is no such something? 
Indeed. how can there be something which is not? Russell 
disposes of the apparent contradiction by substituting 
descriptions for names. The details of this scheme have 
been dealt with in 1.4 C4) and need not delay us here. (o')
Leonard Linsky comments: "Anyone content to regard 'Santa
Claus lives at the North Pole' as false will be able to 
live with Russell’s version of this treating 'Santa Claus' 
as a disguised description having primary occurrence. ' (6)
He continues; "There are arguments supporting the 
Russellian view. If Santa Claus does not exist, how can it 
be true that he lives at the North Pole? Living at the 
North Pole is not something that a nonbeing is up to ... 
Still. appeals to intuition in this matter yield 
conflicting results.
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We feel that a person who says 'Santa Claus lives at the 
South Pole' has gone wrong in some radical way in which the 
person who says that 'Santa Claus lives at the North Pole' 
has not. So a distinction seems overlooked in any theory 
which uniformly marks them both false." (7)
In what follows it is hoped that the helpful parts of 
Russell's initial formulation will be clarified in such a 
way as to remove this criticism of it.
At first sight there seems to be an interesting difference 
between the present King of France and Santa Claus. quite 
apart from these matters of residence or appearance. In 
the phrase 'the present King of France' is included the 
condition that France is known to be no longer a monarchy, 
so that the impossibility of the existence of the 
denotation is analytic. This would be clearer if one said 
'The present King of the French republic' or something to 
that effect. This brings to light one category of non— 
existents: the self—contradictory ones. The impossibility
of, for instance, the golden mountain, seems to be of a 
different sort. It is not logically impossible for a 
mountain to be made of gold. (8)
Such a logically impossible item, of course. is the round 
square. But there are a whole lot of possible designations 
which are not, on the face of it, self—contradictory at 
all.
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this true or false? 'Werewolves do not cast a shadow, and 
vampires do not show in the mirror'. It is significant 
that one can genuinely and meaningfully ask, after making 
this statement, 'Or is it the other way round?'
Both categories of statement have in common the fact that 
although we know that the item spoken of does not exist, we 
may yet speak of it in terms which suggest that it does.
It is perhaps significant that if one did encounter a case 
of genuine mistake (as when an ill-informed visitor 
believed that M. Mitterand was the present king of France) 
there would be no problem. We would simply clarify the 
terms and the discussion could continue without further 
disagreement. (N). Likewise in cases of genuine delusion: 
this poor fellow thinks that Mynydd Aur is made of gold.
N : See the distinction between 'discourse about fiction'
and 'discourse about actuality', in DonelIan's 'Speaking of 
Nothing' (9). where he develops 'the historical explanation 
theory of reference'. This says that 1. proper names are 
not surrogates for descriptions. but 2. their reference is 
derived by historical connection and in statements about 
non-existents a 'block' occurs in the historical chain, (p. 
23).
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No. it is the case in which someone talks of something 
which does not exist without actually believing that it 
does. that gives rise to apparent contradictions. Yet why 
should it? I suggest that in making such statements one 
is guilty only of ellipsis. in that there is a hidden 
reference to one's knowledge of the item's non-existence.
Thus when I say that I know that werewolves cast no shadow, 
and that vampires have to be home by dawn, can be deterred 
by crosses and garlic. etc.. I am in effect saying that I 
know that is the tradition adopted by the Hammer horror 
films. (10) And so it would be with statements about 
Pegasus. (N) about centaurs, elves and unicorns, about all 
of which I may know a great deal without in any way 
claiming, or even unintentionally implying. that they 
exist.
N: See Routley. Richard. 'On What There Is Not' (2). He
makes the simple but effective point that there is no need 
to attribute existence to the object of an idea, as opposed 
to the idea. Pegasus and the Pegasus-idea are distinct 
terms. "Pegasus is a horse, the Pegasus-idea is not, 
since ideas are not (significantly) horses.' (p. 153).
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Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, (11) it is an essential 
condition attached to any talk of griffins and centaurs 
that they are understood not to exist. (N)
If the identification of this ellipsis is correct, then we 
may perhaps have removed the distinction between things 
which do not exist for the reason that they are self­
contradictory and things which we know from other 
information do not exist. A fuller statement of what is 
intended might yield an expansion parenthetically attached 
to the name and a change to a passive form of the verb: 
'Centaurs (which are to be found in mythology, but not in 
the real world) are regarded as being part horse, part 
man'; or 'Santa Claus, a figure of popular imagination, is 
thought of as living at the North Pole'.
N: For another way of putting this see R. B. Redmon's
article in Mind (12). "To say 'Pegasus does not exist' is 
to say that 'Pegasus' is not in a certain language." There 
are, he points out, cases of the opposite sort, in the form 
of pure descriptions, which he calls PD, "such that it 
would be contradictory to deny the object purportedly named 
by the PD had certain properties." (13) See also A. M. 
Honore in Philosophy, 'Reference to the Non-existent' (14) 
in which, among several interesting points, he sums up the 
conclusion as to whether existence is a predicate: it is
not for assertions which presuppose the existence of the 
subject: but some assertions (for instance those about
objects known not to exist) do not.
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It is an ellipsis, purely, to say 'Centaurs are part horse, 
part man' and 'Santa Claus lives at the North Pole'. And 
if this is so. then these sentences contain as much a 
logical contradiction as any about 'the round square’. 
They are analytically false. They falsify themselves. (N)
The problem appears to arise in Russell's example when a 
false statement of this sort is denied. If it is false to 
say 'the present King of France is bald'. for the reason 
that nothing true can be asserted of the contradictory 
phrase 'the present King of France'. then it seems to 
follow that it must be true that the King of France is not 
bald. and therefore that something can be asserted of the 
designation 'the present King of France'.
N: A similar point is made by Charles Crittenden (15) in
his paper 'Thinking About Non-Being', in which he concludes 
that there can be successful reference to characters in 
fiction (p. 292), the references being "to what exists-in-
fiction" (p. 300). Thus the statement "Holmes smoked a
pipe" is elliptical for "Someone wrote a story containing 
'Holmes smoked a pipe' (or containing sentences implying 
this." (p. 303). "'Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe' may look 
like 'Bertrand Russell smoked a pipe', but they are 
verified differently ..." (p. 309).
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B u t 11 o n 1 y s e e rns so. a n <;l f o r a reas o n c o n n e c t e d w 11: h t h e 
looseness of the language. (N overleaf).
It is an accident of syntax that the denial falls into the 
sentence in the wrong place. When we deny. for the above 
reasons. that the King of France is bald, we do not wish 
the negative to belong to the adjective ('not bald') but to 
the whole sentence. We would like not to have to say 'the 
present King of France is not bald' but rather 'Not: the
present King of France is bald'. Similarly if we wished to 
deny that the King of France is bald at present. but admit 
that he was or will be. we should say: 'The present King of
France not is bald'; but that too would be false because 
any predication of 'the present King of France' is false.
It is for these two sets of syntactical reasons that the 
appearance arises of being able to make statements about 
non-existent items, and it is for these linguistic reasons 
that such statements do not in fact, when seen in their 
true light, in any way imply the existence of the items 
spoken of, let alone bring them, in some mysterious way. 
into existence.
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N: See Barry Miller's "'Exists' and Existence" (16) in
which he points to the loose use of 'exists' as. variously, 
'are real: or 'are alive'. as in the sentences 'Elephants
exist. but mermaids do not' and 'Elephants exist. but 
dinosaurs do not'. (p. 249). However one might note that
the present-tense connotations of the verb are purely 
accidental and arise from the inconvenience of saying 
'exist-timelessly' or 'exist or existed' each time. M. 
Dummett (17) makes a similar point when he says; "Geach 
has argued that the verb 'exists' has two distinct senses: 
one in which it has no significant tense. and one in which 
it has one. According to him, it is only in the former 
sense that it is right to say that 'exists' is not a 
predicate: in this first sense, it is to be rendered by
means of the existential quantifier: but. in the second
sense. it is a straightforward predicate. When. for 
example. we say that the League of Nations no longer 
exists. we are genuinely making a statement about - 
predicating something of - the League of Nations. as 
opposed to the case in which we say that phlogiston does 
not exist."
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II.4. A Visit to the Crypto-Zoo
Wtiereas we know when speaking of mythical or imaginary 
beings. or of things which have an inbuilt contradiction, 
that they do not exist. there are some items spoken about 
of which we are genuinely not quite sure. I have in mind 
such items as the Loch Ness Monster and the Abominable 
Snowman. In this sub-section I want to ask about what 
would be meant if it were asserted. or denied. that such 
things exist.
In May 1983 a teenager in Devon saw a large black animal 
with white markings on its chest, otherwise similar in 
appearance to a lion. A lady in Inverness had seen 
something she described as a cat larger than a dog. in 
1976. And indeed several other people had had sightings of 
what appeared to be the same type of creature. at various 
spots in Britain. during the late '70's and early '80's. 
(1) .
The evidence was collected by an amateur zoologist, Mrs Di 
Francis. who published it in a book called 'Cat Country'. 
(2). She claimed that the creatures seen were members of 
a species of large cat, which had been living in Britain 
since the Ice Age.
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Now on the one hand we have apparently evidence for 
something. and on the other a valid case for holding it in 
doubt. Here is the dilemma : if these large British cats
exist. then why is this not generally known and admitted? 
But if they do not. what, if anything was seen?
Mrs Francis claims that they are. in effect. generally 
recognised since there has existed for many centuries a 
body of legends known jointly as tales of the Black Dog.
But legends of a Black Dog are yet not counted as evidence
for the existence of something. One would therefore think 
that Mrs Francis’ body of collected first-hand experiences 
would now be accepted as the sort of evidence required. to 
support the assertion that such an animal exists.
Apparently not. A senior lecturer in Biological Sciences 
was quoted by The Times (3) as saying that he found the 
evidence unconvincing. It then emerged that he had no 
knowledge of the evidence. not having read the book; no 
wonder he found it unconvincing.
The fact is that in such cases almost nothing would count 
as evidence. The curator of mammals at the London Zoo 
stated that "the only cone 1 usive proof would be the body of
one of these animals   I look forward to seeing the
body."
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m e  leature-writer in The Times (4) commented that at that 
point there would be no need for zoology to offer its 
assistance, since the acquisition of a body would remove 
any doubts as to the creature's existence and identity. 
"Une fears that professional zoology will thus step in at 
the point where it is no longer so badly needed. for Dr. 
Bert ram. wh i 1 e findi ng the rna t ter i nt r i gu i ng. i s 
understandably too busy to search for the conclusive proof 
himself. ohe points out that if the animal exists it 
could be trapped any time one wanted. by means of "four 
baited cages around Inverness". (5).
One remarkable thing about Mrs. Francis' large cat is the 
fact that it is part of a world-wide menagerie the study of 
which has even been given a name: crypto—zoology. The
subject was discussed at the Third International Congress 
of Systematic and Evolutionary Biology. in session at 
Brighton, on 7th July 1985. i6) In America their native
yeti, known as Bigfoot or Sasquatch, has even achieved the 
status of being protected: there is a Committee Against
Shooting Sasquatches. This campaign, far from providing 
evidence that such a creature, to be able to be saved from 
slaughter, must exist, in fact makes the evidence of its 
existence (a carcase) harder to obtain. Apart from Bigfoot 
and the yeti. there is also the Chinese Wildman and the 
Russian Alma.
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It is said that some specimens of jaw and teeth have been 
unearthed in the case of the Wildman: but of course they
might. as has often happened, turn out to be those of some 
other creature. Bigfoot has left a number of footprints, 
and plaster casts of some of these were exhibited at the 
conference. It would be easy to throw doubt on their 
authenticity. or to explain them by natural distortions. 
The fact is. however. that it is generally assumed that a 
sufficient body of evidence could, somehow, be collected to 
achieve the position at which the existence of any of these 
beings would be generally accepted. And the interesting 
thing about these cases is that this evidence is not 
forthcoming.
One might well take the view that this is not accidental. 
It is in the nature of Bigfoot that his existence cannot be 
proved. There is a crucial difference between an animal 
which is seen by solitary hunters and leaves large 
footprints in the sand, and one which can be displayed in a 
glass case or even perhaps in a zoo. The difference lies 
in the number of people able to assure themselves of its 
existence.
Before investigating this point in more detail. let us 
consider what would happen if Bigfoot or his friends were 
trapped and brought home.
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The article reporting on the conference in The Times
reminds us "that the now familiar gorilla was a 
controversial concept when its description was circulated 
in 1847", (7) and presumably some evidential breakthrough
was required for a large enough body of people to be able 
to have confidence in its existence for it to be generally 
accepted as existing. (8).
Now if Bigfoot were trapped or the Loch Ness Monster were 
trawled up. either could then be subjected to zoological 
investigation. At that point it would undergo a radical 
change. It would be categorised as, for instance, a large 
species of eel. and suddenly would no longer be the Loch 
Ness Monster. The moment of identification by 
authoritative opinion is the moment at which Bigfoot ceases 
to be Bigfoot.
There are two questions here. 1. Would Bigfoot then 
exist? 2. Does Bigfoot exist now? By the first I mean 
that if the large biped were given a scientific name and a 
place in the order of nature, would we then be happy to 
admit that it existed: to which the answer must be Yes, but 
with doubts that it is still then Bigfoot. And by the 
second question I mean that until then some sort of 
significance must be attributed to the propensity to leave 
large footprints in the sand, which is not available. for 
instance. to Father Christmas. Is that sufficient basis 
for existence?
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When one attempts to answer those questions systematically 
it is apparent that the matter is more complicated than 
might at first have been supposed. One would have to say 
in both cases 'It depends ....' It will help us understand 
this crucial marginal area of existence statements if we 
analyse now what exactly it would depend on.
Question 1 . We should of course have to satisfy ourselves 
first as to the authenticity of the situation. Has 
something really been found? We would perhaps like to see 
it. Is the specimen found indisputably the creature which 
was previously the monster in question? Are the scientists 
who are examining it suitably qualified and unbiased? We 
might indeed be difficult to please on some of these
questions. There is a great deal that can go wrong.
Let us assume that this obstacle-course has been
negotiated. and that we have satisfied ourselves that the 
scientists are giving an honest description of a real 
discovery. It would seem to be plain that we would not 
(unless we were perhaps the world authority on the subject) 
be happy to make this step in isolation. We should want to 
know whether people whose opinions might be relevant 
accepted all this as well; and if there were a body of 
opinion against that position, we would perhaps have to 
consider both its arguments and its credentials before 
continuing with our decision.
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Now if a majority of suitably-informed people still denied 
that what had been discovered was Bigfoot/Nessy. we for our 
part would have to have some compelling reason for 
overriding their view. One can imagine that taking place, 
as when we possessed enough information to see that they
were all. however many of them, making an identifiable 
error. The question of how large a majority it would 
require to check us in our confidence and require this 
special circumstance is one which we should perhaps ask in 
a moment.
Let us for the time being say that we know that if 
everybody else said it was not Bigfoot, we would have to 
have an unusually compelling reason for disagreeing; and 
this would not be necessary if everybody else agreed that 
it was Bigfoot. We have seen, however. that mere 
acquiescence in a general view would not be enough to form 
the basis of an assertion of existence, since we would have 
started our investigation by assuring ourselves that 
something had indeed been caught.
This too is a process subject to gradations. Ideally I 
should like to see the item and be able to examine it. 
Seeing, touching etc. are paradigm conditions for belief in 
the existence of things which may be sensed.
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Having clone that I would have no doubt that the item under 
discussion existed. and the question of whether Bigfoot 
existed would then be rephrased as 'Is this Bigfoot?' If I 
were not able to see the thing for myself. I should need 
powerful and impeccable second-hand evidence. 'You can't
believe everything you read in the papers'. I should
believe it more readily if. for instance. I met somebody 
(whom I knew to be sane and truthful) who had seen it.
Failing that I might rely, but with slightly less
confidence, on photographs and formal reports.
Now if we take these two sets of conditions. the direct or 
semi-direct experience of the existence of something on the 
one hand. plus. on the other, the reference to informed 
opinion as to what that something was, then we have the
elements of the mixture which makes up the answer to 'what
it depends on', in the case of Question 1 , as to Bigfoot's 
existence. The secondary question of whether his identity 
would survive his discovery is, I think, of less
importance. That depends on whether one wishes to make his 
mysteriousness and elusiveness a defining attribute of 
Bigfoot, or whether one regards these qualities as 
dispensible.
Let us call the two elements P and Q. P = the evidence 
from observation. Q = the opinion of suitable other 
people.
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Answering 'Does Bigfoot exist?' requires an interplay 
between these two. P on its own would provide that 
something exists. but there would be no need to say It was 
Bigfoot. Q on its own would say that if that something 
exists. then it is Bigfoot, but would give no guarantee 
that it did exist.
Before considering other examples. let us deal briefly in 
the same manner with Question 2 .
No carcase has been found. no specimen trapped. Yet 
sightings are still reported and visible evidence claimed. 
It is possible at one extreme that what is seen is an 
illusion, and that the supposed evidence is classed as such 
under the distorted view of wishful thinking. One might 
say. as no doubt Jungians indeed do. that all this monster- 
sighting is evidence for a manifestation of the collective 
unconscious. In that case Bigfoot exists, but only as an 
image in our cultural and psychological makeup. The 
footprints are not made by a biped. but by a whirlwind or 
the condensation and evaporation of pools of dew. Since it 
is the essence of Bigfoot that he is real enough to make 
footprints himself. rather than have them thus made for 
him, then I think at that extreme we would want to say that 
he does not exist. 'The delusion of Bigfoot exists' is not 
the sort of assertion we were after.
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This situation, however, would have to be proved, and it is 
notoriously difficult to eliminate a possibility. That, 
indeed. is how these creatures manage to survive. in an 
otherwise inhospitable ontological climate. One imagines 
the Jungians getting up from their meeting only to catch a 
glimpse of a large humanoid ape slipping away among the
trees. If one tried to remain agnostic. the Save the
Sasquatch Society would demand that the sightings be either 
faulted or explained. Yet to say on this basis that
Bigfoot exists because something has been seen and makes
footprints in the sand is to embark on an exercise in 
terminology. What is being said is that 'Bigfoot' is the 
description of the cause. at present quite unknown. of 
these phenomena. It is not to posit in any way the 
existence of a humanoid ape. or whatever. In passing, it 
is worth laying emphasis on this last point. 'Bigfoot' is 
then the term given to an unknown cause.
Now if I saw Bigfoot myself, while hunting in the Rockies, 
the matter might seem to be resolved. This would not. 
however, be the case if I had never heard that anybody else 
had seen him. I could quite credibly put the experience 
down to the effects of the strength of the sunshine. or 
indeed the moonshine. I can imagine myself becoming 
convinced that I had been deluded, in the face of the lack 
of corroborative views.
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ir on the other hand I was in the Rockies and among Bigfoot 
supporters. but failed myself Lo see him, it would
similarly be open to me to hold them all deluded: though 
the number and sobriety of the people in question might 
make this position increasingly difficult to uohold.
But if I saw Bigfoot myself for was convinced that that had 
happened) and knew of many upright and serious people who 
solemnly said that they had done so also. then of course 
the conditions would then obtain under which I could assert 
that Bigfoot existed. In other words, we are back to a 
suitable combination of P and Q. (N).
Note that the balance between the two appears to be 
important. Neither P nor Q on its own is sufficient. 
Intuitively one feels that a lot of P may perhaps be 
adequately supported by a little Q, and a lot of Q by a 
little P; but the ideal would appear. at a rough 
assessment, to be an equal quantity of both.
N: Above, p (T95) P = the evidence from observation: Q
the opinion of suitable other people.
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Let us now try out this conclusion against other examples.
I do not, personally. believe that flying saucers exist, 
and by this I mean that I hold that whatever people may 
think they see on the occasions when they claim to have 
seen flying saucers they have not seen craft from outer
space visiting the earth. On the above analysis we would
have to ask first 'Do they see anything?'. and second 'If
they do. how would that something qualify as a flying
saucer?'
I might, for instance, simply disbelieve them. I could put 
it down to attention-seeking or to an over-indulged 
imagination. Or I might believe that they thought they saw 
something. and put it down to delusion. If they convinced 
me that they had indeed seen something (we may leave 
aside for the moment how this might be done) I turn to the 
second question, and ask whether the phenomenon could be 
identified. There is a subsidiary terminological question 
which asks whether a fireball or an experimental plane is. 
for the time being, a flying saucer. until its real 
identity becomes known. The corollary would be whether a 
flying saucer becomes a meteor etc.. and ceases to be a 
flying saucer, when thus identified.
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m e  process of convincing me of the existence of flying 
saucei5 would thus be twofold. First, if I saw one myself 
I would then believe that people making such claims saw 
something. I would of course not make this decision 
lightly. I would have to satisfy myself that it was not a 
trick of the light or a fault of eyesight. But let us 
suppose that the object was as plain and undeniable as it 
is often supposed to be. I then move on to ask whether 
this something is a flying saucer in the sense that its 
provenance is extra-terrestrial.
What would it take to convince me that this thing was a 
flying saucer. in that sense? We are now in the Q section 
or the process, having hypothetically disposed of the P 
one. Now I think my reaction to this situation would be 
very much conditioned by the context of the event. On the 
one hand. one might be living in a society which believed 
wholeheartedly and unquestioningly in the existence of 
flying saucers. In that environment I would have 
previously been a heretic. and there would be a latent 
predisposition to change my mind. It is, I suppose, from 
experience. rather than just for convenience. that one 
recognises that if one disagrees with everybody else one 
may be wrong. At the other extreme, in which nobody else 
believed in the existence of flying saucers, the opposite 
pressure would obtain. and I should therefore be more
I
inclined to maintain my scepticism.
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It would, probably, require at least one authoritative 
voice to counter the general trend before I could 
confidently make my new assertion.
As it happens (to continue this investigation of real
situations) we do in fact live in a context lying somewhere 
between these extremes. Many books have been written 
seeking to prove the existence of flying saucers and to 
explain their appearances. These are apparently supported 
with detailed evidence. Photographs have been taken. Even 
the requirement of official recognition is in the offing. 
The matter was at one time raised in the House of Lords, 
and an official investigation is being carried out by NASA.
On the other hand the vast majority of people have no
direct experience of flying saucers, and know nobody who 
has. and so lack the primary (P) ingredient for believing 
in their existence. I could thus count on a measure of 
support either way.
Suppose the balance were to be tilted, gradually. More and 
more people saw flying saucers. More ' and more 
authoritative institutions took the matter up. It became 
reported as factual on television. Appearances were filmed 
in circumstances which precluded fake. At a certain point 
in the tilt of this balance my Q factor would pass its
critical point. provided always that my P factor was not 
null.
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But:, say that even at this point I had had no experience of 
the phenomena myseif. nor knew anyone who had. I could of 
course satisfy the P factor from the evidence collected in 
the Q analysis, the general and growing opinion that what 
was being experienced was in fact flying saucers. I think 
that unless and until I had good first-hand or at second- 
best second-hand experience of the phenomena being dealt 
with I would still entertain residual scepticism.
In these circumstances it would of course become 
increasingly eccentric to do so. But equivalently it would 
become increasingly unlikely that I should continue to lack 
the P factor: and no doubt the two conditions are related.
To be the only person holding or resisting a particular 
belief is to be accounted mad. That situation, however, is 
susceptible to change. Let us consider Copernicus. On the 
face of it it is obvious and indisputable that the sun goes 
round the earth. Everybody can satisfy themselves of this 
fact by simple observation. There would appear to be no 
need to investigate further. One sympathises with the 
Pisan philosopher Libri who refused to look through
Galileo's telescope on the ground that what Galileo claimed 
it showed was impossible.
How much evidence did it take to convince people of the
real nature of the solar system? One cannot for oneself,
even now. demonstrate that the apparent movement of the sun 
is an illusion, caused by the turning of the earth.
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One can. of course, and this is crucial, see how this could 
well be the case, once it is pointed out. The evidence of 
science is more likely to convince scientists. and that 
presumably was what took place. The scientists would then 
use their authority to convince the rest.
In other words, there is a lot of the qualifying (Q) factor 
in such cases. the phase of the process in which it is
decided that what is being experienced is best described as 
such-and-such. If so with Copernicus, how much more with 
quantum physics and modern astronomy. None of us are
equipped with our own electron—microscope or radio-
telescope. nor would we know what to make of the data 
revealed if we were lent one. That we do nevertheless 
accept the findings of science on these matters illustrates 
the extent to which we are prepared to go along with the 
general agreement, provided it is relayed to us from the 
fountainhead of experthood.
We have, with these examples. reached the boundary of
consent about existence. Let us note here that we cannot 
feel quite happy about the meaning of existence at this 
extreme. If no ordinary person can experience. either 
directly or at second-hand. a nuclear particle. then it 
would seem to demand a particularly trusting acceptance of 
expert opinion to feel confident.that they exist. The P 
factor is entirely missing.
213
Is it for this reason that we do not feel in our guts that
they are saying something meaningful when they claim that 
such things exist? Perhaps we feel that it is a convenient 
way of expressing something else. and that the assumption 
of the existence of the nuclear particle is an expression 
of a certain view of events. rather like those expressions 
implying the existence of angels. We have enough respect 
for these people to feel sure that they have their own 
reasons for arguing about how many positrons may be located 
on a pinhead.
Interim conclusions
We have now reached a point at which we may draw some 
conclusions from these considerations.
Both experience and convention are necessary determinants 
of existence; neither are sufficient. Two main points here 
may lead towards an ultimate conclusion:
1. That assertions of existence are not solely determined 
by experience.
2. That assertions of existence are not solely determined 
by convention.
The question which will have to be settled in the end is 
the means^ and relative strengths of the combination.
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Priority. balance. ratio. predominance. method of 
interaction: these are matters which need to be further
considered. To talk and behave as if something exists 
amounts to finding it expedient in terms of experience to 
hold that view, plus sharing an agreement on the subject 
with others. We may note in the meantime that ' any 
position which holds that only the evidence of experience 
is relevant. a view which might be termed pure positivism 
is ruled out. as being too extreme, by these conclusions; 
as IS also its counterpart. in a pure form the doctrine 
that all statements of existence are completely convention- 
based.
To summarise further:
1. To have the experience but lack the consent is possibly 
to suffer from delusions. Nothing is brought into 
existence that way. Note that it does not matter how 
real the experiences are. We can happily accept that 
the experiences are real but that the pink elephants 
are not.
2. But what about the other way round: to have the consent 
not in fact backed up by experience? When people 
believed in witches, demons, or Olympian gods, we would 
say that there were in fact no witches, demons, or 
Olympian gods for them to experience. Yet it seems as 
if the consensus on the subject can override that 
difficulty. It can be agreed that certain experiences 
sha11 count as experiences of witches, demons. gods.
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Is that not in the end, however. what aiwave happens -
although we do not always say so, because we do not 
need to. at the time? Certain experiences count as 
being experiences of chairs, tables. dogs and cats. 
Thus even in the case of witches and gods there .^ s an 
element of experience involved. This point illustrates 
how closely intertwined and mutaily reliant are the 
elements of experience and convention.
The question would seem to be : 1. how much consent, and
2. how much experience — or what degree. or what quality 
of both - is needed?
How many peop1e does it take to make something exist by 
agreeing that it does? Evidently not a majority, at least 
for the purposes of theology. But would we not need an 
overwhelming, almost inclusive majority, to convince us of 
the existence of certain things - to make us believe. in 
the absence of experience. in the existence of ghosts, or 
flying saucers?
Experience would certainly speed things up, and in fact 
most of the agreeing might be dispensable. except for that 
small amount which acts as a prophylactic against charges 
of delusion. But how much agreement is that? Can it be 
quantified?
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We have seen that in real life I would believe in flying 
saucers (a) if I saw one. and one or two other trustworthy 
people convinced me that they saw it too, or fb) if almost 
everybody else believed in them. and I had some sort of 
experience which conformed to this view. To behave 
otherwise in such circumstances is to adopt the occult; to 
make a claim to special and exclusive knowledge without 
however recognising the need to justify that claim.
It is tempting to conclude that we live in an ontological 
democracy. The orthodoxy of existence is a matter of 
votes.
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II. 4a The Book of Job
We said in the previous sub-section that in certain cases 
of doubt as to something's existence 'almost nothing would 
count as evidence'. (1) In this sub-section we shall
consider a means of systematizing this form of guarantee.
It was Arthur Koestler who drew attention to the type of 
thinking which he called 'closed systems'. If you argue 
with a Freudian, he pointed out, he would bring Freudian 
terms to bear to refute you. by claiming your disagreement 
itself as a demonstration of his case. " ... you were
caught in a vicious circle. Similarly, if you argue with a 
Stalinist that to make a pact with Hitler was not a nice 
thing to do. he would explain that your bourgeois class- 
consciousness made you unable to understand the dialectics
of history." Disagreeing with a paranoiac. he continues,
renders you part of his evidence: "... he will at once
accuse you of being a member of the world conspiracy to 
suppress truth." (2).
When Einstein made his famous pronouncement 'if the 
facts do not fit the theory. then the facts are wrong'
he spoke with his tongue in his cheek: but he
nevertheless expressed a profound feeling of the 
scientist committed to his theory. (3).
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A closed system, he says. is "a system which cannot be 
refuted by evidence" since it converts data and criticism 
into its own terms. (4)
It is perhaps significant that Koestler chooses the 
Freudian system as the first of his examples. since the 
self-proving nature of Freud's theories is one of their 
most noticeable characteristics. In his book 'The 
Interpretation of Dreams', for instance. Freud proposes a 
grand and overall theory to which he attaches just that 
sort of commitment referred to. namely the theory that all 
dreams are cases of wish-fulfiIment. He was so impressed 
by the importance of this theory that he envisaged "that 
some day a marble tablet will be placed on the house" 
inscribed with the words "In This House, on July 24th. 1895 
the Secret of Dreams was Revealed to Dr. Sigm. Freud". (5)
What then does he do when a dream is reluctant to conform 
to his requirements? There are some which he comes across 
which are at first sight blatantly not fulfiment of wishes. 
These, however, he interprets as disguised or suppressed 
wish-fulfiIment, in which, for instance, something is made 
to stand for its opposite. Anxiety dreams. for instance, 
seem to "make it impossible to assert as a general 
proposition ... that dreams are wish-fulfiIments: indeed
they seem to stamp any such proposition as an absurdity."
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Yet there is a way round this difficulty; the theory is not 
concerned with the apparent quality. but with the 
interpretation behind it. "We must make a contrast between 
the manifest and the latent content of dreams." (6)
Critics of this blatant casuistry are peremptorily
dismissed. "It is hard to credit the obstinacy with which 
readers and critics of this book shut their eyes to this 
consideration and overlook the fundamental distinction
between the manifest and the latent content of dreams." 
(71
Once having decided that his theory was universal in its 
applicability. Freud was committed to deciphering in its 
terms even the most intransigent case. This extreme he 
eventually found himself obliged to confront. A woman 
patient dreamt that she was to take a holiday in 
circumstances she particularly wished to avoid. Freud had. 
the day before. explained to her that all dreams are 
fulfilments of wishes. and when she brought this specimen 
to his consulting rooms the next morning he was at first 
dismayed. " ... was not this the sharpest possible
contradiction of my theory that in dreams wishes are
fulfilled?" (81
His solution is masterly. and shows us how a closed system 
(if such this is 1 could turn out to be infallible. The 
woman patient disliked the trend of his advice. and wanted 
to prove him wrong.
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She thus fulfilled this wish by producing a dream which 
contradicted his theory: and by doing so she demonstrated
it. "the dream showed that I was wrong. Thus it was her 
wish that I might be wrong, and her dream showed that wish 
fulfilled." (9)
If one has the strong sense at this point that the critic 
cannot win. this is due to the method of closed systems. 
They deprive you of your weapons. Nothing will count as 
evidence against the theory. If it appears to be such, it 
can be adapted.
Let us now consider what is perhaps the paradigm case of a 
closed system.
"There was a man in the land of Uz, whose name was Job." 
It is put into the mind of God by Satan that Job's 
uprightness and fear of God are due to his fortunate 
circumstances. To test this hypothesis (and, as God 
knows, prove it wrong) Satan is permitted to deprive him of 
these. At their next meeting God observes to Satan that 
the removal of his material fortune has not corrupted Job's 
uprightness, and a further assault, against Job's physical 
state itself, is agreed on.
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Job's consequent misfortunes cannot be attributed to the 
punishment of wickedness. since he is without sin. Indeed 
fas we know) it is rather the •other way round. His 
uprightness itself is the cause of his misfortune. It is 
this fact which makes it seem inevitable that he will 
accuse God of injustice: and to do so would of course be
sinful.
Indeed the Biblical story implies that God is using the 
ultimate resource of being intentionally unjust. in order 
to carry out this test: and no doubt we are to see in this
an expression of the 'problem of evil', in the sort of 
extreme form which must have taxed the piety of the Jews in 
the concentration camps.
It is clear to other participants in the story that since 
God is just and Job is suffering, then it follows that Job 
must have sinned. (10). For Job to admit this conclusion 
would be, in their eyes, his correct response. (11). But 
Job knows that he has not sinned, as of course does God. 
and as do we, the readers. (12). He is thus in an 
unenviable dilemma. and much of the book is devoted to 
displaying this. If he denies his sinfulness he implies 
God's injustice. (13). (Indeed this is the course he 
chooses, and the solution in the end provided by God is. as 
we shall see. to sever the line of reasoning giving that 
implication).
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To do that would be the only sin of his life. and he will 
not willingly approach it until brought to this by the
taunting of his companions.
This sort of constriction is evidently one of the perils of 
the closed system. and it adds a dimension of moral 
destruction to Job's already physically beleaguered state. 
Faced with this final predicament, what does Job do? It is 
particularly interesting (as indeed it was in the case of 
Freud) to see a problem which arises directly from the
closed nature of a closed system being worked out in
practice.
What does Job do? He maintains as far as possible the
consistency of his argument. "Though he slay me, yet will
I trust him". (14). "How many are mine iniquities and
sins? Make me to know my transgression and my sin." (15) 
"My lips shall not speak wickedness. nor my tongue utter 
deceit. God forbid that I should justify you: till I die I 
will not remove mine integrity from me." (16)
To summarise before proceeding: If Job does not accuse God
of injustice. it is because he has defined God as
invariably just, and therefore there can be no data which 
would count as evidence for God's injustice - and this. we 
see. is so even when God is intentionalIv 'unjust'.
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ihe case Oi. Job helps us to see that closed systems rest on 
a logical basis: if God is defined as being (among other
things) invariably just, then 'God's injustice' is a self-
contradiction. and therefore impossible. Indeed the story,
after much moral complexity, shows God's ultimate justice, 
and (as we shall see) by doing so indicates the illusory 
nature of his apparent injustice.
In the meantime. Job has not sinned, nor will he (17). "So 
the three men ceased to answer Job. because he was 
righteous in his own eyes." (18). It requires
intervention from another observer to clarify the position.
The answer is that God is not morally accountable: it is
wrong to infer from the fact that Job is just the 
conclusion that God is not. because the same criteria do 
not apply. Indeed it remains impossible for God to be
unjust. (19). To suggest such is an inappropriate form of
speech. (20). It is therefore logic which has to be
adapted; not the governing premises, but the link between 
them. Job was thus wrong to think that his righteousness 
was in any way a reply to God's will. (21). "Behold. God
is great, and we know him not ... " (22).
When God himself, who has been listening to the debate,
finally intervenes, it is to emphasise the non-
comparability of the cases, due to their different scales. 
(23).
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be used as part of a statement about the totality of the 
universe. We have seen the point made before, for instance 
in the case of Russell's distinction between first-order 
and second-oder propositions, and Carnap's point (24) about 
the inappropriateness of asking questions based on a
framework. about matters (such as the reality of the
totality) external to that framework. Similarly
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus distinguishes between what is 
in the world and what is beyond it. "Whereof one cannot 
speak." God might have said. "thereof one must be silent." 
So Job indeed replied to God; "What shall I answer thee?
I will lay mine hand upon my mouth.". (25)
At the end. however. God proves himself just in human 
terms, in that he restored the righteous Job's good 
fortune. and "blessed the latter end of Job more that his 
beginning." (26) This further refinement adds a route by 
which a theory may be sustained even in the face of a 
breakdown of the internal mechanism. If the evidence
remains intractable - evidence for the absence of God's 
justice, for instance, being such that it cannot be adapted 
to become evidence of God's justice - still the desired 
outcome may be only postponed. not yet disproved - God may 
in due course prove to be. as the definition demands,
ultimately just. perhaps in terms of a longer time-span 
than the one at present under consideration. Indeed the 
time-span available in this case in infinite.
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This leads to the possibility of delaying the conclusion, 
by positing a further piece of information not yet 
discovered.
Not only religion but science itself may operate in closed- 
system terms by proposing such a future - sine die, 
perhaps. And it is with this consideration that we come to 
the relevance of closed systems to questions of existence.
The cases of Freud and Job are of course quite different. 
In the first the theory was such that evidence could always 
be adapted to conform to it. In the case of Job we have 
plainly intractable evidence producing a logical paradox
based on a matter of definition, which has to be resolved
largely by logical means. They do however share some
elements. and it is these which we may find instructive. 
Further investigation of the structure of closed systems
will reveal these.
From what we have seen so far it becomes clear that there 
are in fact two sorts of closed systems. We may term them 
the inclusive and the exclusive. The first guarantees the 
existence of the items they are proposing; nothing will 
count as evidence that God is not just. or that dreams are 
not wish-fulfilment. The second guarantees the non­
existence of non-members of the system. If biological 
science does not include in its categories a dog-sized cat.
or a man— like ape. then it can countenance no evidence for 
the existence of these.
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It is, then, apparently possible to make things exist or 
not exist by a purely internal mechanism; by so 
constructing the terminology. Two things are striking 
about this: 1. That we want to say that this is somehow
cheating, that it does not seem satisfactory; 2. That we 
want to say that this was not what we meant by existing, or 
not existing. Perhaps what we learn by this is that 
existence must have a dependence on something outside 
terminology.
If in fact the semantic philosphers (as discussed in 
Section I, sub-section 5) had been able to sustain a 
consistent case for a convention-based view of existence, 
then closed systems would have been the norm rather than 
the apparent oddity they are. But if the system is so 
constructed that no evidence, no experience would make any 
difference, then the proposition is in effect null, since 
for all the difference it makes it might just as well have 
not been made. What is it to say that God is merciful if 
even God himself is unable to disprove this? Is it not to 
rid the word 'merciful' of all meaning?
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We are now in a position to identify what is wrong with 
closed systems: it is that they make an implicit claim to
be doing something which they do not do. While appearing 
to be saying something about a state of affairs in the 
outside world, they are in fact only informative about the 
internal workings of their own structures. Our 
dissatisfaction at this deception is closely related to 
something we have previously discovered: that matters of
existence cannot be analysed purely in terms of semantics 
or dealt with as features peculiar to a language system, 
but must, to be meaningful, bear some relation to 
experience.
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II.5 The World of Things
In accordance with the progression of this section. from 
the abstract towards the concrete. we move now to a 
consideration of what we may suppose to be the most 
definite examples of things being thought of as existing, 
the case of physical objects.
'^Then we say we are sure of the existence of certain things 
we are implicitly making a contrast with others for which 
we are not so sure of that. Thus we may contrast chairs 
and tables with flying saucers and ghosts : or with things
we know do not exist, werewolfs. unicorns, centaurs; or. in 
another category, with the present King of France and 
the round square. As a means of setting some standard, we 
would contrast chairs and tables further with such matters 
as universals and numbers. We contrast the 'physical 
object world'. in fact, with all the types of items we have 
so far been considering in Section II.
It is noteworthy that if there had not been some sort of 
problem with the existence of all these other cases we 
might not have wanted to refer to the existence of 
physical objects at all. But that would then have been 
because we would not have needed to. The fish, one may 
presume. does not remark on the water - at least until 
deprived of it. This is implicitly to assert that we do 
live in the physical object world - a point that would 
hardly be queried by the non-philosopher.
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rrom our point of view the interesting point is that the 
question of the existence of physical objects has in fact 
possible applications. beyond these cases of comparison in 
which it stands as a paradigm. It occurs again. in 
its own right as it were. when there are cases of doubt
The discussion in this sub-section is directed towards a 
consideration of what we mean, what effect or difference we 
intend. when we say that physical objects exist. We will 
in due course consider how one might come to say this. but 
for the time being we may consider what implications would 
be present if we did so.
In the matter of contrast referred to above we could refer 
to their empirical effects, saying for instance that we can 
sit on them and use them for writing on in a way we cannot 
sit on or write on numbers or universals. We can say that 
we can call them in evidence on their own behalf in a way 
we cannot with centaurs and unicorns. Further, we may say 
that they will not betray us by internal inconsistency, as 
would the round square and the king of France.
(Interestingly the contrast is less clear in the case of
the yeti and flying saucers). In other words (and hardly
surprisingly) they have a head start by the very fact of
being physical objects. when we are talking in empirical 
terms.
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It is when an internal problem crops up, and such easy 
certainties desert us, that they lose this prerogative. 
If, in Cartesian terms, we may doubt everything, we may 
doubt them in just the same way as everything else. If,
then, one asserts (and not for the purpose of comparison)
that physical objects exist, or alternatively that a 
certain physical object exists, it would have to be against 
some sort of background of scepticism.
Descartes considered the hypothetical position in which 
everything is an illusion. Leaving aside the question of 
the coherence of universal illusion, let us keep our grip 
on this table. If everything is an illusion, then this is 
an illusion. But I happen to know, as a matter of fact, 
what that would be like. We move now from the general to 
the particular case of illusion. If this table were an 
example of an extremely successful hologram, a three- 
dimensional image created by interplaying beams of light, 
then I should not be able to put my glass down on it. It
would fall to the floor and break. Descartes would reply
that the glass as well (and he and I, presumably, and 
therefore this discussion) would be equally illusory. But 
since putting an illusory glass down on an illusory table 
must be exactly the same, in itself, as putting a real 
glass down on a real table, we can safely return to the 
specific case: if the table, on its own, might be a
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conjuring trick or some other misunderstanding, on my 
part, of my sensory impressions, what would I mean if I 
asserted, or denied, that it existed?
On this level I would mean such things as that I could 
safely put my glass down on it. It would not fall to the 
floor and break, as it would (and an illusory glass no 
doubt would not) if the table were in fact a construction 
of laser beams. I would mean also that I could expect it 
to behave in a way I associate with the things I call 
physical objects.- to display a degree of permanence and 
consistency, for instance, so that it will not, while I am 
sitting here, come and go, change its shape or size, or 
(for instance) start singing. (N) (There are indeed items 
on the borders of the category I recognise as physical 
objects, such as steam or various gases, which do not 
display the degree of fixity and immutability required; 
and this is precisely why they are borderline cases). (1)
N: In Chapter III ('The Environmental Field') of his
'Principles of Gestalt Psychology' K. Koffka (1) identifies 
the distinction between 'Things and Not-things'. "Are 
clouds things? If yes, is fog, air, light, cold?" he asks 
(p.70). He then considers words, noises, waves, motions 
and forces, (p.71). He concludes: "Thus we may single out 
three characteristics of things which will severally and 
jointly be constitutive of things: shaped boundedness,
dynamic properties, and constancy." (p.72).
235
In other words. when I say it exists. I am bringing Intc^
play quite a lot of information as to what I expect of
tables. information dependent on quite a lot of experience 
of things which I call tables.
This is in fact what I mean by 'table'. and one that
conforms to these diverse and rather strict requirements is 
what I mean by 'one that exists',
Assuming we have found out how to sort out the question of 
whether anyone is playing a trick on me or whether I am for 
some other reason. such as having faulty eyesight,
mistaken. there is still a general point which, however we 
may attempt to defer it. must be faced. 'This table
exists' might be said in the context of a discussion about
micro-physics. Let us consider how one might actually come 
to say this. as part of the following line of discussion. 
The electron is an electrical charge; it is thus non­
material, in the sense of having no substance; as a
physical object in the normal sense, of being visible and
tangible. it does not exist. Yet this table is inevitably 
composed of electrons. And 'this table exists'. How to 
explain that paradox?
Alternatively, again on the general level. there is the 
argument related to idealism; to put it crudely, as a non- 
neurologist. all our perceptions of the world are derived 
from our sense-impressions as interpreted by the brain.
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Wtiat exists for us, is therefore a series of refractions of 
light giving rise to neural charges. How does that leave 
this table:' Does it. or only its impression, exist? And 
so on.
Now what is striking about these rather hackneyed points is 
that we have. without as it were moving from our seats, 
identified several quite different senses in which physical 
objects may be said to exist or not exist. Do these 
different senses imply different demands in terms of 
qualifying conditions? To answer this we must consider how 
one would in fact set about deciding on the existence of a 
table.
I think I should always be concerned about whether I could 
safely put my glass down on it. This is not just the 
result of a natural caution. but of a feeling that if such 
questions could not be asked we would not be talking about 
a table at all, real or imaginary. Can you put your glass 
down on a bundle of electrons? There is about that 
question. I feel, and the related one about sense- 
impressions and neural charges, a misleading quality which 
relates it to the Cartesian condition of total delusion. 
It implies that only the table is insubstantial, not the 
glass. You can of course (as we have remarked) put an 
illusory glass down quite safely on an illusory table. 
There would not be a lot of point in doing so. but if the 
risk of breakage were one's main worry I can think of no 
safer course.
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Yet if one pursued the Illusion to the contents - say an
illusory little St. Estephe ('lacks body'?) - and finally 
to the illusion of intoxication. of next morning's 
headache, and all other matters which could otherwise 
distinguish the illusory from the non-i11usory. then the 
effect would have been lost: it would still have been just
like putting a real glass down on a real table.
We must note that it is only when the two conditions are 
mixed - real glass/illusory table - that danger occurs. 
And there is a lesson to be learnt from this. In any 
meaningful case I would be asking not ’is the world an 
illusion' but: 'is this table?’
To conclude. it seems that one cannot find an appropriate 
use for discussion of the existence of physical objects 
which does not have practical consequences. To ask whether 
the glass, the table. and their contexts are an illusion 
invites the comment that it would make no difference: and
so it is not worth asking about. It is, however worth 
asking the question about the table if one knows, or 
assumes. the real existence of the glass. In such a case 
the answer would actually make a difference. and so the 
question might really and usefully be asked. Once again it 
is the element of informativeness. in the way of the 
answer's making some sort of difference. that makes it 
reasonable to talk about existence.
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II CONVENTION AND EXPERIENCE
Titroduct ion
In the first Section of this thesis we set the background 
for an investigation of statements about existence by 
giving examples of the way the subject had been treated in 
past philosophy. and we found that a group of residual 
problems. broadly speaking to do with the relation of 
existence statements to convention on the one hand and to 
experience on the other. remained sufficiently persistent 
to be worthy of further discussion. To be precise. we 
found that while Plato had produced what appeared to be a 
general rule to decide on questions of existence, it was of 
no use in certain cases because it implicitly relied on the 
part played by an observer: and we illustrated this point
further in relation to the work of Berkeley. We then found 
that certain distinctions arising from the writings of 
Anselm. and some apparent misunderstandings of these, 
highlighted the lack of an agreed formula for deciding 
questions of existence. in spite of the fact that Plato 
appeared to have provided one. Bertrand Russell's apparent 
removal of any problems in this sphere turned out. on 
investigation, to be little more that a restatement of 
the problems; and the work of philosophers of the semantic 
school left undecided the degree to which experience. as 
well as language, governs decisions on questions of 
existence.
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In the second Section we gave examples in a systematic form 
of the way existence statements come to be made, and the 
sort of procedures which are adopted to deal with cases of 
dispute, with the aim of considering what is intended when 
existence claims are made or denied and in the hopes that 
this, in turn, would shed further light on the roles of 
convention and experience in relation to such statements. 
Broadly speaking these first two Sections constituted types 
of review, firstly of what has been said and secondly of 
what is done. We now turn to a slightly different sort of 
exercise.
While the previous Sections looked outwards, at the sayings 
and doings of others. Section three has more of an inward- 
looking aspect, regarding as it does the subject of this 
thesis itself. In fact it largely sets out to clarify two 
of the terms which occur in the thesis's title. In the 
process these will be defined, at least for present 
purposes.
As a means of approaching this subject it is intended to 
use the distinction between quantity and quality expressed 
by Peter Winch in his book 'The Idea of a Social Science 
and its Relation to Philosophy'. (1) This, and the rela­
tion of quantification to quality. Winch derives from H. B. 
Acton (2) and ultimately from Hegel. It is intended to 
show that the distinction is not as clear as Winch 
supposes, and in doing so to identify the boundaries of 
convention and experience.
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Having reached this present point we have inevitably 
established certain views and standpoints, and it might be 
as well to note these now.
When this thesis tries to sort out what is going on when 
people use the word 'exist', the intention is not (as has 
been frequently said) to answer the questions of their 
disputes, but rather to help them to ask those questions 
clearly. Perhaps in the process some of the more untidy 
questions will simply disappear, that in itself being a 
sort of answer. If that should happen we have done some 
good.
In this process there arises a recurrent theme, an idea 
which has been increasingly forcing itself upon us, namely 
that saying something which there is no point in saying is 
best avoided. That is, if the situation in which one has 
made the claim 'p ' is indistinguishable, in every way other 
than the fact of the utterance of 'p ', from the situation 
in which 'p ' is not asserted, then it seems to me that 'p ' 
is wrong. It pretends to something which it cannot 
sustain, such as the transfer of information, since no 
statement would surely pretend to vacuity.
If nothing is achieved then it would have been better to
have said nothing. The valid use of a term or a
proposition may be judged by results.
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Convent i on
Citing Hegel's 'Law of the Transformation of Quality’, 
under the heading 'Differences in Degree and differences in 
Kind', Peter Winch (3) says "the concepts which we apply to 
the more complex behaviour are logically different from 
those we apply to the less complex." As an example of the 
failure "to distinguish physical changes from conceptual 
changes" he mentions "the sudden qualitative change of 
water into ice following on a series of uniform 
quantitative changes of temperature" and the question of 
how many grains of wheat one has to add together before one 
has a heap. (4)
This cannot be settled by experiment because the
criteria by which we distinguish a heap from a non-heap 
are vague in comparison with those by which we 
distinguish water from ice; there is no sharp dividing 
line. (see Note overleaf)
A similar point is made by Richard Routley (5), who gives
such questions as "How wide is Mt. Egmont? Where do its
slopes end? ... Is this a new wave? How many mountain
peaks are in a range?" and adds "Questions as to precise
boundaries, in particular, are very common with natural
entities: these are somet imes settled by decision or
convention, and sometimes not." (6) Human artefacts on
the other hand "do have sharp boundaries" and so are taken
as paradigms of entities. (7)
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N:
Acton (2) cites Hegel as follows; "(8) In the note to 108 
of the Encyclopedia Hegel also refers to puzzles about the 
number of grains it takes to make a heap, and the number of 
hairs that have to be plucked from a horse's tail to make 
it a bald-tailed horse." (Acton, op.cit. p.82-3). He 
differentiates these cases from that of water freezing, 
also used by Hegel: "in the second case there is a marked
observable difference; first there is liquid, then there is 
solid. In the first case, however, there is no such marked 
transition, since there is an element of choice about 
whether we call a set of grains a heap of not." (ibid. 
p. 92). Acton is concerned to expose the fallacy of the 
Communist belief in sudden leaps of change, such as 
revolution, and in predictability. (p.89). However 
perhaps we should note that there is some analogy between 
water freezing and grains becoming a heap. Acton points 
this out, though Winch appears to ignore it. The look of 
the grains changes, like that of the water, when "after a 
while, we see them as a whole." (Acton, p.93) But, when, 
we may ask, is that? 'After a while' invites a whole host 
of questions. Acton continues: "Psychologists give the
name 'form quality' to the 'look' that wholes have as 
distinct from the separate appearance of each of their 
parts." (loc.cit). This is perhaps not the place to 
inquire whether psychologists have devised a means of 
measuring when 'form quality' comes into being.
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Winch likewise is arguing that there are some concepts not 
susceptible to quantification because not sufficiently 
specific. (We may note that this distinction itself might 
be one such, because it would be hard to say at what degree 
of specificness a concept would become quantifiable.) I 
have argued elsewhere that it is in the nature of some 
concepts that they are of a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative nature, and that therefore no degree of 
refinement would enable them to be quantified: "In order
to decide at what point something becomes 'acceptable', do 
you measure the little units of acceptability in it? Does 
it cease to be acceptable at some point when these units 
are removed from it one by one, and if so at what exact 
point does this change take place? The idea is absurd. It 
is absurd because that is not the way the word 'acceptable' 
is used". (8) I went on to distinguish quantity and 
quality by virtue of the contextual relation of the latter. 
"Quantity is what it is regardless of the context in which 
it exists. A change from one qualitative nature to another 
involves the making of a decision, and this is made by the 
rules appropriate to the circumstances prevailing." (9)
I now think that this distinction is itself flawed, in that 
all apparent quantification has an innate qualitative 
element. Winch says that the number of degrees one needs 
to "reduce the temperature of a bucket of water for it to 
freeze ... has to be settled experimentally". (10)
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But can it be settled experimentally what a degree is? How 
large? How is it to be measured? By what criteria do we 
distinguish a degree from a non-degree? This is clearly a 
conceptual matter, in Winch's terms. It is not, to use his 
quotation from Acton, a matter "that the facts press upon 
us in unmistakable fashion". (11)
If it were the case that the number of degrees by which one 
has to reduce the temperature of a bucket of water for it 
to freeze "has to be settled experimentally" then that 
would be knowledge which one could gain purely by means of 
experience. That however assumes that it has already been 
settled what a degree is, and this is not something given 
to us by nature but rather a matter on which we have to 
make a conceptual decision. Since this must be the case 
for all units of measurement it means that quantificaion 
cannot have experimental identity in independence of, and 
distinction to, the alternative decision or convention- 
based qualitative world. One might try to imagine a 
process of the simple addition of specific units until a 
new form is reached; say we go on adding soldiers until we 
find we have a platoon. Leaving aside the question of 
whether what is and what is not a soldier has been reached 
by agreement rather than observed, it is obvious that we 
could not do this without prior agreement as to how many 
soldiers constitute a platoon. There has of course been no 
discovery at all; and so it will be with all cases of 
change produced by addition.
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These are in fact two simple rules which will hold in all 
cases, and they may thus be put into general form.
A: Items identified by the application of measurement must
ipso facto be convention-based.
B; Items identified by the addition of given units are 
convention—based through dependence on prior
agreement.
In A the case holds in general because units of measurement 
are part of the cultural activity of measuring, rather than 
given by nature. In B the case holds in general because 
the units, although in this case given, cannot of 
themselves delimit a concept other than themselves. They 
lack this capacity because they are, as stated, given as 
units.
It might be debated, for instance, whether pennies have 
within them the capacity to combine to become pounds. If 
they do, then the event of 100 pennies being £1 is part of 
the conceptual background of their occurrence, and not 
something which takes place as a result of the accumulation 
of pennies. In this case the pennies are not just simple 
units, but also one—hundredths of a pound, so that the 
matter is analytic. If however the pennies do. not have 
within them the capacity to combine to become pounds then 
the event of 100 pennies becoming £1 must be something we 
provide from outside the given data. The pennies could not 
in this case provide the information for us.
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A heap, in Winch's example, is something of a different 
order to a number of grains of wheat. Thus no number of 
grains of wheat can form a heap. This is because, as we 
shall see shortly, it is we who form heaps, not wheat. My 
point here however is that when water undergoes an 
undoubted conceptual as well as physical change on becoming 
ice, the quantification of this issue also resides in us 
rather than the water, which is not, in itself, getting 
colder in quantified terms. This is not through any 
elusiveness on its part or incompetence on ours, but simply 
because quantification is a human and not an aqueous 
activity.
It might be objected that we could not form a heap of 
grains of wheat without grains of wheat; so that the 
formation of heaps cannot be just a matter of agreement. 
This is perfectly acceptable, but it can also be shown that 
the formation of heaps is not just a matter of the addition 
of grains. For one thing it depends also on the prior 
knowledge of the concept 'heap'. Without that you would 
not know that what you had was a heap. Grain cannot supply 
that information. Grain cannot decide what is a heap. A 
heap is a concept. Human beings form concepts. Grain does 
not.
Similarly with the case of water freezing: water does not
itself grow colder by degrees, because degrees are a form 
of measurement, and it is human beings that measure, not 
water.
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We. therefore, not the data, provide the grid by which we 
measure or identify. We do this by prior agreement, as to 
what shall count as what. It is this element of prior 
agreement that I mean by 'convention'.
Finally, we may wonder what form this agreement takes. Is 
it collective, tacit, explicit, arbitrary, rule-governed, 
and so on? (12) In elucidating this we will fill out the 
concept of convention as used in this thesis, and once 
again, see why convention is involved, to however slight a 
degree, in claims about the existence of even such physical 
things as chairs and tables.
The element of prior agreement is involved in many 
activities, and so takes many forms, but most strikingly it 
takes the form of the use of common language and hence of 
the terms therein. This is not the place to discuss in 
detail how language is learned, but we may note that when 
we acquire the use of a language we acquire, with that 
knowledge, the capacity to refer to prior agreement. This 
will not normally be explicit: you do not talk with a
dictionary in your hand. It may however be explicit when 
required. Instructing a foreigner or correcting a child 
one could refer to dictionaries and grammars. The role of 
prior agreement in the use of language in fact resides in 
this permanent possibility of making the agreement 
explicit, if required.
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Possession of a common language is an aspect of possession 
of common knowledge. Without shared prior knowledge we 
could not be in a position to identify anything. The idea 
that observation alone can give any form of knowledge or 
certainty can be shown to be erroneous. Karl Popper, whose 
first-hand familiarity with the thinking of the Vienna 
Circle makes him an interesting witness, puts it thus: 
'The statement, "Here is a glass of water" cannot be 
verified by any observational experience. The reason is 
that the universaIs which occur in it cannot be correlated 
with any particular observational experience ...' (13)
What Popper means when he says the statement cannot be 
verified by observation because it contains universals, is 
that to know the truth of it one would have to know the use 
of the concepts denoted by the terms 'glass' and 'water' 
(or their equivalents in other languages). The statement 
would, if questioned, have to be supported by further 
statements, 'This is what we mean by a glass' and 'This is 
what we mean by water'. If that procedure might take place 
- and testing the possession of common knowledge in this 
way would actually occur, of course, only if there was 
doubt as to the correctness of the use of language, as in 
the case of a foreigner or a child - then we have exposed 
the key element of convention as the term is used in this 
thesis. It resides in the supporting background to the 
words 'what we mean by'.
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What applies to glasses of water applies also to everything 
else which may be apparently apprehended by observation - 
chairs and tables, heaps of grain, and so on. Convention 
is involved in anything one might say about their existence 
because it is only by possessing prior knowledge that one 
can know what it is they are. You can only say certain 
things if you know certain things.
To ask who decided, whether this is arbitrary or rule- 
governed, and so on, is to miss the point. We have said 
above, and this is important, that the process can be rule- 
governed if required - a dictionary can settle a dispute. 
In the normal course of events it will be self-supporting: 
what is agreed is what is agreed. Common knowledge is
whatever knowledge people share: and so on, through
innumerable tautologies. Note also that the definition in 
the dictionary does not result from a committee decision as 
to what should be the case, but rather forms an observation
of usage, a record of what i^ the case, and so is itself
the recognition of existing agreement.
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Take for example, the test case of seeing something for the 
first time. (N) You may want to know that it is. Now 
nothing about the thing itself can tell you what it is, any 
more than observation of a glass of water by itself can 
tell you that it is a glass of water. This fact may be 
definitively demonstrated by considering the kind of answer 
you hope to get to the question 'What is that?' If someone 
answered 'It's a flat shiny surface woth dark sides' you 
might reply 'I can see that. But what is it?' An answer 
of the form 'It's a solar panel' (for instance) would be 
the one you wanted.
Before leaving this important matter, let us consider a 
little further what the satisfactoriness of that reply 
implies, since it will throw yet further light on the 
nature of agreement and hence the sense of 'convention' as 
used in this thesis.
N: I refer to this as a test case because it reveals how
people would deal with a situation in which the element of 
prior knowledge was absent. It is also relevant at this 
point for the same reason; it shows us that this 
deficiency must be overcome in order to resolve questions 
of identity.
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You cannot get from the words ‘It's a solar panel' the 
understanding of what a solar panel is, any more than you 
can get that from the sight of shiny flat-surfaced three- 
dimensional object of rectangular shape. You need in turn 
further knowledge. You need, in fact, to know what a solar 
panel is before seeing it, as well as knowing that this is 
a solar panel. Say you did not possess that knowledge. It 
should then be necessary to break the information down into 
simpler units. 'A solar panel converts sunlight into 
energy.' You go on ('what's sunlight?') until you reach 
the point where knowledge is already shared.
But say you did at once understand the information 'It's a 
solar panel'. How have you come by this knowledge? 
Probably nobody has ever had to say to you: 'A solar panel
is ...' ('a set of cells which react to sunlight to convert
it to energy' or whatever). You have heard people talking 
about solar panels, in a context which enabled you to 
apprehend its meaning. The point about this is that there 
is no explicit rule-governed activity involved.
You might of course have got it wrong. What would happen 
then? Say you hear people talking about solar panels and 
the context did not make it clear what sort of things they 
were. You might then conclude that they were committees 
formed to inquire into the use of solar energy. Your 
mistake would become evident in due course, to the extent 
that someone could identify it and explain.
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'That's not what is meant by a solar panel.' Note the 
words 'what is meant', or 'what we mean'. This is a 
statement of fact, of what may be observed, rather than a 
rule. It points to the existence of prior agreement, 
rather than constitutes its formation.
To put these points another way: if you understand what a
solar panel is when receiving the answer 'That's a solar
panel' you have evidently gone around with the concept 
'solar panel' ready for use before ever having the 
experience of an instance of it. How then have you gained 
that facility? It cannot be by experience of solar panels, 
since you are seeing one for the first time. Rather it 
must be by observation of agreement among other people. It 
must be by observing that people use the phrase 'solar 
panel' in certain ways and in certain contexts, and for
obvious practical reasons you will conform to that usage, 
thus avoiding error and correction. The agreement among 
other people (a fact of behaviour which may be observed, 
rather than a rule imposed) and your agreement with that 
agreement, are examples of what is here meant by 
convention.
There remains to be dealt with one further possible
objection to the concept of convention as we are using it 
here. and investigating this will provide yet further 
elucidation of that concept. Since it is claimed that 
convention plays a part in determining existence
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statements, and since convention involves agreement among, 
and with, other people, there arises a possible difficulty 
with the question 'Do other people exist?'
At first sight this difficulty seems likely to have two 
prongs. One would be that a regress could be said to set 
in if, in answering the question, one refers to agreement, 
and agreement is such as to involve other people; one might 
then ask whether those other people exist, and answering 
that find oneself referring to the existence of further 
other people, and so on. Alternatively if in avoiding this 
regress one took the existence of other people as given, 
then one would be assuming what requires to be shown.
If this objection is valid it makes the question about 
other people a special case, perhaps a limiting case in 
terms of the claims of this thesis. If that were so it 
would be important to note it, and tempting to proceed to 
ask why this should occur. What would be so special about 
other people? The answer might be that the special nature 
is inherent in the sense here attributed to convention, and 
the limiting effect would be a restriction (albeit not a 
particularly inconvenient one) on the usefulness of this 
sense of the term 'convention'.
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However it seems that there are a number of existence 
questions which cannot properly be asked (in the sense of 
expecting an informative answer) and that 'Do other people 
exist?' is one such question. Let us now see why this is 
so.
The question 'Do other people exist?' is problematic, in 
terms of the claims of this thesis, i_f it is accepted that 
existence has a reference to convention. and that 
convention involves agreement, and agreement is understood 
to be agreement among or with other people. But if that is 
all accepted, and the question is therefore problematic, 
then the answer is already known, so that the question 
cannot properly be asked, in the sense of expecting an 
informative answer.
If those claims are not accepted then the question cannot 
lead to a regress or to a question-begging assumption and 
so is not problematic.
It might seem from this that the question 'Do other people 
exist?' has been answered by saying 'Yes, because other 
people exist.' (14) What has taken place, however, is 
that an observation has been made about the way the term 
'exist' is used. Its use involves other people. It is 
perhaps for this reason that we must conclude that other 
people are a special case as far as existence questions 
are concerned.
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Experience
We cannot arrive at the knowledge of the degree of 
temperature at which water freezes by experiment alone, 
because we have provided from outside the experiment the 
idea of degrees of temperature. What, if anything, one 
might now ask, can be known of by experiment alone? But
first we must ask what constitutes experience.
I have been using the term 'experience' as part of a group 
including 'observation', 'experiment'," 'empirical
evidence', (N) in contrast to a group of terms including 
such forms as 'conceptual', 'consensus', 'agreement' and of 
course the one with which it forms a pair in the title, 
'convention'. Some philosophers (15) have thought it
useful to talk of 'raw experience' or the 'raw data',
presumably referring to the given data, the actual sensory 
events as received by the nervous system, as distinct from 
the data of experience given shape. form or order by, 
presumably, the secondary phase of the nervous system, the 
brain. Philosophers should beware of becoming involved in 
neurology, and any notions they have of what actually 
happens when (for instance) light falls on the eyeball are 
probably grossly over-simplified.(N2 overleaf)
N: 'Empirical' from Greek 'empeiria' = 'experience'.
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N2; See for instance Koffka (16), who points out that there 
is no picture involved in the act of seeing, just a 
possible table of degrees of stimulation. In terms of 
vision, in Koffka's analysis, the nearest we can come to 
raw data is light waves which "excite the rods and cones in 
our retina" (p.79). "When I see a table, this table qua 
table does not affect my senses at all." (ibid). The 
solution, Koffka concludes, lies not in terms of stimuli, 
or of sensation and perception. but of organisation, and 
that is a subject in itself, (p.98).
In fact my use of the word 'experience' in this work does 
not involve us in any discussion of the senses, illusion, 
reality or perception. (N).
N: On the connection of observation with sensation Gilbert
Ryle has some interesting points to make in 'The Concept of 
Mind' (17). This passage includes the famous remarks on 
the privacy of sensations, which he says is an unexciting 
but important point, that you cannot "hold my catches, win 
my races, eat my meals, frown my frowns or dream my 
dreams". The point he is concerned to make in these pages 
is that sensations are not objects of observation at all. 
Observing, however, does involve having sensations. For 
the present purpose however, in so far as sensations are 
involved in observation, their nature or form need not 
concern us. It is sufficient to note that observation and
experience are logically interconnected.
258
It is the part played by an observer that distinguishes
something as experience. Experience, for present purposes, 
it whatever involves the presence of an observer.
In the above work we have arrived at the general conclusion 
that if the truth or falsehood of a statement makes no 
possible difference to anything outside the statement then 
there is something more than vacuous about the statement, 
there is something positively wrong with it.
Wittgenstein expressed much the same idea when he said "A 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, 
is not part of the mechanism." (18) The same would apply 
if there is in principle no way of telling whether a 
statement is true or false, but in fact for the same 
reason. If there is no way of telling, then it can make no 
difference, and so the statement was no real statement at 
all, but empty sounds deceitfully disguised.
What then of those cases where an existence statement 
appears to hold for purely logical reasons? (How, as Kant 
would put it, is a priori knowledge possible?) Anselm's 
ontological argument, for the existence of God, for 
instance, (19) that a being a greater than which could not 
be conceived must exist, because otherwise a greater being 
could be conceived, might be considered to hold good for 
purely logical reasons, even if nobody ever did the 
conceiving. On the face of it logical necessity, and hence
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whatever may be said, about necessary being, does not in any
way depend on the presence of an observer, and so defeats
our case. But how informative are statements about 
necessary beings? (20) The answer is that necessary 
existence can never be proved of a particular item, only of 
a general case. The value can never be substituted for the 
variable. It is as in cases of probability: one ends only 
with a statistical truth, never a matter of instance.
If therefore it can be said only that there must be a value 
to the variable but never what that value is, then you 
cannot prove by this means the existence of any particular
thing. It is as if the answer turns out to be not an
answer to the question which was asked, and therefore not 
informative on that subject at all.
Regarding the role of experience in existence statements we 
may now summarise the above argument as follows:
1. If there is no difference between an item's existing 
and its not existing, the term is not being properly 
used.
2. If a part is played by an observer in the state of 
affairs under consideration then there is such a 
difference.
3. If for some reason it is impossible to say that an 
observer plays such a part in the case then it cannot 
be shown that condition 1. does not apply.
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Note that we cannot show that there no difference if an
observer cannot be shown to be involved. There remains 
moreover the intermediate case, say 2a, in which it is 
possible for an observer to be playing a part, but this is 
not certain. This represents those cases where we do not 
know whether or not something exists; although we know what 
set of events would determine the matter these have not 
taken place and we do not know whether they will. (21)
If such uncertainty could not be accommodated by the theory 
then the theory would be flawed. (N)
Convention and Experience
It will be seen that for all their mutual interaction 
convention and experience cannot be defined in terms of 
each other. They deal with independent aspects of the 
provision of meaning, and it is not at all as if one starts 
where the other stops. The one - an element of prior 
agreement - and the other - involvement of an observer - 
are not intrinsically related. It is partly for this 
reason, in fact, that their joint and rival roles in 
existence-statement theory is of special interest.
N : Richard Routley (22) makes a similar point: "It is
simply that a satisfactory logical treatment will have to 
allow appropriately for indeterminacy."
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IV. TESTING THE THEORY
introduction
Having derived from the investigation so far at least the 
loose form of a theory, it will be instructive now to test 
it for its ability to be applied in particular cases. 
Since the theory is in the first place derived from 
observation of particular cases, it would be no surprise to 
find that this is possible.fN) What is of interest, and 
use, however. is that the attempt to apply the theory to 
cases other than those from which it is derived gives rise 
to the need for slight but crucial modifications. If these 
in turn enable us to apply it generally, we shall have 
succeeded. This process of adaptation, is after all. what 
the testing is for.
We start. then, with the preliminary theory in the form as 
given above (1). Both experience and convention 
are necessary determinants of existence; neither are 
sufficient. Assertions of existence are not solely 
determined by experience. Assertions of existence are not 
solely determined by convention.
N: The choice of example, both in Section II and here, is
governed only by the criterion of usefulness for the 
purpose, and by the wish to provide a historical context in 
Section II, while a modern one seems more appropriate here,
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However. a strong element of the one may compensate for a
degree of weakness in the other. By 'convention' we mean
agreement among relevant people: by 'experience' we mean
primarily first-hand observation. but may be disposed to 
include second-hand reporting regarded by the asserter as 
re liable.
Clearly this needs considerable clarification and
refinement. (for instance by demonstration of 'relevant' 
and 'reliable'). and it is to be hoped that the following 
series of tests will assist in providing those. It should 
be noted that in our discussions the 'agreement' or 
'convention' element has not always been as to ’ whether 
something existed. but sometimes also as to what it would 
be if it did exist. (2)
To see how this formula might be put to use, and what would 
result, I propose to ask the following questions:
1. Does Extra-Sensory Perception exist?
2. Do Black Holes exist?
3. Does evil exist?
4. Does God exist?
Both the first two questions are of a real and practical 
nature. whereas the third and fourth relate rather more 
(though as we shall see not exclusively) to philosophical 
considerations.
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The purpose of these attempts to apply the theory is t-: 
throw light on the procedure by which the questions can be 
answered. This I take to be equivalent to deciding what 
the questions mean. and both are to do with deciding what 
the difference would be. if the answer were yes or if the 
answer were no.
This is not. of course. the same thing as providing an
answer to the questions. It may however be a useful step
towards such a goal.
1. Does Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP) exist?
First. we must consider whether this is an appropriate 
question. Should we not rather say 'Does ESP occur?' or 
'Do people practise ESP?' Would we (leaving aside the 
absurdity of the questions) say 'Does counting exist?'
rather than 'Do people count?', or 'Does golfing exist?' 
rather than 'Do people play golf?' It would be as well to 
dispose of this difficulty straight away.
In fact this consideration relies on an analogy with
perception which extra-sensory perception does not 
necessarily sustain. ESP is not supposed to be just a way 
of perceiving, but an ability to do so in a distinct form, 
an ability which some people. and not others, are supposed 
to possess, in other words something equivalent to a knack.
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As a second step this observation allows us to identify two 
distinct meanings of 'perception'. both of the word on Its 
own and in the pnrase 'extra—sensory perception'. In one 
sense it is a participle and in the other a substantive. 
In the case of 'perception' this is less clear, although we 
do use the word sometimes as an abstract noun, for instance 
when distinguishing perception and sensation.
ESP. then, means two things:
1. The process of perceiving extra-sensorily; in which 
case one would talk of its occurring.
2. The ■ faculty of this. of which one might talk of its 
being.
Of course sense 2 is logically dependent on sense 1. since 
there could be no faculty if there were not instances of 
the acts or events. or rather it would be hard to say 
anything about it if there were. It would not be 
confusing. I think. to express this as a distinction 
between the acts and the activity. Although the activity 
comes into existence as a generalisation from the acts. as 
such apparent summations often do it then takes on an 
independent grammatical life, so that one could for 
instance legislate against it in general, without having 
to say which particular instances of its future occurrence 
were against the law, (There might, of course, as the 
anti-ESP law would hope, be none. ESP the activity would 
still remain illegal).
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it is no news. of course. to iearn that we have this 
generalising ability. the ability to form universels. but 
the point I wish to make is that it is because of it that 
one can say 'Does ESP exist?'
Now it is my task in the present sequence to test the
general theory that experience and convention are co­
determinants of existence statements: that existence
statements get their meanings from a reference to them
both. that neither on its own is sufficient, to determine 
the validity of existence statements: and that they may
play a complementary role, in that a relative deficiency of 
one can be compensated for by an extreme of the other, 
provided both are in some degree present.
It is plain at once that any such question as 'Does ESP 
exist?' will be asked in a context, and that the context in 
which it is asked would initially appear to affect the 
outcome. This, we must say at once, could lead to an
unsatisfactory result which might well undermine the 
theory. If, by our terms, ESP were found to exist in one 
cultural setting (say the Glastonbury Midsummer Festival), 
in which anyone asking the question could produce to their 
own satisfaction sufficient quantities of experience (which 
I shall refer to, as above at II.4.7., by the letter p) and
convention (q), and would not accept as relevant any
contrary findings: and not in another cultural context, say 
a police investigation into a major crime, where the
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validity of the p and the q factors would be differently 
judged. This would be an unsatisfactory outcome because it 
would mean that ESP would both exist and not exist. which 
IS self-contradictory.
That is to say ESP would appear to exist or not to exist 
because the matter is partly decided by convention, and the 
consensus involved in convention can vary with contexts, 
ihis IS not the same as saying (for instance) that humming­
birds exist in one climate. and so in one context, and not 
in another. The climatic context is not claimed to be a 
condition for the existence of humming-birds (but merely 
for their location), whereas context-based convention is by 
this theory being claimed to be a condition for the 
existence of ESP. If one body of opinion held that 
humming-birds exist. and another that they were illusory, 
then we would have a similar situation to that of ESP and 
would have to find a way of dealing with it. (3)
Another way of putting this would be to say that a 
confusion has crept in through the loose use of the word 
'exist'. That humming-birds occur in one climate (and so 
in one context) and not in another has no bearing on the 
existence of humming-birds, merely on where, if they exist, 
they may be found. If convention has a bearing on the 
existence of ESP (or indeed on humming-birds, or whatever).
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however. it might be thought that since convention can 
apparently vary from one context to another so can the 
decision as to whether or not ESP exists.
So the problem is not just that ESP might be said to occur 
in one context and not in another (which would pre-empt the 
question of its existence) but that in one context it might 
be held (as far as the convention determinant of its 
existence was concerned) to exist, and in another context 
equally firmly held not to exist. Although the process of 
discussing this apparent difficulty reveals the impotence 
of convention on its own, we shall also see below, in the 
final pages of this sub-section, the essential part played 
by the residual element of convention in an apparently 
experience-related situation.
Now it is clear that there would be no point in referring 
one cultural system to the other, since they may be taken 
to be mutaily unacceptable. We may take it also that the 
validity of the q factor is confirmed, for those concerned 
- since this is only to say that there is a predisposition 
within the context to answer the question in a certain way. 
(4j This therefore lays the responsibility, if the 
question can be asked and answered at all, on the p factor. 
If it were said now (as we were tempted to say before (5) 
that the question is what would count as experience, of ESP 
or whatever, this is to risk referring experience back to
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accepted opinion. which would amount to making p dependent 
on q. so that they are not two conditions but one. That 
procedure is precisely what is adopted by closed systems
(6) so that the effect is both that they cannot be faulted
and that they are ultimately void of informative content.
(7) It would mean in this case that all questions of 
existence are convention—based, a conclusion we might have 
come to but have rejected (8). What is needed therefore 
is a test of the validity of p which would be acceptable to 
those who are asking the question.
In order to overcome this possible short-coming of the 
theory when put into practice in this extreme case, we need
to provide a mechanism which can determine p in all cases.
buch a mechanism ... exists. (Such a mechanism, that is, is 
familiar and apparent to us. and is generally accepted).
It is the principle of experiment. The criterion by which 
this is judged is its failure or success.
Let us take first the example in which people claim to have
experience of ESP. They might, for instance, claim to be 
able to dowse or to divine for information with the use of 
a pendulum (as many people in fact do). The case for 
divining is however (according to an article in The 
Independent). in doubt:
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“The use of diviners can be traced back at least 500 years,
and it comes as a shock to most people when you tell them
there is no evidence for the validity of water divining." 
(9)
Moreover, not only is there no evidence in favour of 
dowsing (the article continues), but there are clear ways 
of disproving its validity.
“The reader can make some simple experiments. Tie a 
weight to a piece of string about a foot long. Look 
out some snapshots of men and women and enlist the aid 
of two friends in separate sessions. Tell the first to 
rest his elbow on the table and hold the pendulum 
steadily over a photo of a male. Explain that the
pendulum can sex photographs, animals and insects, and 
that after a few seconds the pendulum will begin to
move backwards and forwards over the photograph. 
The friend may be surprised that this occurs. Now 
substitute a female photograph and explain that, for a 
female, the pendulum will start to move in gradually 
increasing circles. The pendulum moves as predicted.
Now enjoin the first friend to silence and admit the 
second friend. Go through the same procedure, but this 
time say authoritatively that the female will elicit 
the forward-backward movement, a male the circular 
movement. The pendulum will perform accordingly." (10)
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The researcher attributes the effect to unconscious 
muscular movements. The article continues with further 
statistics on the success of dowsing. In New South Wales, 
Australia, records show that
“Successful bores at points selected by dowsers were 
fewer than at points selected by geologists. The 
percentage of absolute failures among divined wells was 
double that for non-divined wells."
I give these as examples of experiment in use: the
researcher is establishing his case against the existence 
of this type of ESP by providing p material. in defiance of 
the q background which (he says) “starts from the 
standpoint that water divining is an established fact."
Let us now consider the alternative context. in which it
was generally considered certain that ESP did not exist.
The police force of the state of Massachussets
investigating the case of the Boston Strangler might be
thought to present such a context. As a last resort,
however, a Dutch diviner named Hurkos was allowed to give
his views on the identity of the strangler. He overcame
the extreme scepticism of the police by correctly telling
one of the officers some details of his personal life which
no-one else could have known. His method of dealing with
the dispute as to the existence of his extra-sensory
perception. in fact, was to provide a sufficient input of
the p factor to overcome the almost total lack of the q
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one. There must, however, have been a latent quantity of 
that available, however minute, or presumably he would not 
have been in the police station at all.
It is interesting to find that although we have quite 
clearly identified the procedure for deciding whether ESP 
exists, and even seen that procedure in use, we have not 
given (and did not intend to give) the answer to the 
question. We may note in passing the importance of success 
as a criterion of experiment. Hurkos in fact did not 
successfully identify the Boston Strangler, and his claim 
must, in our terms, be judged by that. This would leave us 
having to provide an alternative explanation for his other 
feats.
His escape route, however, remains open: he claimed that in 
fact he did identify the strangler, and it was the police 
who got the wrong man.
Similarly those who continue to use the pendulum technique 
after accepting the results of the tests reported in The 
Independent (which they may, after all, try for themselves, 
thus making this indisputably relevant to the p factor) 
might make some claim such as that they are still 
nevertheless harnessing the power of the sub-conscious to 
inspire their guesswork, and it would be open to them to 
limit their claims as to the conditions. for instance non- 
experimental ones, under which this tends to work.
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We have seen in this case of the existence of ESP how a
positive q factor might be redressed by a negative p one, 
and a negative q factor counteracted by a positive p one. 
In the sub-section which follows it will be interesting to 
find that the process also works the other way round: that
I S ,  that p factors of either polarity may be 
counterbalanced by q ones. It is not the case. it seems, 
that p is in undisputed control. but we shall see that in 
the end its role is crucial.
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Do Black Holes exist ?
'I had already discussed with Roger Penrose the idea of 
aefining a black hole as the set of events from which 
it was not possible to escape to a large distance, 
which IS now the generally accepted definition."
Stephen Hawking. 'A Brief History of Time' (T)
Hawking traces the history of the concept: "The term black
ho 1e 13 of very recent origin." (2) He shows how
subsequent work has produced considerable detail in the
rescript ion of the supposed phenomena known by this name. 
"The work that Roger Penrose and I did between 1965 and 
'.9/0 showed that. according to general relativity. there 
must be a singularity of infinite density and space-uime
curvature within a black hole." (3) "In 1976. however,
tne study of black holes was revolutionized by Werner 
Israel ... Israel showed that. according to general 
relativity. non-rotating black holes must be very simple 
■ ■ • ' (4) Hawking is confident in his knowledge of the
details of their characteristics. "One can also consider 
the possibility that there might be black holes with masses 
much less than that of the sun ... Low mass black holes 
could form only if matter was compressed to enormous 
densities by very large external oressures." (5)
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The number of them is also of great Intei est to h im; '.t-:
ir we could determine now many primordial black holes there 
are now. we would learn a lot about the very early stages 
of the universe." (6)
In view of all this it comes as a distinct surprise to us 
to realise that neither Hawking nor anyone else has 
discovered a black hole.
"Black holes are one of only a fairly small number of 
cases in the history of science in which a theory was 
developed in great detail as a mathematical model 
before there was any evidence from observations that it 
was correct. Indeed. this used to be the main 
argument of opponents of black holes: how could one
believe in objects for which the only evidence was 
calculations based on the dubious theory of general 
relativity?" (7)
The reason for no—one's having found a black hole appears 
to be partly that they cannot do so. in principle. "How 
could we hope to detect a black hole. as by its very 
definition it does not emit any light?" (8) ’ Yet this 
little difficulty does not seem to deter them. "Further 
encouragement for the existence of black holes came in 1967 
with the discovery by a research student at Cambridge. 
Jocelyn Bell. of objects in the sky that were emitting 
regular pulses of radio waves." (9)
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ihe behaviour of Cygnus X-1 is puzzling; might not this 
then be evidence for the existence of black holes? Its 
unseen companion causing its erratic orbit would be of 'too 
large a mass to oe a neutron star. It seems. therefore, 
that 10 must oe a black hole." CIO) "A black hole seems 
to be the only really .natural explanation of the observa- 
tions." (11) And. more confidently. "We also now have 
evidence for several other black holes ... " (12) and
"The number of black holes may well be greater even than 
the number of visible stars ... " (13) And so on.
Hawking's premiss seems to go like this; events which are 
otnerwise unexplained are compatible with the existence of 
black holes; so they provide possible evidence for the 
existence of black holes, which itself is indicated by the 
theory of general relativity. He then seems to have 
decided fa) that there could be black holes. then (b) that 
there must be black holes. and so (c) that evidence 
compatible with the existence of them is evidence for the 
existence of them. On the basis of this he proceeds to 
tell us how black holes behave (" .... they glow like a hot
body. and the smaller they are. the more they glow") (14) 
before he has produced compelling evidence that there are 
any .
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\~t with his usual candour Hawking admits that all the work
he and Penrose and others have been doing on trying to 
solve the theoretical problems to which the existence of 
black holes gives rise would be unnecessary if it turned 
out that black holes did not exist. Hawking has a bet with 
a colleague at the California Institute of Technology that 
Cygnus X-1 (the only likely possibility of finding one so 
far) does not contain a black hole. "This is a form of
insurance policy for me. I have done a lot of work on
black holes. and it would all be wasted if it turned out 
that black holes do not exist." (15)
So here we have a case where a considerable body of
autnoritative opinion (not to mention a considerable 
expenditure of research grants) is committed to the 
existence of black holes. Yet "the only real evidence" for 
them IS "calculations based on the dubious theory of 
general relativity" (7) There is secondary evidence from 
Cygnus X-1; "By now. I would say that we are about, 95% 
certain" that Cygnus X-1 contains a black hole, "but the 
bet has yet to be settled" (8).
If we now apply the 'p ' and 'q ' analysis, as in the last 
example, we find that there is a considerable body of
agreement as to what black holes would be, if they were 
found to exist; that if the item posited existed, it would 
be a black hole in the sense which has been fully 
described.
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The only evidence which tends to prove their existence 
comes from the calculations. All this must come under the 
'q' heading, as being agreement constituting a convention.
It is at first extremely difficult to see how there could 
ever be direct evidence of the 'p ' kind, since the 
definition of black holes appears to rule it out.
Secondary evidence as from observation of Cygnus X-1. 
however, is compatible with the existence of black holes; 
and this, if extended sufficiently, might provide a 'p ' 
input. However all this evidence might still be evidence 
for something else. Hawking admits that the p ingredient
is still missing, when he says that they are only 95%
certain Cygnus X-1 contains a black hole. that the bet is 
therefore not settled. and that it might turn out that
black holes do not exist. He implies that if another 
explanation is found for the anomalous behaviour of Cygnus 
X-1 he would accept that other explanations might hold for 
all supposed cases of black holes. and that therefore. 
lacking a p ingredient, he would accept that black holes do 
not exist.
The research grants are therefore being awarded purely on 
the basis of a q input. That this is not satisfactory is 
demonstrated by the urgency with which the elusive p 
ingredient is pursued (the irony being that this search 
itself involves the need for further research arants).
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in n ne meantime although we cannot say that another 
explanation is forthcoming and that black holes (lacking a 
p input) do not exist, we cannot say either that they do 
exist, until such a p input is established.
It is interesting to note that the authorities on this 
subject apparently agree with our interpretation of what is 
Involved in the existence of black holes. since they 
continue to seek conclusive observational evidence for 
something of which they have convinced themselves by 
calculation. In other words, they hold that existence is a 
matter of experience as well as agreement of opinion.
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It is necessary first to distinguish two apparently 
different ways the question might apply. First. it might 
be asked whether there was a quality, evil, as well as evil 
things. Call this sense A. More fundamentally it might be 
asked whether evil acts and so on are not simply cultural 
constructs. so that we should rather say ‘We view and term 
such-and-such evil from the point of view of this cultural 
context'. so that there is not a quality of being evil 
which can be transferred from one context to another. In 
this. sense B. I think it would be better to say 'Does 
evilness exist?' in that the question refers to a notional 
quality shared by evil deeds and so on rather than to a 
possible outside agency. the force of evil, the spirit of 
evil. the devil, essence of evil. or whatever. For the 
purpose of asking the question which will help us test our 
theory this makes no difference, however. and we may more 
conveniently stay with the slightly less accurate form of 
sense B. 'Does evil exist?' may then be paraphrased:
A: Is there a transcendent negative or destructive force?
B: Are there deeds which are bad in themselves?
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One can of course intend to ask both quest ions at 'ince .
wicn one same words. Indeed it might be possible to show
ohao a negative or positive answer to either entails the 
same for the other. though I do not intend to embark on 
this. They can. however, be asked quite separately, with 
no interest in a possible connection.
Religions have been based on the affirmative to A. They
are termed dualist. and a prime example of such is
Zoroastrianism. Zarathustra‘s teaching envisages "not a 
single ultimate principle in the Universe. but two." i1) 
In the Zoroastrian world. then, evil is an independent
principle. Let us try to see to what extent convention and 
experience are involved in the meaning of the Zoroastrian's 
a f f i rma11ve answer to question A.
Now on the face of it there is no part played by experience
in this at all. We do not have access to the
transcendental world in which these things take place. Yet 
we know that Zoroastrianism is very much a religion of this 
world. In fact that is what the world is for: to take part
in the cosmic battle against evil. "All beneficent
existence ... had a shared aim. to struggle against the
Hostile Spirit and the evil which he had maliciously 
brought into the perfect world of Mazda's creation ... "
(2) Clearly we may see all this as metaphor. as a set of
images expressive of moral principles. It would be easy to 
see it. thus, as a means of translating questions of sense
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A into those of sense B. This leaves aside. however. the 
matter of the belief held by Zoroastrians in the reality of 
evil as a primal principle. that is as something pre­
existing all its manifestations.
Seen in that way. however, evil is a Platonic 'ideal' in a 
specific form. As such it innately rules out experience as 
a determinant of its existence. I would say of it what I 
said of Russell’s remarks on uncounted numbers. (3) "The 
point is. of course. that these numbers do not have any 
sort of existence at all until they are thought of." To 
say that something pre-exists its manifestations is to 
speak with hindsight. It cannot be said until it is too 
late to say it. If there have been such manifestations 
then how can it be shown that the Ideal pre-existed them. 
The only evidence for it is them. If there have never been 
such manifestations then the matter would not arise. since 
one would have no means of knowing or speaking of the 
Ideal, and given that that situation could go on for ever 
it would be exactly the same in all respects as if the 
Ideal did not exist. for which reason I would propose not 
claiming that it did.
To translate A into B is, of course. simply to move from 
Plato to Aristotle, from the ante rem to the jji re location 
of universals. It was not to be expected that we should 
break new ground on the subject of evil.
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vve nave been reread to make t his move. however . because the 
accempc to understand what couid be meant by the existence 
of evil in the A sense broke down at exactly the point 
where we round that experience was inapplicable as a 
x’eference: without manifestations there is no difference
between its existing and its not existing. If Zoroastrians 
believe in evil as an outside force, they must do so in the 
light or having experienced examples of its effects in the 
world.
sense B - is it evil in itself. or do we just see it as 
such from our standpoint? - seems even more clearly a case 
of decision-making rather than discovery. After all. it 
means: 'Do we regard moral judgements as absolute or
relative?' Let us see how the matter is actually put by a 
protagonist, the philosopher C. L. Stevenson:
"1. 'This is wrong' means I disapprove of this: do so
as well ...
3. 'This is good’ means I approve of this: do so as
well." (4)
Now in Stevenson's formulation evil has disappeared as part 
of the process: it is a question of attitude only. It is
not so much that Stevenson would say that evil does not 
exist: the question does not arise. because there is no
need to posit an outside factor. The phenomena can 
perfectly well be explained in other ways. This is not a 
proof that evil does not exist.
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It Is an argument to the effect that there is no re aeon
suppose that it does. That. however. is not the conven­
tion-based approach that we might have been expecting. It 
remains open to refutation by evidential means, in that if 
Professor Stevenson were to give as his reason for omitting 
evil from the equation the lack of evidence for evil. then 
his argument would fail if such evidence were produced; and 
if (as would presumably be the actual case) he claimed that 
there was no need for evil as a concept to be introduced, 
because all moral judgements and behaviour could be 
explained by attitudes of approval or disapproval. then it 
would be open to somebody disagreeing to identify a moral 
act which could not be explained by attitude.
Someone arguing from the contrary position - to the effect
that there is a role for the concept of evil in moral acts
and judgements - would receive some assistance from those
philosophers (such as R. M. Hare) who wish to point out 
that moral statements are not just prescriptive. but 
universal: “When we commend an object. our judgement is
not solely about that particular object, but is inescapably 
about objects like it." (5) The object we commend and the 
objects like it must have something in common. Might not 
therefore the quality held in common by the objects in the 
contrary case be describable by the term 'evil'? 'Good' 
and 'evil' may be the names for those qualities which make 
up the likeness Hare refers to.
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r  1 rinet ion we nave now noted is between a school of
cnouernt w n i c n  proposes an ou ts ide element. beyond  and
a i s ti nct rrorri tne pnenornena. as do Zoroastr ians; and that 
'jI tne s u b j e c t i v e  school, e x e m p l i f i e d  by Stevenson. which 
sees the t e r m  as u n n e c e s s a r y  b e c a u s e  it r e c o gn ises nothing 
b e y o n d  the pnenornena except an attitu de  on the part of the 
observer. ihis is clearly a case w h i c h  may  be des c r i b e d  bv 
tne a p p l i c a t i o n  or what was ea rlier termed the co ­
e x t e n s i v e n e s s  principle' (6). "If the name is co-extensive
V7itn tne pnenornena. then we m a y  ask about its usefulness,
if it IS not co -ex t e n s i v e  than one may ask about its
identity." (7) What follows from  the decision ('Is N c o ­
e xt e n s i v e  w i t h  the phenomen a?') is s u m m a r i s e d  in the
passage cited. We may add. related to the q u e stion  of the 
existence of evil. that the linguistic q u e sti on  leading 
from the a n s w e r  'yes' 'Do we need the n a m e ? ' . which bears a 
cl ea rl y c o n v e nt ional emphasis. at the same time focuses on 
the o b s e r v e d  phenomena with w h i c h  the name is held to be 
c o - e x t e n s 1v e .
A n s w e r i n g  the questio n 'Does evil exist?' in that 
p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u mstan ti al b a c k g r o u n d  the refore gives us an 
ex am pl e of the conjunction of the elements of experience 
and convention. It con si st s of a th r e e - s t e o  o r o c e s s .
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Disapproval (according to these philosophers') is a 
cultural attitude. and therefore a matter of agreement or 
convention. Recognising similarities among things one 
disapproves of depends on experiencing these instances or 
manifestations of them. The decision as to whether to call 
these similarities. grouped as a quality. evil. is a. 
conceptual matter. a choice of terminology. Even in this 
relativistic area of the sense B question the elements 
cannot function adequately on their own. but rely on one 
another.
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Finally. let us see whether the techniques w h i c h  nace 
arisen in the course of these considerations of the roles 
of convention and experience in existence statements can 
help in the clarification of the following question.
4. Does God exist?
and how the distinction itself, between convention and 
experience, applies to that question.
First, we must suppose that God is to be defined by 
characteristics which do not in themselves beg the 
question. If the definition adopted were such that it was 
simply a redescription of something which had already been 
established as existing, or was assumed by the terms being 
used to exist, then there would be no point in asking the 
question. Don Cupitt. for instance. in his book 'Taking 
Leave of God' (1) redefined God as something he called 'the 
religious requirement'. "There is so far as we are 
concerned no God but the religious requirement". (2) Now 
since he has presumably come to this conclusion by first 
identifying something as 'the religious requirement' then 
there would be no point in asking the question 'Does God 
exist?' It would be equivalent to saying 'Does this item 
which I have experienced exist?' It is clear from Cupitt's 
statement that the question of the existence of the 
religious requirement is not under debate. He is 
apparently familiar with it and knows what it is.
Z9Z
oirniiâriy bu. Anseim's proof ma ke s use of a âe f i m  1 1 en of 
Mod which. as inaeed the proor then shows. ensures fhe 
existen ce  o f t n e te rrn i n c uestion. A b e in g t h a n wh i c h a 
gr eater cannot be thought must. A n s e l m  shows. exist. Eut 
this 13 to operate w i t h i n  a cl osed  system. To define Ctod 
in such a w ay that he mus t exist m a k e s  any q u e sti on  as to 
nis exi s t e n c e  irrelevant. r a t h e r  than a n s w e r i n g  it. The 
qu e s t i o n  Does God e x i s t / cannot be a real questio n in 
such a context.
IS m o r e o v e r  not ciear from these and other d e f i niti on s  
what form of exist ence God m i g h t  have b e yond the existence 
of the items w ith  w h i c h  he is b e i n g  equated. Cupitt makes 
the point that he does intend to 'add something' (in his
phrase) (3) beyond  what is fully d e s c r i b a b l e  in terms of
hu man conscious nes s. He w i s h e s  to say. in effect. 'here is 
num an consciousness. w i t h  all its asoects and 
m an if e s t a t i o n s :  and here again, al beit i n t e r nali se d w i t h i n
this structure. is G o d . ' This  is not the same thing as 
s ayi ng 'here is the c o m p l e x  one m ay  call human 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  and among the m a n y  c o m p onent s w h i c h  compose
it IS s o m e t h i n g  we intend to call God.'
We ma y  there fo re appro ac h the q u e s t i o n  'Does God e x i s t ? ' by 
as king a p r e l i m i n a r y  question.- 'Is God, as d e f i n e d  by the 
pe rson a s k i n g  the question. n o t h i n g  additional to the 
phenome na  al r e a d y  identified? Or is God som e t h i n g  be yond 
or ou tside  those phenomena?'
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ihis we have identified above as 'the co-extensiveness 
principle' (4) and we clarified the procedures derived from 
it by the accompanying diagram.
(see overleaf)
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It is clear from this that if the answer to the
extensiveness' question is that God is not being defined as 
something beyond or additional to the Items already 
identified. then the question 'Does God exist?' does not 
apply. There is nothing for the question to do. We would 
then need to ask quite a different question. one of a 
terminological nature.
Faced with these potential difficulties. if we are to ask 
the question meaningfully at all we must adopt a definition 
which does not assume the answer. It is proposed therefore 
to use for present purposes a purely hypothetical 
definition. on the understanding that any terms which do 
not remove the meaning of the question could be substituted 
for those here used. That is. a school of thought might 
wish to say that God was transparent. multidimensional and 
left-handed: the only requirement in the end would be to
add at least some qualities which were specific enough to 
distinguish God from other transparent, multidimensional 
and left-handed creatures. On this basis we may now 
choose. simply for convenience. five attributes to define
God
God is
Omniscient
Omnipotent
Eternal
Unchanging
Omnipresent
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A m o n g  inese we may now make distinctions. Fiioao. 
oometning. such as gravitational attraction. lo . in 
terrestrial terms. the atmosphere. might be ■omnipresent, 
without our suspecting it to be God. Similarly something, 
such as matter. might be eternal, and we would not wish to 
say chat was therefore God. The same might be said of the 
Cl111' 1Dute unchanging . The sguare root of 64. fO'r instance . 
or one relation between the pole and the equator. rniaht be 
found to be eternal and unchanging. but we would not be 
inclined to conclude that either of them was God.
it does not follow that if something were eternal, 
unchanging and omnipresent we would not find ourselves 
inclined to identify it as God. However the compulsion 
would be very much greater if we discovered a being which 
was either omniscient or omnipotent. and if such a being 
were both, or if it combined either quality with one or 
more of those just mentioned, then the compulsion to accept 
that this conformed to the definition of God would be 
overriding. And clearly if we knew that any being had all 
the qualities listed then we would have no doubt that this 
was God.
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In other words if we take the first two characteristics as
being identifying ones. and the next three as being 
contributory to that identification. then we have what was 
termed above (5) upper and lower case conditions. and we 
may therefore run the programme devised in the section 
entitled 'Syndrome Construction’. Allocating the symbols: 
Omniscient: A. Omnipotent: B. Eternal: x. Unchanging: y. 
Omnipresent: z.
Syndrome construction: upper and lower case conditions.
Given the identification of two upper case and three lower 
case conditions. a set of events is identified as N if it 
possesses the characteristics represented by any one of the 
following :
A + B
A 4- X
B 4- X
A 4- B 4- X
A 4- y
B 4- y
A 4- B 4- y
A -f- X .4- y
B 4- X 4- y
A 4- B 4- X 4- y
A 4-
B 4- z
A 4- X 4- z
B f X 4- z
A 4- B 4- X 4- z
A 4- y 4- z
B 4- y + z
A 4- B 4- y 4- z
A 4- X 4- y 4- z
B 4- X 4- y 4- z
A4-B4-X4- y4-
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rrom this. using the sign 'v' to represent a disjunction 
; eitner or botn'! we may formulate a set of sufficient 
c ondit ions, as foilows;
1. A t 3
or'
2. (A V B) + ( (x V  y^ v z )
: nere remains the point as to how one would set about
ueciciing whether an item does have characteristics 
A . D . . y . z . Mere it might be useful to distinguish between
two possible conclusions one might come to.
I. If P has characteristics
A -t- B or (A V 3) + ( (x v y) v z) then P is God.
I- - If something is God, then it has characteristics
A + B or (A V B1 + (' (x v y) v z) .
In tne first case we have an item and wish to know whether 
it is God. This is comparable to the cases we discussed in 
II.4 (6). Since this item exists, if it is God. then God 
exists. This we may categorise. in the terms used above, 
as a conclusion which starts from the primary, p. 
information. and applies the q factor of decision based on 
agreement (agreement, in this case, on what counts as being 
God). It IS experience which tells us whether a given item 
has certain characteristics. It is convention which 
decides whether something having those characteristics is 
God. (7)
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aecided what will count as God. and proceed towards the p 
input. oy. presumably, inspecting the world to see if any 
item in it answers to the qualifying definition. In other 
words whereas in I we started from a p situation and 
brought to bear the q aspects. in II we start from q and 
introduce p.
We thus have a set of procedures which may be undertaken as 
a means of asking the question 'Does God exist?' or, to put 
the matter another way, of understanding what is meant by 
the assertion 'God exists'.
Conclusion
The process of testing the theory has brought to light some 
elements in the investigation of the roles of convention 
and experience in existence statements which might be worth 
underlining.
The usefulness of the distinction itself becomes apparent 
when we simplify the background into o and q factors. as we 
have found it practical to do in these tests.
In certain circumstances this distinction may be amplified 
by an analysis into upper and lower case conditions, as we 
found it useful to do when discussing syndrome 
construction. in Section II.2. (8)
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Throughout. and particularly in the section dealing with 
the world of science and medicine (9) it has been useful 
for us to bear in mind and frequently to note the
distinction oetween an invention and a aiscC'very , and this 
has led us to a closely related idea. the principle <1 f c-1- 
extens1veness. which has lust been applied in rhe above
These related mechanisms of distinction have turned out to 
possess the merit of providing a flexible range of 
procedures ior dealing with the aspects of existence 
statements, and they form the infrastructure of the general 
theory out 1ined above.
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Introduction
In a remark on Notes and References at the end of the Table 
or Contents at the start of this thesis. mention was made 
of 'a number of extended footnotes ... which I did not wish 
to leave undiscussed but which do not form part of rhe 
direco course of the argument." These follow here as 
Appenaices. They are diverse in subject matter and bear no 
structured relationship. Their order is that of their 
relevance to the text. The one thing they have in common 
13 that. in their different ways. they are supportive of 
the train of thought and assist in the investigation. 
baying that they do not form part of the direct course of 
the argument is in fact another way of saying that they 
help to fill out its background.
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APPENDIX I Re 1 at ing to Sect!on 1.2
Brunton on Berkeley: A Note on the Grammar of Discovery
J. A. Brunton. in his paper 'The Absolute Existence of 
Unthinking Things' (1). contrasts the logic of experiences 
- for example pain - with the logic of external objects. 
(2). We can talk of pain which is not currently observed 
because we have experienced pain. But have we not also 
experienced external objects? It is only the ones which we 
wish to say nobody has experienced - such as undiscovered 
fossils - that are in a different logical sphere. Note 
however that the logic is set up as part of the case: the 
difference i_s that nobody has experienced them.
It is not that it just happens that nobody experiences them 
like the lost book at the back of the drawer. We have 
stipulated that they are not experienced; it has become a 
defining quality, this makes them a special sort of logical 
thing. It is perverse to find difficulty in something of 
one's own making,
Brunton's point might be better expressed by saying that 
there is a difference between the logic applying to things 
which have been perceived, like the lost book, and of which 
it is therefore fortuitous that they are not perceived now, 
and things of which it is part of the data that they have
never been perceived, like the so-far unknown fossil.
304
ine airrerence is that in the former case we can say things 
anour onem using the language of perception. such as that 
they are hard.. brown, etc. In the latter case the effect 
on the logic c-f making it an ex hvpothesi condition that 
perception does not apply is that we can say nothing about 
them at all. We have no language in which to do so. Even 
t O' say 'Of something 'It is there ' involves being able to 
taxe part in discussions of the questions 'what?' and 
'where 1'
Yet note a further complication in the logic. To say of 
something that it has been discovered. like a previously 
unknown fossil, is not just to imply, it is to entail, that 
it was there unperceived. To identify an item which was 
not previously there is not to discover it. it is to invent 
it. The question we find ourselves having to address is 
this: Is discovery ever a possibility? Are apparent cases
of discovery really all inventions? And since to ask such 
questions is to fly in the face of custom and usage we have 
to confront the paradox. We can give no meaning to 
something's being there unperceived; we cannot find a 
language to express it. Yet it is our language itself 
which makes it impossible for us. on first perceiving it. 
to deny that it had been there.
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ihe reliance on the past rense for such existential r o aims 
at first sight distinguishes the two logical 
0 ircumstances ; but this is an illusion. Although one might 
say of the lost book at the back of the drawer 'I know it 
must be somewhere' on the basis of having had direct 
experience of it. one can also talk of an inferred fossil 
in such present-tense terms: and in the case of the ability 
regarding the book this too is fortuitous. since one might 
quite well have forgotten all about it until turning out 
the drawer, on which occasion any comment ('So it was there 
ail that time!') would be past tense.
Let us first summarise the situation, then investigate a 
possible outcome.
The Grammar of Discovery
To claim to have discovered something is to assert:
(a) that it is there:
(b) that it was there before: and
(c) that it was hitherto unperceived.
Without (b) one is dealing not with a discovery but with an 
invention. Without (c) one could not claim to be the 
discoverer. It is a weak form of discovery indeed to find 
something which other people knew was there.
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There is no difficulty with fad. Involved in the business 
of discovering is an act of perceiving. When ine makes
claim ia) one is simply noting that one is perceiving 
something. The ontological implications can be dealt with 
another time.
There would be no difficulty with claim (b) on its twn. 
inis 13 to do with understanding the correct use of the 
past tense. If one can describe the state of an item now. 
one can then proceed to extend the description to its oast. 
Nor IS there any latent difficulty in the distinction 
between being perceived and not being perceived. One can 
make quite definite statements about the non-perception of 
an item. I show you this book. I then put a cover over 
It. and say 'That book is now not being perceived'. We can 
know tnat for certain. in the present. After a bit. of 
course. such statements can make use of the past tense. 
But all this is about something which. to our knowledge, 
has been perceived. Its being unperceived is meaningful 
by contrast with that alternative. This cannot be the cas^ 
with the unknown fossil.
307
There is just that one element missing. When you uncover 
the fossil it is like uncovering the book in all respects 
except that one. 'It was there’ and 'It was unperceived' 
are quite compatible in the case of the book; we know 
exactly what they mean, because (i) we put it there and we
found it there and (ii) we are contrasting its state in the
interim with its perceived state.
Now once we have found the fossil we are able (though in a 
weaker form) to make such contrasts and observations, and 
hence to make such statements. What we cannot give 
coherence to is the ability to talk about the fossil during 
its unperceived state. If it is hard and blue now, we
feel, it must have been hard and blue then; in the case of
the book it is natural to assume that it stayed as we left 
it when we covered it over - there is no reason to suppose 
that it suddenly changed; but what do 'hard' and 'blue' 
mean when attributed to something which has never been, and 
is not being, touched or seen? They mean that it will be 
so describable when it is revealed? If so, then it follows 
that it is not so describable now.
Certainly it seems quite intel 1 icrible to say that the 
undiscovered fossil has a colour, or a density, within a 
certain range; the statement might turn out to be false, 
but it nevertheless looks meaningful. (3)
3-08
But what IS actually meant is that the undiscovered fossil 
would, when discovered. turn out to have (N) a certain 
colour or density, or turn out not to have that; so that 
what is being talked about. hypothetically. is the
discovered fossil. not the undiscovered one. What can be 
meant &y saying anything about the fossil in its 
undiscovered stateY Since we may only speculate that 
there may be such a thing. it must remain to all intents a 
fiction. an object of conjecture, and this conjecture must 
De limited to saying (a) that it will be discovered. and
(b) what qualities it will turn out to have then. It
cannot be about the fossil in its undiscovered state. We
may now show why this is so. by taking an example.
Say the fossil about which one speculated remained for ever 
in the undiscovered state. This has always to be a
possibility, if one wishes to talk about that state and
therefore to be free of qualifications such as 'when it is 
discovered'. In such a case the claim 'There is a hard, 
blue undiscovered fossil (which will never be discovered)' 
cannot be differentiated. in terms of anything which might 
make it true or false. from its denial. 'There is no hard, 
blue undiscovered fossil (which will never be
discovered)'. What then can it mean? Let us see it we can
give it any sort of sense.
N; 'Turn out to have' does not imply, of course, 'turn out 
to have had all along'.
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Two possibilities spring to mind, but neither prove to be 
free of a reference to prognostication of a future 
hypothetical event. (N)
1 Say that hard blue fossils had been found in the past.
It could then be claimed that one more will be found in
the future. A world in which this inductive 
probability is (now) true is not the same as a world in 
which it is false. But (in response) what is being 
said is that it is probable that it will turn out to be 
true, the apparent present probability being only a 
forecast of a future state of affairs.
2 Say that no hard blue fossils has been found, but only
fissile red and brown ones. Knowledge of how fossils
are formed might enable us to say that there must, 
somewhere, be a hard blue one. A world in which this 
deductive theory is correct is not the same as a world 
in which it is fallacious. Yet in response it must be
pointed out that the theory can never be known to be
correct or incorrect unless and until the fossil is
found, and the apparent difference in the world now is 
again only a projection as to what the difference in 
the world might be in that event.
N: It is not necessary to hold that all existence
statements rely on hypotheticals, to observe that
statements about the existence of the unperceived have such
an unavoidable dependence on them that they may perhaps be
reduced to such hypotheticals. (4)
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APPENDIX II. Re latino to Section I
Text of St. Anselm
S. ANSELMI cantuariensis archiepiscopi 
OPERA OMNIA 
vulumen orimum
Franciscus Salesius Schmitt. (Nelson & Son Edinburgh.
1946 (MDCCCCXLVI)
Schmitt D 101.
Pros 1ogion 
Capitulum II 
Quod vere sit deus
Ergo, domine. qui das fidei intellectum. da mihi. ut 
quantum scis expedire intel ligam. quia es sicut crediinus. 
et hoc es quod credimus. Et quidem credimus te esse 
aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. An ergo non est 
aliqua talis natura. quia "dixit insipiens in corde suo; 
non est deus"? Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit 
hoc ipsum quod dico: 'aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari
potest'. intelligit quod audit; et quod intelligit in 
intellectu eius est. etiam si non intelligat illud esse. 
Alius enim est rem esse in intellectu. aliud intelligere 
rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae facturus est. 
habit quidem in intellectu. sed nondum intelligit esse quod 
nondum fecit.
3121
3355 quod 1 am fecit. Cinvincitur ergo et i am insi c-iens esse 
ve ! in Intel i e c t u a liquid quo nihil maius cogitari O'jtesr , 
quia hoc cum audit intelligit. et quidquid intelligicur in 
intellectu est. Et certs id quo maius cogitari nequit. non 
Potest esse in solo intellectu. 3i enim ve1 in solo 
intellectu est. potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius 
est, 3 1 ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo 
inteiiectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo
maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. 
Lxistit ergo procui dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non 
'/alet. et in inteiiectu et in re.
(Chapter III p.102; Quod non possit cogitari non esse.)
Capitulum IV
quomoao insipiens dixit in corde, quod cogitari non potest.
Verum quomodo dixit in corde quod cogitare non potuit; aut 
quomodo cogitare non potuit quod dixit in corde. cum idem 
sit dicere in corde et cogitare? Quod si vere. immo quia
vere et cogitavit quia dixit in corde. et non dixit in
corde quia cogitare non potuit; non uno tantum modo dicitur 
aliquid in corde ve1 cogitatur. Aliter enim cogitatur res 
cum vox earn significans cogitatur. aliter cum id ipsum quod 
res est intelligitur. IIlo itaque modod potest cogitari
deus non esse, isto vero minime. Nul lus quippe intelligens
id quod deus est, potest cogitare quia deus non est.
313
p. 104: licet haec verba clicat in corde, aut sine ulla aui
cum aliqua extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo 
maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit. 
Litique intelligit id ipsum sic esse. ut nec cogitatione 
queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum. nequit 
eurn non esse cogitare.
Gratias tibit. bone domine. gratias tibi. quia quod prius 
credidi te donante. iam sic intelligo te illuminant, ut si 
te esse nolim credere, non possim non inteliigere.
Schmitt p.128
Gaunilonis pro insipiente
(6) gives argument about lost island.
Schmitt p.133
Responsio Editoris
fill)
........ Palam autem iam videtur 'quo non valet cogitari
maius' non posse cogitari non esse. whod tam certa rations 
veritatis exist it.
(IV)
........ Nam et si nulla quae sunt possint intelligi non
esse. omnia tamen possunt cogitari non esse, praeter id 
quod summe est.
P. 134
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Svnipos 1 urn : Cci What There
3each has a number of points of criticism to make on 
ouine's stand r e g a r d i n g  existence. Quine says that the 
basic ontological question is 'What is rhere?' Geach 
points out that this is m e a n i n g l e s s  w i t h o u t  a context.
p.135). He IS unhappy too about Quine's idea that the 
acceptance ot an ontolog y is a m a t t e r  of choice. "We need 
not ... ac cept Quine's v i e w  that various ontolog ie s may be 
equally right and that our choice of o n t o l o g y  must depend 
on our v a r i o u s  interests and purposes. For the conceptual 
scneme is not a m a t t e r  of free choice. Certain concepts, 
like existence and truth and thing and p r o p e r t y . are used, 
and cannot but be used. in all rational di sc ou rse  
whatsoeve r;  and ontology is an attempt to scr ut inize  our 
use of them. To be right or wrong in on t o l o g y  means being 
clear or m u d d l e d  about such fu n d a m ent al s." (p.136).
Ayer is also c o n c e r n e d  to criti ci se Q u i ne's  point that the 
use of term^ does not commit the user to h o l d i n g  that what 
it denotes exists. Ayer's argument is that it can. "At 
the same time. one may v ery  well w i s h  to mak e assertions 
from which it does follow that something exists: and to the 
extent that we do make such ass e r t i o n s  we are. acco rd ing to 
Quine. commimtted to an ontology.
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To say one is committed to an ontology is. indeed, just his 
way of saying that one affirms that something or ocher 
exists." (p.137). He later says with characteristic 
directness that one's assertions may well stem from one's 
ontological beliefs: "When Quine and Goodman renounced
abstract entities, were they thinking only that it would be 
more convenient ... was there not a suggestion that their 
reason for renouncing them was that they did not believe in 
their existence?" Co.148).
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APPENDIX IV Relating to II.3. p.155
To exist or not to exist
That is the question. If. on the one hand, we say that 
Hamlet does not exist, then we seem liable to have the play 
without the Prince: on the other hand to attribute
existence to a fictional character seems inappropriate. if 
not downright contradictory. and would lead to an 
overpopulated universe.
First, to clarify the situation, let us distinguish between 
three meanings of the term Hamlet. We may do this by the 
slightly artificial ploy of using signs to identify two of 
them: 1. Hamlet. and 2. 'Hamlet'. 1. is the play written
by Shakespeare and called after its main character. 2. is 
the part played by the actor in the play.
Now clearly both these exist. What then is the problem? 
The question of whether then Hamlet himself exists seems to 
imply that behind 2. there is a Platonic absolute of which
2. is an imitation, or an instance. This would perhaps 
follow from the fact that at any one time several different 
actors are portraying several slightly different Hamlets in 
different parts of the world. None of these can. we would 
wish to say. be Hamlet himself. just as none of the Santa 
Clauses in different department stores can be the real 
Father Christmas.
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everytning else. are bound by cne logical impossibility 
being in several different places at the same time. b
micrnt have saia tnat not more than one of them rouid 
real, but that wo uld  leave us searching for the oriter 
it'T u e c i ü i n g  which one. a search w h i c h  we m a y  confident 
oreuict would prove to be unsuccessful).
What, however, is tne actor doing, w h e n  he portrays Hamlet? 
He 13 on the face of it memorising and p r o n o u n c i n g  lines 
written oy Shakespeare. Yet his intention is to tortray 
namiet. He will be able to tell us a lot about this 
person. beyond the mere repetition of the lines. Now if 
ail the actors at present portraying Ha ml et  are intending 
to p o rt ra y (as we may assume) the same person, then we have 
a .situation very much like Plato 's  forms. in which  each 
m a x e r  or a oed or a table. h o w e v e r  di v e r s e  their ohysical 
interpretations (due to the imperfections of human 
a b i l i t i e s ) . has his eye on the F o r m  of Bed. or Table. or 
whatever, made by God.
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If that were the case. then there i_s a Father Christinas. 
We know that, because we see attempts to approximate to the 
real. absolute Father Christmas so similar as to be 
recognisably imitations of the same thing. Nor would there 
be any difficulty if it were known (forgetting for the 
moment about Saxo Grammaticus) that Hamlet was a pure 
invention, of Shakespeare's. There is no logical difference 
between something being made by Shakespeare and something 
(like the Form of Bed) being made by God.
Dealing with the difference between descriptions and names. 
Russell maintains that the distinction is that names are 
meaningless unless there is an object which they designate, 
and that this difference is reflected by the truth- 
qualities attributable to each case.
"There was a time when. if you had lived at Athens and had 
said 'Who is Socrates?' the man of whom you asked the 
question might have pointed and said, 'That is Socrates'. 
It is because of this now distant connection with 
experience of people long since dead that propositions 
about Socrates are part of history and not of fable. like 
propositions about Hamlet. (N)
N; This line of thinking is more fully analysed by Keith
S. Donellan (1), who terms it 'the historical explanation 
theory of reference.
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s t a t em en ts about Hamlet are false. They only bec-ome ti'ue 
wnen. ror namiet. we s u D s t i t u r e  'Hamlet' . This illustrates 
S'Ue or the p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of proper names: that. unlike
ces or 1 pt i o n s . they are m e a n i n g l e s s  unless there is an 
obiect w h i c h  they d e s i g n a t e . "  (2)
But are all statements about Hamlet, as opposed to 
n a m i e t ' . reaily raise? H o w  about; 'In Shakespeare's 
eponymous play. H aml et was the son of Ge r t r u d e  and 
C l a u d i u s ’. If one puts inverted commas in there one would, 
to maxe sense. have to add 'the name o f ' ; 'Hamlet' was the 
name of the son of the characters 'Gertrude' and 
C 1aud1 us . or 'the son of Gert ru de and C l a u d i u s  was called 
'Hamlet'.'
A na yet. in R u s s e l l ' s  terms. if there is a true statement 
about Hamlet then there must be something which the name is 
desi gna ting. We can ea sily appreciate the d i f f i c u l t y  if we 
take R u s s e l l ' s  exam ple of Socrate s as a standard. There 
was (we may s a f e l y  assume) no time at w h i c h  the v i s i t o r  to 
nlsinore. as ki n g  ' Wbio is Hamlet?' . w o u l d  have had a 
maurnful youth wearing black clothes oointed out to him.
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This matter of history is probably the key to the way we 
use the word 'exist' in this sort of case. Richard III 
existed: Hamlet never existed. Richard III died. so no
longer exists. but the name nevertheless designates 
something which. under the right circumstances (i.e. 
between 1483 and 1485, in certain parts of Britain) might 
have been pointed out in answer to a question. The name 
Hamlet designates no such thing, either past or present.
In other words there is once again the prime empirical. or 
positivist, appeal to experience. In relation to existence 
we ultimately want to know the answer to such questions as 
'where?', 'when?'. and 'how do you know?' The answers to 
these questions may be true or false. and in the case or 
works of fiction will be false. That is how fiction 
differs from history. where they may be true. (N see 
overleaf).
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are maae in oearie s book. Speech Aoie Tv . 
that fictional characters do exist in ficcion. 
ana so can be r e f e r r e d  t o . (p.78). He co ntrasts the case
■11 She r l o c k  Holmes. where reference can be made within the 
fictional mode of discourse with that of Mrs. Sherlock
Holmes. where reference fails to take place. (4) Similar 
points are o f t e n  made about Hamlet's wife. (o). It is 
compat 1b 1e with Sh erloc k Holmes's not existing. Sear 1e 
says. that ne "e xi s t s - i n - f i c t i o n "  (p.79). Gerald Vision 
o ; rinds the effect of those hyphens interesting. Writing 
or S e a rl e' s book. he says that the fact that we include in 
our understanding of reference the ability to refer to 
Sherlock Holmes means that what Searle gives as 'the axiom 
■of existence' . "Wh atever i s r e f e r r e d  to must exist " is 
wrong. (7). Red mo n (5) puts this a n o th er  way. Hamlet
■U'Oes not exist' and 'Hamlet's wife does not exist ' are. he
says. in d i f f e r e n t  languages. (p.59). He might have said
tney arise in d i f f erent contexts. "To say 'Pegasus does 
not e x i s t ' is to say that 'Pegasus' is not in a certain 
language" (p.64).
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W j_^r- a
grammar or existence
In m e  norm of Thailand there are a number of semi-nomadic 
tribes. They do not regard themselves as Thai, but rather 
maintain purely crioal afrilrations. Among these one tribe 
has the unusual distinction. both anthropologically and 
pniiosopnically. that they were thought until recently not 
to exist. it IS not that these people were not known about 
ût ail; they were considered to be purely mythical. The 
inais call tnem the Pni long nuang. meaning The Spirits of 
tne bellow Leaves. Their own name for themselves is 
variously transliterated as Brabri. or Mlabri. or 
combinations of these sounds.
A number of questions arise all at once. If one asks 'Who 
said the Brabri did not exist?' one is put in the position 
of asking then 'the who?' It seems at first to be nothing 
to do with the Brabri. The Brabri were never consulted on 
the subject. The decision was, as it were, taken on their 
behalf. Of course they have only themselves to blame, for 
lurking so elusively in the wild banana trees and the giant 
bamnoos. bur, it must nevertheless come as something of an 
irrigation to be told that you have been discovered. when 
you presumably knew quite well that you were there all 
a 1ong.
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The Brabri always knew that they existed. There is no 
problem of unperceived existence in this case. It seems at 
first to be purely a question of name. It was not of the 
Brabri that there was doubt: it was The Spirits of the
Yellow Leaves that were thought not to exit. Here is a 
brain-twister indeed: there could not have been a doubt as
to the existence of the Brabri. because no—one had ever
heard of them. Yet it is not the case either that we have 
a simple situation of contrast between a description and a 
name. Phi Tong Nuang is the Thai name for these people, 
and Brabri. or Mrabri. or Mlabri. their own. The two 
names mean the same thing. designate the same items. It 
happens that all the hi 11 tribes of northern Thailand have 
two names. the ones the Thais call them and the one they
call themselves. There has never been a problem about 
identification. Both names mean the same thing. Any 
statement we make about one has the same truth conditions 
as it would if it were about the other; and thus it was the 
case that people thought the Brabri did not exist.
The discovery that The Spirits of the Yellow Leaves were 
real means, then, that we have to entertain the possibility 
that someone will one day step into a jungle grove to be 
confronted with a herd of unicorns. It is a general 
principle. of course, that nothing can be ruled out unless 
it is self-contradictory.
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Does their emergence thus bring with it a whole procession 
of putative entities; the Loch Ness Monster and the 
Abominable Snowman. followed by dragons, leprechauns and 
centaurs, led into the Grand Parade of reality by The 
Spirits of the Yellow Leaves?
In fact the matter is rather more mundane. All that has 
taken place is the correction of an error. The Thais 
mistakenly thought that the Brabri did not exist; the Thais 
mistakenly thought that the term 'The Spirits of the Yellow 
Leaves' designated a fictional class: they knew. however,
what it would be like for the opposite to be the case. The 
emergence of the Brabri from the jungle provided the 
experience to counterpart this understanding. It amounted 
to the discovery. not of a 'new' tribe, but of the falsity 
of the supposition that that experience was not obtainable.
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APPENDIX VI Relating to Section III
The biggest snail on earth - Thoughts on the concept of a 
necessary being
In a paper entitled 'God as Necessary Being' published in 
The Journal of Philosophy (1) John Hick draws a distinction 
between logical and factual necessity, and in agreement
with J. N. Findlay he gives the opinion that "post-Humean
empiricism can assign no meaning to the idea of necessary 
existence, since nothing can be conceived to exist that 
cannot be conceived not to exist. No proposition of the 
form 'X exists' can be analytically true."
Anselm's example inevitably springs to mind in contention 
with this:— a being 'than which a greater cannot be 
thought'. I want to suggest now that a statement of the 
form "The biggest snail on earth exists" is necessariIv 
true, given that there are snails. Of course there might 
have been no snails, but then there might have been no 
beings; and conclusions as to the existence of a necessary
being are reliant on the prior assumption that there are 
beings. It is of course not being claimed that it is 
necessarily the case that there are snails, but that If. 
there are snails then 'The biggest snail on earth exists' 
is necessarily true. I then intend to ask whether, if this 
is so, it is a question (in the terms which Hick uses in
the article) of logical, or of factual necessity?
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If "The biggest, snail on earth exists" is true. it is at 
first tempting to say that there is something accidental 
about its truth. since there might well have been a bigger 
snail than this one. But this is of course not so. There 
cannot be a bigger snail. on earth, than the biggest snail 
on earth. Surely then we have here a case of logical 
necessity?
Hick might reply that the proposition ("The biggest snail 
on earth exists") is not analytic. but synthetic. in that 
the requirement of existence is not present in the phrase 
'the biggest snail on earth'. But is the analytic form 
then the only form which can be taken by 'logical 
necessity'? Hick assumes so. on the grounds that Kant 
"derives the category of necessity from the necessary or 
analytic proposition in formal logic" (2) Does this mean 
that it cannot also be derived in some other wav?
It seems likely in any case that we could argue that 
'existence' i.s contained in 'biggest on earth' . in that 
there must, by virtue of the meanings of the words. always 
be a referent for this term. That would certainly be one 
way of assimilating this apparent case of logical 
necessity.
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Now if (as Hick puts it in the article) "no matter of fact 
can be logically necessary", then is it not a matter of 
fact that the biggest snail on earth exists? I take it 
that something is 'necessary' if it could not have been 
otherwise; and this seems to be the case with the existence 
of the biggest snail; but is this, in this case, a factual 
or a logical matter?
On the face of it, it looks as if this could not be a 
factual necessity because we know the truth of the
proposition without being able to demonstrate it
empirically. Yet is it not just the sort of thing which we 
feel should be a matter of fact? With these doubts before 
us we must now review the question of whether this is 
really a case of necessity at all.
Certainly it is not just that the biggest snail on earth 
happens to exist; it couldn't not. 'Ah, but this one,
which is the biggest, might not have been the biggest. Its
qualifying for the title is contingent. Things might have
happened or not happened - its growth might have been
stunted, another's might have been enhanced - to change 
this.' But then some other snail would have been the
biggest on earth. The position could never have been
vacant. That is not a matter of contingent accident. That
is inevitable once we understand the structure of the
phrase 'biggest on earth'.
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What is it. then, about this phrase which gi 
power? Let us analyse it and find out.
biggest' involves. without further amplification. a 
specificness not shared by 'big' or 'bigger'. 'A bigger 
snail exists' would require the addition of more 
information. for instance in the form ' than Sammy'.
'A big snail exists' is only meaningful if again we have 
prior information. such as 'Sammy is a big snail' - but 
this would be too vague. What makes him big? 'Sammy is a 
bigger snail than Freddy' gives us a standard to judge by ; 
'and a bigger snail exists'. This would be true in all 
cases except one; the case of the biggest snail on earth - 
it would only be untrue in the one case that Sammy were 
that snai1.
But "The biggest snail on earth exists" is always true, and 
always specific to the extent that there is only one for. 
to take account of the dead-heat situation which we shall 
be dealing with again later, one group) answering to that 
description. As it happens we do not know. and in 
principle we could perhaps never know, which snail is that 
snail. That seems odd. since certainty is what we are 
after. But the statement of which we wish to test the 
truth is not "This (or N) is the biggest snail on earth", 
but simply "The biggest snail on earth exists".
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A little more investigation will reveal that it is the very 
quality of 'biggest' preventing us allocating it to any 
particular example which also renders it certainly 
applicable to some example.
What is this quality? In mathematical terms 'biggest' is a 
variable with only one possible value. This is not 
exceptional. when we consider that at any one time any
variable can only have one value; and in any case the value
of 'biggest' can also change over time '- as snails grow, 
and others stop growing. Implied is the additional 
specification 'at this time' or 'at time t '. We do not 
have the information available to us to be able to give the 
value of 'biggest at time t '. Perhaps this is a function 
of our choice of example. In the case of something under 
our (theoretical) control and fully observable, we should 
be able to say both "The biggest aeroplane in the world 
exists" and "This is the biggest aeroplane". But the point 
which makes 'biggest' (or any superlative) of interest is 
that we would be able to know the truth of the first 
statement without ever having to be able to make the
second. The ability to make the second then becomes
irrelevant. The truth of an existential statement with a 
superlative as its subject is guaranteed. How does this 
work?
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it works like this. There are snaiIs. This is a factual 
matter. and it is factual also that some snails are bigger 
than others. Neither of those two things need have been 
the case. Adding the bounds 'on earth' we may be sure,
again in a factual way. that the totality of snails, at any
one time. is a finite quantity.
We are on the borders of the logical here. since the
addition of 'on earth' brings with it this important 
element of finitude. To say 'on earth' is to rule out. a 
priori. an infinite quantity - particularly if one adds
'now'. The next two steps move us from the factual to the
logical.
If all snails are either bigger or smaller than each other
then we have a sequence in which B is bigger than A . C
bigger than B. and so on. Given finite conditions. this 
sequence must have an end. We eventually get to ' is 
bigger than ' and find - we have run out of snails! To 
put it more succinctly; in any finite series there must be 
a final term. This is not a discovery arising from our
excursion into helicology. It is a logical conclusion
arising from the meaning of the term 'finite series'. The
sentence was analytic after all. We have thus discovered
why the existence of referents of superlatives is logically 
guaranteed; it is because the assertion of that is 
implicitly analytic. It takes the general form; in a 
finite series there is a final term. The 'final' is
included in the meaning of 'finite'.
333
Findlay, quoted by Hick, says that the idea of necessary 
existence is ruled out, "since nothing can be conceived to 
exist that cannot also be conceived not to exist". (1)
What would it be like to conceive the biggest snail on 
earth not to exist? Shall we attempt this? First there is 
the possibility of a tie (referred to above) to be disposed 
of. Say that after all the snails in the world had been 
examined there were two larger than all others which the 
most exhaustive process of measurement revealed to be 
exactly the same size.
Now far from concluding that the biggest snail on earth 
therefore did not exist, we should (I suggest) rather say 
that there were two of them. Of course there cannot be two 
of such a singular thing as 'the biggest snail', but does 
not 'the two biggest snails' make sense?
There remains again the practical problem referred to 
earlier. Even after carrying out the world snail census 
and identifying the winner, we could not be sure that there 
was not somewhere, say hidden in a cave on the island of 
Ogygia, a snail greater even than this.
Yet there is no problem here. If that snail existed, it 
would certainly exist. We do not know much about it, but 
we do know that. We need only say, in the meantime: 'This
is the biggest snail on earth as far as we know (and it 
exists); and if a bigger one turns up, that would then be
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the Diggest snail on earth as far as we would know (and it
would exist).‘ There Is no way a bigger snail could be 
produced which did not exist.
However it might be objected that we cannot say with 
certainty of any item that this is the biggest snail on 
earth: we can only say that it is as far as we know' and
this perpetual qualification certainly means that the 
biggest-snai1-on-earth-without-qua1 ification is incapable 
of being arrived at - and so does not exist?
Yet although we cannot say confidently that this or that 
snail IS the one. we can still say that there must be one. 
and not in a Platonic heaven but, by definition, on earth. 
Do we mean that God knows which it is. whereas we remain 
ignorant? No. We mean that we know that there is such a 
thing. and that it may be this one: and if it is not this
one then it is some other one. It is a sort of probability 
theory.
So. the biggest snail on earth is a necessary being! 
Moreover it seems that its necessity must be logical. and 
that that of all other items in this category will be. and. 
by the same argument. all other cases of necessity. There 
seems to be no room for the concept of factual necessity.
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'H and the Scientific Outlook' bv T. R. M:
Some questions about existence ask for a verbal decision.
'.'2; These cases are 'not a matter for observational
investigation' Does Professor Miles perhaps then propose
three types of existence question:
1. where the answer may be decided without reference to
observation - the 'verbal decision' type.
2. where observation is relevant to the answer. ' ... in
so far as the result of such an investigation
influences our decisions.' (3)
3. where the answer may be decided by reference to
observation only.
It seems that 3 may be considered to be in the majority.
( ...'only a minority' are not matters for 'straightforward
investigation').
I want to ask. contrary to this, whether there are any such 
questions as 3 at all: are there any questions about
existence which are not at least partly requests for a
verbal decision (or something equivalent)?
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It is no coincidence. though a slightly separate point, 
that questions about existence are never asked in cases 
where observational investigation on its own might answer 
them. People ask whether Father Christmas exists rather in 
spite of the evidence. but not whether Harold Wilson 
exists. since to ask such a quesion one has to be in 
possession of the answer. And if someone asked 'Do trees 
exist?' it would be either an appeal for a decision about 
idealism, or a reference to botanical classification, never 
a matter to be decided by going outside.
The decision-making principle 'holds particularly in the 
case of scientific technical terms' (4). Yet oddly enough 
a general extension of this principle seems to be 
contradicted most efffectively in experimental science. 
Take for instance the search for the ultimate sub-atomic 
particle. Physicists conclude from the evidence of 
unexplained phenomena that there must be a further- 
unidentified particle. They then as it were go in search 
of it. They want to know 'does the minitron (shall we call 
it) exist?' And this is to be settled by experiment.
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oV3~em "ney are using cannot adequately describe events 
vitnour tne use of another term. All that is n ow reçuired 
IS that the minitron shall conform sufficiently well with 
t.'tner aspects of tneir concept-system. f If it did not thev 
'.'70u 1 u oe obliged to modify either the system o^ r their 
description of the particle until it did - a process that 
T. .t. Kuhn has referred to as ’ ad hoc modification' ) . This 
13 nardly a case where the existence of something is 
decided by observation.
Tan we think of such a case? One is tempted to rake the
eXampie O'r something previc.iusly unknown. But if it were 
■luite unknown its discovery could hardly be an answer to 
the question 'Does x exist?'. since no such question could 
have been asked. How about 'Does something exist which is 
at present unknown?' This is a very interesting question, 
but for the wrong reasons, since once again I claim that it 
IS not at all answerable by investigation or observation 
alone. If you now come across an x which fills the bill, 
one would want to know in what sense something which by 
definition could not be known could be said to exist. 
Certainly no empirical meaning could be given to its 
existence before discovery. There was no way its existence 
could have been known to affect anything observable.
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il, in retrospect. you want to say that we can detect its 
prior existence. are we not admitting that we did. ail the 
time, know of it. though without identifying it? Certainly 
it goes against the grain to say that it comes suddenly 
into existence when discovered. Yet one cannot ask. let 
alone answer, existence questions about it until then. And 
then, of course, one does not need to.
It is tempting to consider this at greater length but 
there is a further important point to discuss. As I see it 
the main burden of Professor Miles's argument comes on 
pp.40-43. which is that there is a useful distinction 
between first-order and second-order existence questions. 
'The abso1ute-existence mistake consists in treating 
(second-order questions) as though they were first-order 
questions, and as though they could be asked in vacuo 
independently of the context which gives them their 
meaning.' (5)
Does this imply (the 'and' leaves it in doubt) that first- 
order questions can be asked without respect to a context 
which gives them their meaning? P.39 ' ... the existence
of chairs. tables, bookcases can be determined empirically 
by simple observation ... ' But how can simple observation
tell you that the thing you find to exist is a chair?
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42 Profess.r Mlles s insiders whetfr
being a thing
ex 1 St 1 ng ? ) and says. wit h i' e g a r d t o e >: a rn pies v e ry r e 1 e v a n t 
to this argument. that 'vvhiat is required in each case is a 
ruling or dec 
court of law.
rursusd. this line or thought might indicate that the 
context wnicn gives them their meaning' is relevant to any 
existence question.
Perhaps one could sum up the 'absolute existence' and 
r irst-'iraer/second—order discussion on pp. 40-43 somewhat as 
follows: 1. Existence questions which misleadingly look
first-order may be better restated in second-order form (6) 
3- if the question which they represent is then asked, 
criteria for deciding whether a word is a tning-word become 
relevant. (7) 3. The answer tells us about the use of the
word. But a word is a thing-word if 'that for which it 
purports to stand' (8) is a thing. 4. And things are 
paramountly such as we would 'feel disposed to say' (9) 
exist.
If that is at all a fair summary, it leads to the 
conclusion that second—order questions are every bit as 
much about existence as are first-order ones - their route 
to that end being only slightly less direct.
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Possibly, however, the abso1ute-existence argument does not 
rest on this distinction, but on the difficulty of deciding 
on a method for approaching metaphysical questions. (10) 
So that the argument might alternatively run: 1.
Questions about the ultimate constituents of the universe 
are not empirical. (11). 2. Therefore there is no agreed
method for solving them. (12). 3. Therefore they are
meaningless. (13).
This is perhaps to simplify grossly; but if something like 
that IS being said, all we have to do to refute it is point 
to an agreed method (equivalent to the laws of 
mathematics/logic/language/law ... ) for solving such non-
empirical questions as do not fit these other categories.
The point recurs on p.144. To what frame of reference does
the God-statement belong? And by what methods are
arguments within that frame of reference conducted? The 
argument appears to demand an empirical sense (14). since 
'exists' cannot be used without a context - there is no 
absolute sense of 'exist'. But equally one might take this 
line of reasoning to indicate the need for another frame of 
reference? Something of the sort has been hinted at by the 
ideas of a 'request for a verbal decision', 'analogous to a 
decision in a court of law'?
I :■ answer the demand that 'it is up t him t :■ s av what
irame C'f reference it is and by what methods arguments 
witnin that frame of reference are conducted' (15). I would 
introduce the term 'conceptual'. To return firsc to the 
types of existence question with which we started. I would 
say that all existence quesions are conceptual in my sense; 
tnat some are empirical as well: and some are mathematical, 
moral, etc. as well.
This would seem to be a matter of administration. of 
ep13temo1og1ca1 organisation. Shall we try an analogy? 
Tne Borough Council is divided into departments, of health. 
Housing. parks and gardens. refuse-collect ion. etc. Each 
department has among its activities an element of 
administration: each has similar problems of
administration. as well as its special problems and duties 
of clinics. rates. flowerbeds, dustbins ... But there is 
also a Department of Administration. This concerns itself 
with the way in which the others are related - the co­
ordination and overall effectiveness of the whole, not just 
the parts - with the administration elements of each of 
them. and also. incidentally, with its own internal 
administration, its own efficiency.
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This. by the generality of its application. would seem to 
avoid the reduct ionism implied by talk of 'verbal 
decisions' (Does anyone seriously want to say that the 
existence of God is a matter for verbal 
decision?') Substitute 'conceptual' in the above sense in 
the sentence 'the existence of the unconscious is a matter 
for verbal decision in a way in which the existence of 
chairs is not'. and one may see how the hierarchy of 
existence statements is preserved. Both require conceptual 
decisions; the existence of chairs requires some physical 
effects as well. since chairs come under the Department of 
Physical Objects.- the existence of the unconscious is a 
matter for mainly conceptual decision, since such terms are 
dealt with principally by the Department of Concepts.
344
References
1. MILES. T. R. 'Religion and the Scientific Outlook 
Allen & Unwin, 1959. Referred to above. IV.4 
Reference 7.
2. Op.cit. p.38.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Op.cit. p.43.
6. Op.cit. p.41. central paragraph.
7. Op.cit. p.41. bottom.
3. Loc.cit.
9. Op.cit. bottom p.41 to top p.42.
10. Op.cit. p.41.
11. Op.cit. cf. bottom p.40.
12. Op.cit. first paragraph p.41.
13. Ibid.
14. Op.cit. bottom p.144.
15. Op.cit. p.144. middle.
16. Op.cit. p.152.
345-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
acknowledgement of the main works which 
have been used in writing this thesis
ACTON. H . B . 'The Illusion of the Epoch'. Cohen & West, 1955.
ARISTOTLE. 'Categories' . 'On Interpretation' . 'Prior
Analytics ' . Trs. H.. P. Cooke. H. Tredennick. Loeb. 1973.
AYER. A. J. 'The Problem of Knowledge'. Pelican. 1957.
AYER. A. J. 'Language. Truth and Logic'. Gollancz. 1962.
AYERS. M. R. 'Berkeley and the Meaning of Existence'. 
'History of European Ideas'. 7, 1986.
BERKELEY. G . ‘Principles of Human Knowledge'. Everyman.
BERLIN. I. 'Empirical propositions and hypothetical 
statements'. Mind. LIX. 235. July 1950. pp. 295-6.
BOYCE. M. See FOY. W. fed.) 'Man's Religious Quest'. Croom 
Helm. 1978. p.611.
BRADFORD. D . E . 'Bibliography on the Topic of Existence'.
Philosophical Research Archives, 1976. 2.
BROWN. S. 'Realism and Logical Analysis', 'Verification and 
Meaning'. 'Language and Reality'. in 'Thought and Reality: 
Central Themes in Wittgenstein's Philosophy'. Open University 
Press. 1976.
BRUNTON. J. A. 'Berkeley and the External World'. Philosoohv. 
XXVIII. 1953. pp. 325-341.
BRUNTON. J . A. 'The Absolute Existence of Unthinking Things'. 
Philosoohv. XLV. 174. October 1970.
CAMACHO. L. A. 'Sobre 1o que Existe y 1o que no Existe'. 
Revista de Filosofia de la Universidad de Costa Rica 19. 
January to December 1981. pp. 33-38.
CAPRA F. 'The Turning Point'. Wildwood House. 1982.
3-46-
Unwin 1959.
bnAx\b.. R. W. 'The Exi s t e n c e  of Universels' . New
Scholasticism. 35. Summer 1981. pp. 363-372.
C u R N F O R D . E. M. 'Plano's T h e o r y  of K n o w l e d g e ' . R o u t iedge 1977.
CKi .TENDEN . t'. ' Thi nki ng About Non- 3 e  i ng ' . I ncu irv . 1 6 .
URITTENDEN. C. 'Ontology and the T h e o r y  of Descriptions'. 
P h i l osophy and Phenomenological Research. 31. 1970. d d '. 35-96.
U h T i i . D. 'Taking Leave of God'. SCM Press. i OM'.j .
oUSMARIU, A. 'Nonexistence Without Nonexistents'.
Philosophical Studies. 33. May. 1973. pp. 409-412.
DEELY. N. ‘Reference to the Non-Existent'. Thomist. 39.
April 19^T. pp. 253-308.
DEVINE. E . 'The Perfect Island. the Devil. and existent 
Unicorns'. American Ph1 1osoohica1 Quarter 1y . 12. July 19T5.
pp. 255- 260 .
DiLMAN. I. 'Quine on Ontology. Necessity and Experience, i
Philosophical Critique'. Albany. 3UNY Press. 1984.
DCNELLAN. K. 3. 'Speaking of Nothing’ . Phi1 osophica 1 Review. 
83. January 1974. pp. 3-31.
DUhîMETT . M . ' Frege. Philosophy of Language ' . Due kwo r t h . 197 3 .
p. 386.
EDDINGTON. A. 'The Nature of the Physical 'World'. Cambridge 
University Press. 1929.
FEAGIN. L. 'On Fictional Entities'. Philosophy and 
Literature. 7. October 1983. pp. 240-3.
FERGUSON, J. 'Socrates. a source book'. Macmillan, 1970.
FOY. W. fed.) 'Man's Religious Quest'. Croom Helm. 1978. 
0.611.
FREUD. S. 'Introductory Lecture on Psycho-Analysis'. Trs. Joan 
Riviere. Allen & Unwin. 1922. pp.234-5.
Jr REUD. 3. 'The Origins of Psycho-Analysis' . London and New
York. 1954.
347-
FREUD. S. 'The Interpretation of Dreams'. Penguin Books. 
1978.
GEACH. P. T . . AYER. J. A. and QUINE. W . V.: 'Symposium: On
What There Is’. Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume 
25. 1951.
GRUBE. G . M. A. 'Plato’s Thought'. Methuen. 1935. pp. 15-16.
HALLET. H. F . 'On Things in Themselves'. Philosoohy. XIV. 54. 
April 1939.
HARE. R. M. 'The Language of Morals'. Oxford University 
Press. 1970. p.129.
HARMAN. G . 'Quine on Meaning and Existence'. Review of
Metaphysics. 21. 1: pp. 124-151. September 1967. 2: p p .
343-367. December 1967.
HAWKING. S. 'A Brief History of Time'. Bantam Press. 1988.
p. 99.
HERMANN. K. 'Reading Disability'. Copenghagen. Munksgaard.
1959: cited in HARZEM. P. & MILES, T. R.. 'Conceptual Issues
in Operant Psychology' John Wiley & Sons, 1978. p. 99.
HICK. J. 'God as Necessary Being'. The Journal of
Philosoohy. 1960.
HICK. J. (ed.). 'The Existence of God'. Macmillan. 1964.
HONORE. A. M. 'Reference to the Non-Existent' . Phi 1osoohy.
46. October 1971. pp. 302-308.
JADACKI, J. J. 'Being and Existence: On the Being of What
Seems Not To Be'. Dialectics and Humanism. 8. Fall 1981.
pp. 131-139.
JOAD, C. E. M. 'Plato's Theory of Forms and Modern Physics'. 
Philosophy. VIII. 30. April 1933.
KANT. I. 'The Critigue of Pure Reason'. Trs. Norman Kemp 
Smith, Macmillan. 1980.
KELLY, C . ' 'On Things That Do Not Exist And Never Have
Existed'. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association. 6. 1987. pp. 181-190.
KENNY. A. 'Wittgenstein’. Penguin. 1973.
KIRK. G . S. and RAVEN. J. E. 'The Presocratic Philosophers' . 
Cambridge University Press, 1975.
3-48
KOESTLER. A. 'The Ghost in the MachineT Picador, leo
KOFFKA. K. ’Principles of Gestalt Psychology'. Harcourt.
Brace and Co.. New York, 1935.
LAMBERT. K, 'On 'The Durability of Impossible Objects"'
Inqu 1 , 19. 1976. pp. 251-254.
LAMBERT. K. 'Impossible Objects’. Inquiry. 17. 1974, pp,
303-312.
LING T . 'A History of Religion East and West’. Macmillan.
1977.
LINSKY. L. 'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language . 
University of Chicago Press. 1952.
LINSKY. L. 'Names____ and Descriptions' . University of
Chicago Press. 1977. p. 26.
MALCOLM. N. 'Anselm's Ontological Arguments’. 'The
Philosophical Review’. January 1960. Reprinted in 'The 
Existence of God' ed. J. Hick. Macmillan. 1964 and 'Religion 
and Understanding' Blackwell. 1967.
McPHERSON, T. 'The Existence of God'. Mind. LIX. October 
1950. pp. 545-550.
McTAGGART. J. McT. E. 'The Nature of Existence'. Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
MILES. T. R. 'A Note on Existence'. Mind. LX. 1951. pp. 
399-402.
MILES. T. R. 'Berkeley and Ryle. Some Comparisons'. 
Philosophy. XXVIII. 104. 1953. pp .'58-71..
MILES. T. R. 'Religion and the Scientific Outlook'. Allen &
Unwin. 1959.
MILES. T. R. 'Eliminating the Unconscious'. Pergamon Press 
1966.
MILLER. B. 'Negative Existential Propositions’. Analysis, 
42. October 1982. pp. 181-188.
MILLER. B . "'Exists' and Existence". The Review of
Mathematics. 40. December 1986. pp. 237-270.
MOORE. G . E . ’Some Main Problems of Philosophy'. Allen &
Unwin. 1953.
349
MüURELATOS. A., P. D. 'Some Alternatives in Interpreting
Parmenides'. Monist. 62.
PITCHER. G. (ed) 'Wittgenstein: The Philosophical
Investigations'. Macmillan. 1970.
PLATO. 'Phaedo'. Trs. H. Tredennick. Penguin. 1954.
PLATO. 'The Republic'. Trs. H. D. P. Lee. Penguin. 1956.
POPPER. K. R. 'Conjectures and Refutations'. Routledge. 1972.
PRZELECKI. M. 'On What There Is Not' and 'There Is Nothing 
That Does Not Exist.' Dialectics and Humanism. 8. Fall 1981. 
pp. 123-129.
QUINE. W. V.  ^ From a Logical Point of View' . Harvard
University Press, 1953.
QUINE. W. V. 'Ontological Relativity and other Essays'. 
Columbia. New York. 1969.
REDMON. R. B. 'Exists'. Mind. 82. January 1973. pp.56-
57.
REDMON. R. B. 'Names and Existence'. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. 38. .June 1978. pp. 524-53.
REIN. A. 'Exist(s)'. Philosophical Quarterly:"3A ' October 
1988. : -
ROUTLEY, R. 'Some Things Do Not Exist'. Notre Dame School of 
Formal Logic. 1966. pp. 251-276.
ROUTLEY. R. 'Impossible Objects'. Inquiry. 19. 1976. pp.
251-3.
ROUTLEY, R. 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond'. 
Research School of Social Science. Australian National 
University, 1979.
ROUTLEY, R. 'On What There Is Not' . Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research. 43. December 1982. pp. 151-178.
RUSSELL, B. 'The History of Western Philosophy'. Allen & 
Unwin, 1946.
RUSSELL. B. 'Logic and Knowledge'. Allen & Unwin. 1956.
RUSSELL. B. 'My Philosophical Development'. Allen & Unwin, 
1959. p.168.
350-
HYLb, G. 'The Concept of Mind'. Peregrin Books. 1970.
RYLE. G. 'Pi 1emmas' . Cambridge University Press. 1973.
SEARLE. J. 'Speech Acts'. Cambridge University Press. 1969.
SENIOR. M. 'Noise and Sound in Llandudno'. New Scientist.
6th November, 1975. p.322.
STACK. G . J. 'Berkeley's Concept of Existence’. Modern
Schoolman, 52. March 1976.
STEVENSON. C. L. 'Ethics and Language'. Yale University
Press. 1944. p.21.
SUDARAJA, P. 'Language and Ontological Commitments'. Darshana
International. 6. October 1966. pp. 11-31.
TYRRELL. G . N . M . 'Physics and the Ontological Problem'. 
Philosophy. VII. 28. October. 1932.
VAN •INWAGEN. P. 'Creatures of Fiction'. American
Philosophical Quarterly. 14. October 1977. pp. 299-308.
VESEY. G . et al. 'Understanding Wittgenstein'. Macmi11 an.
1974.
VISION. G. 'Referring to What Does Not Exist'. Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy. 3. June 1974. pp. 619-634.
WENZ. P. S. 'The Books in Berkeley's Closet'. Hermathena. 
128. Summer 1980.
WHITE, F. D. 'Searle on Existence'. Philosophical Papers. 2. 
October 1973.
WINCH, P. 'The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy'. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. 'Tractatus'. Blackwell, 1947.
WITTGENSTEIN. L. 'Philosophical Investigations'. Blackwell,
1953. "
WITTGENSTEIN. L . 'Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics'.
Blackwell, 1956.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. ‘Zettell'. Blackwell. 1967.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. 'On Certainty'. Blackwell. 1974.
35t-
